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Making sure the AUKUS pact remains viable and eventually successful is a major “strategic imperative,” one that is still possible, one US think tank contends.
Defence Minister Richard Marles recently met with his American counterpart, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, and – unsurprisingly – AUKUS was one of the topics of the conversation.
And it should be – US shipbuilding and maintenance delays, a Department of Defence review, and workforce challenges are all spectres hanging over the alliance, but despite everything, from Minister Marles’ point of view, everything appears to be … Fine?
“Australia’s defence relationship with the United States continues to grow and deepen,” Minister Marles said of the meeting.
“We are seeing this across the breadth of our cooperation, be it through our work together on AUKUS, US force posture initiatives, our recent bilateral defence exercise Talisman Sabre or the growing ties between our two defence industries.”
But the fact is, AUKUS is facing a raft of troubles. However, according to one US think tank, the alliance and the technologies and strategic wins it could deliver still mark an opportunity too great to lose, particularly in terms of that country’s ability to project power into the region.
“... AUKUS might be the most strategic play yet by the United States to regain advantages in the Indo-Pacific and to inject stability into a region that has been severely disrupted by Beijing’s continued and increasing set of provocations.”
This is the stance of an analysis published by the bipartisan Center for Strategic and International Studies, titled The AUKUS inflection: Seizing the opportunity to deliver deterrence, authored by Abraham M Denmark and Charles Edel.
As the title suggests, however, the time to act on the program’s shortfalls is now.
Why it matters
When the US DOD announced its review of AUKUS, it caused jitters among Australian proponents of the plan and was a cause of some glee from those against it, but Denmark and Edel made a fine point when they observed that all three countries have gone through election cycles that have seen the party of government change since it was first announced in 2021.
The world is also a markedly different place politically, militarily and economically; it’s no wonder then that the US should undertake a sensible review of what’s been done since then.
It’s not even the first party of the alliance to do so – both the UK and Australian governments have implemented their own reviews of AUKUS, and they are right to do so. AUKUS is having teething troubles and without examination, those troubles will persist while the stakes that make the alliance so important continue to rise.
China continues to flex its muscles in the region and reunification with Taiwan remains one of President Xi Jinping’s most ambitious goals, with a military solution the most likely outcome.
“Deterring China from using its newfound military might to forcibly alter the region’s structure requires convincing Beijing that the United States and its allies have both the will and the capability to resist such moves,” Denmark and Edel said.
“Successfully implemented, AUKUS would inject stability into the region and bolster allied integration. The defence industrial bases of all three nations would see a revitalisation involving thousands of new jobs and renewed economic investment in local economies. Likewise, its members would develop a technological edge in innovation and warfighting that could be critical in a future conflict. AUKUS is a strategic promise as much as an economic one.”
The problems
While all three AUKUS partners are dealing with issues regarding adequate workforce numbers and industry investment, arguably the biggest roadblock is the parlous state of the very shipbuilding facilities meant to be delivering the first tranche of Virginia Class boats.
Before AUKUS was ever dreamed of, US shipyards were falling dramatically behind on the building schedule procured by Congress of two submarines per year. In reality, the US is only just building one a year. At the same time, maintaining the fleet the USN does have is proving to be a challenge; out of 48 hulls, only 32 are operationally ready. That number, by now, should be 66 Virginia Class hulls in operation.
How the US can hope to supply between three and five attack submarines to Australia by the 2030s remains an open question.
Another issue is that no new trilateral capability has yet emerged from AUKUS Pillar II. Too many countries spoil the broth, it appears, and so the ability of three allies to deter their enemies has not been substantially improved by the alliance. And all the while, the clock is ticking.
“The need for the United States and its allies to deter China from invading Taiwan and prevent further Russian aggression along NATO’s flanks is a clear and present danger. And timeliness concerns are not limited to submarines: The promise of Pillar II has always been that collaboration could produce cutting-edge capabilities quickly and deliver deterrent effects that need not wait for a significantly expanded submarine fleet,” Denmark and Edel said.
“And yet, until and unless the timeline is significantly condensed, the goal of enhancing deterrence, and doing so quickly, will remain rhetorical rather than tangible.”
The narrow path forward
Denmark and Edel made the fine distinction that US shipbuilding issues are not AUKUS problems, per se, but rather problems that date back decades.
“In other words, these are American problems that will require American solutions.”
And, the pair contend, the solutions may be in sight. While many believe US President Donald Trump’s “One Big Beautiful Bill” to be a monstrous mistake, it does at least channel needed resources exactly where AUKUS is weakest – into shipbuilding capacity. The bill provided US$29 billion to shipbuilding capacity and US$4.6 billion towards getting a new Virginia Class hull into the water by 2026.
In addition, the US Navy is planning to build a new West Coast drydock, which will go some way towards addressing the maintenance backlog. Neither of these is anything like a solution to the problem, but with continuing investment and effort, that solution could be found.
HMAS Stirling, however, could be a non-American solution, at least to the maintenance problem. Starting, hopefully from 2027, the Western Australian naval facility will host a rotational deployment of first US then UK SSNs as part of what’s called Submarine Rotational Force - West. Under this plan, Minister for Defence Industry Pat Conroy said HMAS Stirling will be able to provide 1,800 days of maintenance over the five-year Submarine Rotational Force - West plan, which could address what one senior US Navy officer said was a 1,100-hour backlog of maintenance for the US submarine fleet.
But again, this is all dependent on AUKUS staying afloat.
“US Navy planners should consider HMAS Stirling as a fourth Indo-Pacific shipyard (in addition to San Diego, Pearl Harbor and Guam) that adds maintenance capacity,” Denmark and Edel said.
“That construction could be significantly accelerated, but US planners need to note that HMAS Stirling is unlikely to materialise as a maintenance hub for American SSNs unless and until Canberra receives a clear signal from Washington that it plans on selling submarines to them.”
Workforce challenges are also addressable by a range of measures, not the least of which is creating a streamlined visa process – an AUKUS visa, effectively – which allows for the movement of researchers, academics, and industry professionals.
Another concern is sovereignty, and while that is harder to address, it’s not impossible. Many Australians quite rightly have concerns that AUKUS cedes our sovereignty to the United States; that we are expected to, in effect, hand over any Virginia Class boats whenever the US requires them. By the same token, some US observers worry those same hulls may not be available when needed.
But this, too, has a solution.
“Planning, in which military strategists from the United States and Australia would jointly undergo a comprehensive process of strategising and organising military operations to achieve specific objectives, would provide US officials with more concrete reassurances that submarines sold to Australia would not disappear if and when needed,” Denmark and Edel said.
“It could also preserve Australian sovereignty in developing the plan and, if necessary, in determining implementation during a crisis.”
Denmark and Edel also suggested trimming down AUKUS Pillar II to focus on three key development areas: autonomy, long-range strike and integrated air defence, and then produce “tangible marquee capabilities” that prove the program works and while providing immediate benefits to warfighters. These are essential regional capabilities whose further development would greatly aid in deterrence both in the Pacific and further abroad.
Additionally, Australia and the US should appoint “special representatives” to drive positive outcomes and produce regular written reports outlining progress to date.
A lot has already been done. AUKUS’ first stage is more or less complete, but the real, concrete work starts now. Work that needs to be done to see AUKUS mature and ultimately succeed.
“Now is the time for government, industry, academia, and others who are invested in its success to be bold,” Denmark and Edel said.
“The best way to do so is to ensure AUKUS is understood by all stakeholders as a net positive for the national security of all three nations, and not a zero-sum game. Everyone stands to benefit from AUKUS – it is an opportunity waiting to be seized.”
You can read the full paper here.
