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Will Russian President Vladimir Putin’s desperate push to win the war on Ukraine prove to be a repeat of the errors of his predecessors?
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Russia’s failure to swiftly absorb Ukraine into its sphere of influence has frustrated President Vladimir Putin, who is increasingly resorting to desperate warfighting tactics to gain an upper hand in the protracted conflict.
Most recently, Russian forces reportedly targeted infrastructure in civilian locations across Ukraine, including the capital Kyiv, launching two separate flurries of drone strikes in a week.
A pregnant woman was among the civilians killed as a result of the latest attack, according to Kyiv mayor Vitali Klitschko.
President Putin has also repeatedly threatened to deploy “tactical nuclear weapons” if provoked by NATO members backing Ukraine’s resistance.
According to Stephen Loosley, non-resident senior fellow at the United States Studies Centre, these strategies reflect a familiar pattern in Russia’s recent history.
Loosley draws a comparison to Russia’s Winter War in Finland in 1939–40 under the leadership of Joseph Stalin, which saw the latter stubbornly defend its territory against a much larger Soviet force.
“Three months after the outbreak of the Second World War, in November 1939, the Red Army invaded Finland on a massive scale,” he writes.
“But the winter worked for the Finns.
“The Soviet conscript army was dealt continuous heavy blows in the field. Soviet equipment was found wanting in just about every sphere on the ground. In the air, their preponderance of aircraft mattered little.”
Like today’s Ukrainians, the Finns “mobilised successfully”, with up to a quarter of the population enlisting to join the resistance.
“Under the leadership of Marshal Mannerheim, the Finns conducted a skillful campaign involving ambush, fighting withdrawals and counter-attacks which inflicted terrible causalities on the Russian columns, bound to the roads,” Loosley continues.
“This grew so appalling that some Russian units had to be forced to the front at gun point.
“Many innocent Red Army Commanders went to their deaths for Stalin’s strategic ignorance. Does this sound at all familiar?”
And like Putin, Stalin “doubled down” in the face of heavy losses.
“The Red Army was reinforced and as the spring arrived in 1940 gradually, the Soviets achieved superiority over their small neighbour. A peace treaty was signed.” Loosley adds.
“No less than Winston Churchill commented that the Finns were showing the whole world how to fight. Again, the chimes of familiarity are ringing.”
So, what’s next for Putin’s Russia?
Loosley flags the risks of nuclear war, claiming Putin’s threat to deploy ‘tactical’ nukes would result in a full-scale nuclear exchange.
“We should realise there is no such creature as a ‘tactical’ nuclear device. There are nuclear weapons, full stop,” he writes.
“On most occasions, whenever the use of so-called ‘tactical’ or ‘battlefield’ nuclear weapons has been war-gamed, especially in academia, a battlefield nuclear attack has degenerated into a comprehensive nuclear war between the Russians and the West.
“This is unthinkable.”
But Loosley notes that Russia’s nuclear doctrine permits the deployment of nuclear weapons if the nation is threatened.
“This is why Putin is incorporating eastern Ukraine into his ramshackle empire,” he continues.
“To deploy reservists effectively, the Russians will need some three to six months for training, equipping, and organising. This is unlikely to occur, given what we have seen to date.
“That means the ‘reservists’, some of whom have not seen military duty, let alone combat, will be sent into the fray as mere cannon fodder to defend against threatening Ukrainian advances. The casualties will be fearful.”
But according to Loosley, despite these disastrous consequences, Putin would likely follow in the footsteps of Stalin.
“Battle deaths are irrelevant, the Russian dictator needs a ‘victory’, just as he required his referendum ‘endorsement’ in the Donbass.
“His only off-ramp must be marked ‘triumph’.”
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