iscover
The Canberra Class LHDs are the most visible and arguably influential symbols of Australia’s amphibious and power projection intentions and capabilities across the Indo-Pacific, but has the time come to part ways in order to pursue distinctly better options for both roles?
One of the key lessons for Australian military planners in the aftermath of the Australian-led intervention and peacekeeping operation in East Timor in 1999 was the glaring lack of strategic sealift capabilities that could support sustained expeditionary operations in our region.
At the time, Australia’s amphibious and sealift fleet was centred around the HMA ships Kanimbla, Manoora and Tobruk, then 28, 29 and 18 years old respectively, which reinforced the importance of flexible, mass amphibious and sealift capabilities, particularly following the need to urgently lease a sealift catamaran, the future HMAS Jervis Bay from Tasmanian-based Incat to provide supplementary sealift capabilities to Australian-led UN forces.
In response to these operational pressures, then Defence Minister Robert Hill, ahead of the 2000 Defence white paper, identified a need to increase the strategic sealift capabilities of the Royal Australian Navy under JP 2048, which would see the modernisation of landing craft for HMAS Kanimbla followed by the proposed acquisition of two large (in the range of at least 20,000 tonnes) sealift ships capable of supporting up to six helicopters and supporting forces ashore.
This gave birth to the Canberra Class landing helicopter docks (LHD) HMAS Canberra and Adelaide announced in January 2006 to be designed and built by Spanish naval shipbuilder Navantia, based upon the Spanish Navy’s Juan Carlos Class Strategic Projection Ships, with analysts at the time highlighting the government’s original intent was to provide Australia with the capability to have “new amphibious ships [that] should be able to direct a battle group, land massed troops and ‘several hundred vehicles’ at the same time”.
All the while, naval aviation aficionados (me included) have remained adamant that the true promise and capability of these vessels were being drastically under-utilised without having some level of organic, fixed-wing, naval aviation assets to provide fleet air defence, strike support for amphibious forces and regional power projection capacity to both Australian and allied operations.
Fast forward to their delivery and entry into service in the mid-to-late naughties, the Canberra Class has served as a permanent fixture for commuters and visitors alike travelling around Sydney Harbour on the many ferries that traverse the waterway, and periodically, as an angel of mercy during various humanitarian and disaster relief missions domestically and across the Indo-Pacific.
For the Australian Army and its burgeoning amphibious and littoral maneouvre focused forces, these vessels have become as familiar their vehicles and barracks, allowing them to train for their new areas of specialisation. Meanwhile for the Royal Australian Navy, they have become expensive boondoggles, both in terms of maintenance and sustainment costs and crewing requirements that require constant escort.
As the regional threat environment has evolved and continues to deteriorate, particularly with the rapid proliferation of advanced anti-ship weapons systems, area denial networks and low-cost, attritable uncrewed systems combined with the Australian government’s ambition to discard Plan Beersheba to reorientate the Australian Army into a “littorally” focused, maneouvrable, combined arms force capable of long-range fires, is it time to re-evaluate the LHDs in Australia’s service and better tailor our maritime forces?
Importantly, we also have to ask how we can maximise the nation’s amphibious and littoral capabilities, and critically, enhance the real world power projection capability increasingly required to ensure Australia’s national security interests in the era of great power competition and multipolarity.
The UK littoral response/strike group models
Established in the UK government’s Global Britain in a Competitive Age Integrated Review of 2021, the Royal Navy’s Littoral Response Group (LRG) represents a modern, agile force construct designed to project power and conduct operations in the world’s littoral zones, those areas close to shorelines where traditional naval and amphibious operations intersect.
Developed as part of the UK’s broader integrated review findings and Future Commando Force transformation, the LRG model shifts away from large-scale, high-footprint amphibious assaults, often centred around large-deck, amphibious warfare ships (think LHDs) in favour of smaller, highly mobile, tech-enabled forces optimised for rapid deployment, dispersed operations and persistent presence in strategically vital regions.
An LRG is centred around a tailored task group, typically composed of a Bay Class landing ship (RFA Mounts Bay Class), a supporting amphibious platform such as an Albion Class landing platform dock (LPD), and a detachment of Royal Marines from the proposed Future Commando Force. Critically, these forces are supported by a suite of enablers, including helicopters (like the Merlin or Wildcat), autonomous systems, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities and naval fire support.
Where relevant, these forces would then be supported by the Royal Navy’s carrier strike groups, led by the Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers and their supporting airwings and escorts, as well as follow on forces from the British Army and the Royal Air Force, all enhanced by critical joint enablers across the cyber and space domains designed to provide an aggregate and cohesive force package.
Crucially, the LRG is designed to operate semi-independently for extended periods, relying on distributed command and control, logistics flexibility and integrated joint capabilities.
Two core LRGs are envisioned in the Royal Navy structure: LRG(N), based in the North Atlantic and European theatre, and LRG(S) focused on the Indo-Pacific region. This dual-pronged approach provides persistent presence in key global chokepoints, enhances deterrence and allows the UK to respond rapidly to crises, conduct evacuations, support allies and engage in maritime security and grey zone operations.
Ultimately, the LRG model reflects a shift towards leaner, more adaptable amphibious capabilities suited to contemporary strategic challenges, balancing deterrence, engagement and warfighting readiness in an increasingly contested maritime environment, drawing upon heavier follow on force to enhance power projection and strategic deterrence capabilities across the globe.
Now in Australia’s context, our amphibious, littoral and deterrence-focused power projection priorities don’t require global reach but they do require a concentration of capability, mass and adaptability from the east coast of Africa through to American Samoa and up to the southern edge of Japan, quite a diverse operating area, with a myriad of tactical and strategic factors to account for.
While the future conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine fleet will provide an important arm of the nation’s strategic deterrence capabilities, adaptable, modular and future-proofed force structures and individual platforms can provide Australian policymakers with a viable, joint-force package capable of delivering the capabilities required.
There is just one catch, we don’t require the LHDs, rather we require a dramatically different platform and force structure model and one that will almost certainly rock the boat.
Australia’s Littoral Lift (Strike) Groups
The Australian government has made it abundantly clear that it envisages a dispersed, lean and flexible amphibious/littoral force that delivers “bang for buck” for the Australian taxpayer and provides the Australian warfighter with the confidence that they can deliver their mission requirements with maximum efficacy and survivability.
At the core of this is the LAND 8710 program which will deliver a modern, networked fleet of amphibious and littorally focused watercraft designed to deliver 18 Landing Craft-Medium, and eight Landing Craft-Heavy to form the core of the nation’s future Littoral Lift Groups (LLGs), which in some ways are analogous to the Royal Navy’s Littoral Response/Strike Groups, sans the heavier lift LPD ships (in our case, HMAS Choules).
With the Royal Navy and the Royal Fleet Auxiliary in particular looking to replace their ageing Albion Class LPDs as part of the Multi-Role Support Ship program, the Royal Australian Navy has a potential partner for delivering en masse a flexible, adaptable and future-proofed “heavy” littoral strike and survivable strategic sealift capability in a single package to enhance the capacity and capability to be delivered by the proposed LLGs.
Enter the Prevail Partners’ Multi-Role Vessel (MRV) first highlighted by Navy Lookout in which the commercial off-the-shelf solution is based on the FSG 4100 roll-on, roll-off sealift ship: “7,500-tonne DWT vessel uses an efficient hull form that has good seakeeping qualities. Simple twin diesels will propel the ship up to 20 knots with an endurance of 28 days and 10,000 nm. There are about 2,428 lane-metres available for vehicles and the vessel can accommodate an embarked military force of up to 400, although the ship’s core crew requirement would be just 35”.
Further to this, Navy Lookout stated, “The MRV can carry the equivalent of 90 C-17 Globemaster aircraft loads of stores and, for example, could get from Plymouth to the Caribbean in under seven days while transporting its own helicopters, boats and headquarters to enable a substantial operation on arrival. Sockets are provided and power supplies are available for standard TEU containers and refrigerated containers for food storage.
“The vehicle deck could transport the equivalent of 65 European lorries, 55 military vehicles containing a mix of main battle tanks, armoured fighting vehicles, trucks and artillery. Another 1,200 lane-metres would be available by using the flight deck and top deck. The stern ramp designed to work with Mexiflotes and facilities the rapid loading and unloading of wheeled and tracked vehicles up to sea state 2.”
The beauty of the proposed platform is the modularity of the COTS solution, allowing for the ships to be rapidly reconfigured for humanitarian and disaster relief roles as well as formidable direct action vessels designed to support sustained, ship-to-shore combined arms amphibious and littoral manoeuvre operations as part of a combined task force incorporating LC-M and LC-H, escorted by our future general purpose frigates while being equipped with impressive self-defence capabilities.
Referring back to the Royal Navy’s Littoral Response/Strike Group model, such a “heavy” sealift platform, could be fielded in a cost-effective manner, with Navy acquiring three such ships, to be permanently partnered with two (three if we bumped the order up to nine) Landing Craft-Heavy and six Landing Craft-Medium each to provide the nation with a formidable, amphibious and littoral warfare capability and full regional coverage from Queensland, the Northern Territory and Western Australia.
However, this is just part of the equation, an important part, but still only a small part, bringing us to the traditional power projection solutions that would ultimately see the early retirement and replacement of the Canberra Class LHDs in favour of much more efficient, cost-effective and potent power projection platforms designed to secure our strategic maritime interests at range, sustainably across the Indo-Pacific.
The power projection question and a solution?
Enter South Korean naval and commercial shipbuilding powerhouse Hanwha Ocean and its recently unveiled Ghost Commander II manned-unmanned teaming concept ship officially revealed at the 2025 International Maritime Defense Industry Exhibition held at Busan in Korea. South Korea has made no secret of its own ambitions and desires to acquire and field a credible naval aviation capability as part of Republic of Korea Navy’s (ROK-N) transition towards becoming a true “blue water” naval force.
The vessel proposed by Hanwha comes in at 240 metres (10 metres longer than the Canberra Class) and with a displacement of approximately 42,000 tonnes (a significant increase over the 27,500-tonne Canberra Class) and would incorporate two electromagnetic catapults, three arresting wires, with six helicopter landing spots, two elevators, self-defence vertical launch systems, a contained, dedicated hangar deck, supporting a vehicle deck and well deck for the deployment of uncrewed surface vessels, autonomous underwater vehicles, amphibious assault vessels and other landing craft.
Hanwha envisages that the proposed vessel would be broadly analogous to the People’s Liberation Army-Navy’s own Type 076 amphibious assault ships and a solution for South Korea’s long-running CVX light aircraft carrier program, providing the ROK-N with a survivable, future-proofed platform designed to secure the long-range maritime interests of the north Asian nation, while being flexible enough to respond to a range of contingencies.
Indeed, speaking to NavalNews at MADEX ’25, retired ROK-N Vice Admiral, Steve S.K. Jeong, Hanwha Ocean’s senior executive vice president/head of naval ship global business, said, “Right now, the ROK Navy is actually developing the concept. It’s a very early concept. Some people don’t agree with the concept of manned and unmanned systems, because how many UAVs can operate on board?
“The concept is not defined yet. There’s still a lot of discussion.” He added that such vessels “are the way of the future, but not of the near future ... Concepts of operation need to be defined first, and then we can design what type of aircraft we’d like to operate, how many to support air operations, what type of ship we need to build.”
And herein lies the solution to our power projection challenges, a platform being developed by a valuable regional partner, backed by a reliable and credible industry partner for Australia to get involved with from the ground floor, to help shape the requirements and critically procure to provide the Royal Australian Navy with much-needed solutions to challenges it has grappled with since the retirement of HMAS Melbourne in the late 1980s.
Importantly, whether the government recognises and/or accepts it or not, Australia is going to require a far more pointed, focused and bespoke naval force structure that delivers scalable, adaptable and offensively focused platforms, structures and doctrine to contend with increasing great power competition and strategic risks to our national interests in the Indo-Pacific.
The beauty? We already have plans for a formidable(ish) escort fleet in our “Tier One” surface combatants, namely the upgraded Hobart Class destroyers and (hopefully) upgunned Hunter Class frigates (should be classified as destroyers) and their replacements, not to mention the aforementioned conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines, all we’d need to do then is finalise air wings.
When paired with the new Mogami fleet and the LLGs as outlined above, that provides Australia with a robust, comprehensive naval force capable of delivering credible amphibious, littoral and power projection capabilities at scale anywhere in the Indo-Pacific.
Not bad “bang for your buck” if we play things smart, so maybe it is time for us to, as Italian opera singer Andrea Bocelli so beautifully sang, “time to say goodbye” to our LHDs.
Final thoughts
Despite the ambitious rhetoric from both sides of politics, the reality for the average Australian is far from promising. While Australia is blessed with abundant natural resources and immense potential, there is little indication that we are fully harnessing our unique national strengths.
Declining economic opportunities, a rapidly deteriorating global and regional balance of power, and the increasing politicisation of everyday life have deepened a sense of disconnection, apathy and helplessness among many Australians.
Meanwhile, modern Australia has been largely insulated from the harsh realities of conflict, with generations having never experienced food, energy, or medical rationing – let alone understanding the economic and social upheaval such restrictions would bring to our world-leading standard of living.
To safeguard its future, Australia must build the capacity to act as an independent power, developing strategic economic, diplomatic and military capabilities more in line with great power expectations. This shift would not only reinforce Australia’s sovereignty but also position it as a key player in ensuring regional security and prosperity.
Moving beyond the prevailing mindset of “it’s all too difficult” would open unprecedented economic, diplomatic and strategic opportunities for the nation.
As tensions in the Indo-Pacific intensify and China continues to assert its economic, political and military influence, Australia faces a defining choice: remain a secondary power or embrace a larger, more independent role in an era of great power competition. Expanding opportunities for Australians while strengthening economic resilience, and, by extension, reducing vulnerability to economic coercion must be at the core of government policy.
Only with a strong and dynamic economy can Australia effectively deter threats to its national interests and ensure long-term security and prosperity.
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
