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In a shock to many, naval powers are increasingly betting on bigger, more heavily armed surface combatants, from the proposed Trump Class battleships to China’s Type 055 cruiser and South Korea’s proven Sejong the Great. But is this a sign of vanity or something deeper?
For the past four decades, Western naval doctrine emphasised distribution: smaller platforms networked together, supported by air power, operating in coordinated formations.
The cruiser, destroyers, frigates and corvette became ascendant. Concentration of firepower seemed a relic of battleship-era thinking, decisively refuted on the morning of 7 December 1941 and further reinforced throughout the war in the Pacific.
Yet something remarkable is unfolding in defence establishments from Washington to Beijing to Seoul: a quiet reversal. Major maritime powers are building, proposing or seriously studying larger surface combatants than they have in decades.
The question haunting defence strategists is no longer whether size and firepower have value, clearly they do, but whether vessels carrying such concentrated capability can survive in an age of saturated drone attacks, anti-ship ballistic missiles and area-denial strategies.
For Australia, contemplating its own naval future as Chinese military capabilities mature and regional tensions simmer, the answer may prove strategically decisive, particularly as the nation’s submarine force evolves under the AUKUS program.
But as drone saturation attacks and anti-ship ballistic missiles reshape modern warfare, Australia’s Hunter Class frigates and future naval strategy face an existential reckoning: will large surface platforms survive peer conflict, or is the future distributed, resilient and smaller?
The American battleship returns
American defence journals and think tanks periodically resurrect the idea of a large battleship concept. The concept exists primarily as intellectual exercise rather than funded program.
Proponents have often envisioned 30,000 to 40,000-tonne vessels bristling with cruise missiles, railguns and advanced air defence systems, platforms capable of striking inland targets with sustained firepower and absorbing substantial damage. On paper, the appeal is obvious: maximum striking power, extended operational range and sufficient redundancy to survive localised hits.
The reality however is, many would argue, far less appetising, particularly in the era of swarming autonomous systems, low-cost smart munitions and submarines.
This is particularly the case when one accounts for the fact that such a vessel would cost US$15 billion ($21.2 billion) or more per hull. Build timelines would stretch to a decade or beyond. Most critically, it would concentrate extraordinary capability and, correspondingly, extraordinary vulnerability within a single platform.
It seemed that until recently, the United States Navy showed no serious appetite for this trajectory, and for seemingly defensible reasons. The concept represents industrial nostalgia dressed in contemporary camouflage, rather than clear-eyed strategic thinking.
Announced by President Donald Trump in December 2025 as a centrepiece of the Golden Fleet initiative, the proposed Trump Class battleship, formally designated BBG(X) and initially represented by the future USS Defiant (BBG-1), marks the US Navy’s return to the battleship concept for the first time since the Second World War.
Rather than reviving traditional gun-armed battleships, however, its primary weapons would be a large magazine of guided and hypersonic missiles. The Navy has specifically identified Conventional Prompt Strike hypersonic weapons and the Surface Launch Cruise Missile-Nuclear, alongside a substantial air and missile-defence capability
The battleship is envisioned as both a powerful combatant and a fleet command-and-control node, capable of leading surface action groups, contributing to carrier strike groups, conducting anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare, and coordinating manned and unmanned forces. Its substantial electrical generation and magazine capacity are also intended to support future technologies, including high-power directed-energy weapons, with the Navy identifying two lasers of potentially 300–600kW each.
Construction of the first ship is targeted for the early 2030s, although the final design, numbers and capabilities remain subject to development and congressional approval; but the US isn’t exactly alone in pursuing ever-larger surface combatants.
Beijing’s cruisers
Unlike the Trump Class of battleship, China’s Type 055 guided-missile cruiser is not a concept. Multiple examples have been built and are in service. Displacing approximately 13,000 tonnes at full load, the Type 055 carries 112 vertical launch system (VLS) cells arranged in seven groups, each capable of firing different missile types simultaneously.
The vessel’s primary anti-ship armament comprises the Yingji-18 (C-602) cruise missile, with ranges approaching 280 kilometres; air defence systems include the HHQ-9B long-range surface-to-air missile and close-in weapon systems.
The Type 055 incorporates a modern Type 346 phased array radar suite – a sophisticated active electronically scanned array system comparable to American Aegis installations, providing target acquisition at ranges exceeding 450 kilometres. Propulsion is gas turbine and diesel-electric hybrid, providing sustained speeds of 30+ knots, hosting a crew complement is approximately 340.
The People’s Liberation Army Navy currently operates 10 of these vessels, with four more being built against a total planned production run (as of August 2026) of 16.
Photographs of the class transiting the South China Sea and Indian Ocean regularly appear in defence publications, including Defence Connect. This is the most serious contemporary expression of the large-combatant philosophy: China is committed to it, willing to build multiple examples, and operating them within reasonable strategic constraints.
Yet it is instructive to note where the Type 055 operates and where it does not. Chinese deployments have remained concentrated in regional waters and relatively benign strategic environments.
However, it is important to understand and accept, to date, no Type 055 has yet sailed into a theatre where modern peer anti-ship threats would be decisive where American submarines prowl, where rival air forces control the skies, or where swarms of anti-ship missiles are credible.
Nevertheless, the ship represents genuine capability, proven design and serious investment. It also remains fundamentally untested against peer opposition.
South Korea’s foray into the large surface combatant competition
If the Type 055 is untested against peers, South Korea’s Sejong the Great Class (KDX-III Batch I) represents the Republic of Korea Navy’s transformation into a sophisticated blue-water force, combining exceptional air-defence capability with long-range strike and command-and-control functions.
The first three ships, ROKS Sejong the Great, ROKS Yulgok Yi I and ROKS Seoae Ryu Seong-ryong, entered service between 2008 and 2012, becoming the ROK Navy’s first Aegis-equipped destroyers and among the most heavily armed surface combatants of their generation.
The critical contextual factor is this: South Korea operates these ships in an environment where South Korean air force dominance is near-absolute, where American air support and naval presence are guaranteed, and where opposing surface forces remain technologically inferior.
At approximately 166 metres and 7,600 tonnes full load, Batch I is exceptionally heavily armed for its size, carrying 128 vertical launch cells alongside eight anti-ship missile launchers, a 127mm naval gun, close-in weapon systems, torpedoes and facilities for a naval helicopter.
The class also incorporates the venerable AN/SPY-1D(V) radar and Aegis combat system provides long-range air-defence and battle-management capabilities, while Korean weapons provide additional anti-ship, anti-submarine and land attack options.
The subsequent Batch II, represented by the Jeongjo the Great Class, significantly expands the design’s capabilities. Displacing roughly 8,200 tonnes or approximately 10,000 tons at full load, the ships incorporate an improved Aegis Baseline 9 combat system, AN/SPY-1D(V) radar and a substantially enhanced ballistic-missile defence architecture.
Their 88-cell VLS battery combines Mk 41 and Korean K-VLS launchers capable of employing SM-6, SM-3 and Korean-developed missiles, while an additional Korean VLS installation is intended for future long-range weapons.
Batch II also introduces a redesigned integrated mast, improved electronic warfare and survivability systems, and enhanced anti-submarine capabilities. The result is effectively a new-generation Aegis destroyer: less heavily armed in raw VLS numbers than Batch I, but considerably more capable against sophisticated ballistic, cruise and hypersonic threats.
Together, the two batches provide South Korea with a powerful family of multi-role surface combatants capable of fleet air defence, missile defence, precision strike and maritime command and control.
German pragmatism v Japanese incrementalism
Shaking off the shackles of the post-Second World War order, Germany’s proposed F-127 (Frigate 127) program represents perhaps the most measured approach to the trend towards larger surface vessels.
Envisioned at approximately 12,000 tonnes displacement, the design philosophy reflects pragmatism rather than industrial ambition, along with a growing need to reinforce NATO’s maritime capability shortfalls and provide a credible, collective defence against any increase in Russian maritime aggression or missile capabilities.
As a result, the F127 has evolved into a ship closer to a destroyer than a conventional frigate. Based on TKMS’ MEKO A-400 AMD concept, it is expected to displace around 12,000 tonnes, measure approximately 178 metres, and incorporate a highly automated design with a comparatively small crew.
Its core combat system combines an Aegis-derived architecture with the AN/SPY-6(V)1 active electronically scanned array radar, providing 360-degree surveillance and advanced engagement capabilities. With a principal weapon battery of 96 Mk 41 vertical launch cells, providing substantial magazine depth for area air defence and ballistic-missile defence. The ships are expected to employ SM-2 and SM-6 missiles, with the architecture designed to accommodate future interceptors and other weapons.
The ships of which Germany expects to build at least six, also incorporate the Naval Strike Missile and its follow-on, supersonic successor, the 3SM Tyrfing anti-ship missile, while a 127mm Mark 45 Mod 4 gun provides naval gunfire and precision strike capability. Beyond these roles, the F127 is intended to function as a fleet command-and-control node, integrating with NATO’s wider air-defence network while retaining surface and subsurface warfare capabilities.
Planned from the outset to counter aircraft, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and emerging hypersonic threats, it will effectively provide Germany with a large, multi-mission Aegis destroyer under a frigate designation.
Japan’s approach differs markedly from both Germany’s modular pragmatism and China’s heavy-cruiser commitment. The Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force has methodically enlarged successive destroyer classes over two decades.
The Atago Class guided-missile destroyers displace 9,500 tonnes and carry 96 VLS cells, with integrated Aegis combat systems derived from American technology under licence.
Bringing us to the JMSDF’s latest efforts to enhance not only the surface combatant capability of the JMSDF but also enhance the missile defence capabilities for the island nation, particularly as both China and North Korea continue to expand and advance their own maritime and missile capabilities.
Japan’s Aegis System Equipped Vessel (ASEV) represents a major evolution of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force’s approach to ballistic-missile defence and fleet air defence. The program emerged in 2020 after Tokyo abandoned the planned land-based Aegis Ashore system, instead opting for two large, highly capable Aegis-equipped vessels that could provide persistent missile-defence coverage while retaining the flexibility of maritime deployment.
At roughly 190 metres long and around 12,000–17,000 tonnes, the ASEV is substantially larger than Japan’s existing Aegis destroyers. Its defining feature is an enormous 128-cell Mk 41 vertical launch system, split evenly between forward and aft installations. The ships are intended to employ SM-3 Block IIA ballistic-missile interceptors and SM-6 missiles against aircraft, cruise missiles and manoeuvring ballistic or hypersonic threats.
In addition to this, Japan is also pursuing integration of the Glide Phase Interceptor and Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile as a means of broadening its defensive and offensive maritime capabilities. The JMSDF’s implicit philosophy is that technological edge and networked force structure provide greater strategic value than size alone.
The survivability trap: When size becomes a liability
The strategic calculus justifying large surface combatants fractures when confronted with contemporary threat environments. China’s DF-21D and DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missiles carry 500-kilogram warheads and can strike naval targets at ranges of 1,500+ kilometres with terminal guidance accuracy sufficient for ship-sized targets, fundamentally altering the geometry of surface combat.
Russia’s Oniks anti-ship cruise missiles achieve supersonic speeds (Mach 2.6) at 300-kilometre ranges; the BrahMos variant, deployed by India and Russia, combines ramjet propulsion with terrain-following flight profiles to evade defensive systems. Even conventionally armed cruise missiles fired from aircraft, submarines or surface platforms pose existential danger to large, concentrated targets.
Modern American Tomahawk cruise missiles strike at ranges exceeding 1,600 kilometres; comparable systems proliferate across multiple navies.
More troubling still is the emerging threat of saturation drone attacks. Affordable unmanned systems, including quadcopters, loitering munitions, distributed drone swarms can be deployed in overwhelming numbers at minimal cost.
A modern frigate carries perhaps a dozen defensive missiles and limited point defence ammunition; engagement models involving 50, a hundred or more coordinated drone attacks present asymmetric disadvantages weighted decisively against the defender. Large surface combatants, precisely because they concentrate high-value capability and represent enormous capital investment, become priority targets in such scenarios.
A single hit from a cruise missile or a coordinated drone swarm penetrating layered air defences could cripple or destroy vessels representing $5-10 billion in military capital.
This represents a fundamental strategic reversal. Historically, larger platforms could absorb damage and continue operations; the Arleigh Burke Class destroyer can sustain multiple missile hits and remain combat-capable. Contemporary threats, particularly saturation drone attacks and precision anti-ship weapons, privilege successful hits over survivability. The larger the platform, the higher the political and strategic cost of its loss.
Australia’s dilemma
Australia’s planned Hunter Class frigates already represent a modest commitment to the larger-combatant trend.
Displacing approximately 9,000 tonnes at full load, each Hunter Class vessel carries 32 Mk 41 VLS cells, Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile air defence systems, and integrated combat management architecture derived from Spanish design with Australian customisation. Propulsion combines gas turbine and diesel engines producing sustained speeds of 26 knots.
The Hunter Class occupies middle ground: substantially larger than previous Australian frigates (the Adelaide Class displaced 3,600 tonnes) yet far from the likes of contemporary regional or global contemporaries. As these ships enter service through the 2030s, Australia must confront a question that will shape naval strategy for the next four decades: in a peer conflict or high-intensity regional war, can surface combatants survive? And if so, under what conditions?
If the answer is a qualified yes – survival is possible only within networked force structures supported by allied air superiority and integrated air defence – then the Hunter Class approach may prove adequate, provided the vessels are built to operate in contested environments with robust point defences, decoy systems, electronic warfare suites and distributed networking capabilities.
Contemporary point defence systems, like the RAM or evolved SeaRAM or Goalkeeper CIWS can engage multiple targets simultaneously, but saturation attacks of 50+ simultaneous threats remain problematic for any single platform.
If the answer is no – if large surface platforms (at least as we currently have them designed and expected to be delivered) cannot survive peer conflict – then Australia should fundamentally reassess force structure priorities.
It has long been argued, particularly given Australia’s unique geographic requirements, that nuclear-powered attack submarines, which remain among the most survivable naval platforms – undersea drone networks for persistent surveillance and strike; distributed undersea mine systems for area denial; layered air defences including maritime patrol aircraft; and offensive cyber capability – would warrant proportionally greater investment than expensive surface platforms whose survivability in peer conflict remains uncertain.
Conversely, there is a fair argument to be made that Australia should seek to avoid emulating the Type 055 or pursue progressively heavier frigate or destroyer designs. These arguments stem largely as a result of Australia lacking China’s shipbuilding capacity (currently producing naval vessels at 5+ annually) to field multiple heavy surface combatants.
It cannot guarantee the allied air support that makes South Korean and Japanese large platforms operationally viable. It cannot afford the strategic fragility of concentrating limited defence resources into a handful of billion-dollar platforms vulnerable to saturation attacks.
Instead, many argue that a heterogeneous force structure, a smaller number of capable surface ships, a larger fleet of autonomous or semi-autonomous undersea vehicles, integrated layered air defence, substantial submarine capability (including the planned Virginia and follow-on SSN-AUKUS), and offensive mine warfare systems, distributes strategic risk and maintains genuine resilience.
Nevertheless, Australia’s major surface combatants are going to increasingly need to rely on their own organic firepower, resilience and capability, not merely operating under the assumptions that we will always be shielded by a larger, benevolent power.
Fundamentally, we are going to have to take a far more considered, wholistic approach, adapting, evolving and integrating true military power across the spectrum to ensure that Australian naval assets can be deployed effectively and efficiently, with a high probability of returning home.
This is going to require significant new investment and smarter investment that balances traditional platforms and capabilities with novel, numerous and cost-effective technologies that delivers Australia a sustainable, decisive, sovereign tactical and strategic overmatch.
Final thoughts
The return of the large surface combatant is not, ultimately, about nostalgia for the battleship. It is about the increasingly unforgiving arithmetic of modern naval warfare.
From China’s Type 055 and South Korea’s Sejong the Great to Japan’s ASEV, Germany’s F127 and America’s proposed Trump Class, major naval powers are reaching a similar conclusion: modern fleets require enormous magazines, increasingly powerful sensors, greater electrical generation and sufficient command-and-control capacity to coordinate increasingly complex battlespaces. Achieving those capabilities inevitably requires larger hulls.
But size alone does not confer survivability.
A 10,000-tonne destroyer is no less vulnerable to a sufficiently capable missile or drone swarm simply because it is larger. Indeed, concentrating billions of dollars of capability, personnel and national prestige aboard a handful of ships creates an uncomfortable strategic vulnerability.
For Australia, this presents a particularly difficult choice. The Royal Australian Navy cannot compete with China ship-for-ship nor can it assume the industrial depth or force density enjoyed by the United States, Japan or South Korea. Every major combatant therefore carries an unusually high proportion of Australia’s available naval combat power.
That does not mean Australia should abandon large surface combatants. Rather, it means they must be designed as components of a much broader, resilient system.
The Hunter Class and its successors will need substantial magazines, sophisticated electronic warfare, layered close-in defences, decoys, directed-energy weapons, autonomous systems and the ability to operate as distributed nodes within a wider combat network.
At the same time, Australia’s force structure must increasingly distribute lethality above and below the surface: SSNs, autonomous underwater vehicles, long-range maritime strike aircraft, unmanned surface vessels, land-based missiles and resilient space, cyber and intelligence networks.
The lesson from the return of the large combatant is therefore that bigger is not always better nor that smaller is inherently safer. The future belongs to the fleet that can generate the greatest combat power while presenting an adversary with the greatest number of problems to solve.
For Australia, that means resisting both technological nostalgia and technological fashion. The objective should be neither a battleship nor a fleet of corvettes, but a heterogeneous, networked and survivable force capable of absorbing losses, sustaining operations and continuing to fight.
That is the real naval competition emerging across the Indo-Pacific, not who can build the biggest ship, but who can build the fleet that is hardest to kill.
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below or get in touch at
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