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Amid rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula and more broadly across the Indo-Pacific, many nations have responded with drastically increased defence capabilities — South Korea, a nation arguably right in the firing line of any regional conflagration, could be the latest nuclear power, posits ASPI’s Malcolm Davis, with some interesting impacts for the region.
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Since the end of the Korean conflict, the two Koreas have maintained an often tenuous peace — defined by the promise of mutually assured destruction should hostilities bubble over, while this peace has typically been held together by conventional weapons, North Korea’s first nuclear weapons test in 2006 turned the order on its head.
Meanwhile, as the US, Russia, and China have sought to maintain the armistice for fear of conflict between the superpowers, the increasingly unpredictable North Korean regime, combined with the competing economic, political, and strategic interests driven by China, has served to prompt a series of major strategic realignments in South Korea.
South Korea’s response has been driven by two distinctly different factors, namely: North Korea’s continued pursuit of reliable nuclear delivery systems and the conventional manpower and firepower of the North Korean Army, and rising power projection capabilities and willingness of China to assert its influence over a number of contested territories and strategically sensitive sea lines of communication in the South and East China Seas.
Accordingly, Korea has embarked on a series of acquisition and modernisation programs targeting each of the branches of the Republic of Korea Armed Forces playing a critical role in the nation’s response to its increasingly challenging geopolitical environment — however, to date, the South Korean government has shied away from developing and fielding their own nuclear weapons, at least until now...
This is shifting dynamic and the historic precedent that has directed South Korea’s military planning and development is best explained by ASPI senior analyst, Dr Malcolm Davis, who said, ”It has long been a concern that North Korea’s nuclear posturing would goad or frighten its neighbours into developing their own nuclear capability.” These comments were given further context by comments recently made by South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, who stated, “It’s possible that the problem gets worse and our country will introduce tactical nuclear weapons or build them on our own. If that’s the case, we can have our own nuclear weapons pretty quickly, given our scientific and technological capabilities.”
While the President’s office was quick to back-pedal in some ways, saying, “I can assure you ... that the Republic of Korea’s realistic and rational option is to fully respect the [nuclear non-proliferation] regime … I’m fully confident about the US’ extended deterrence,” he said, regardless, raising major concerns about the continued relevance of the global nuclear proliferation order.
A nuclear Korean Peninsula to resolve the end of America’s strategic umbrella?
If the regional response to Australia’s announcement of the AUKUS agreement and its core priority of delivering a nuclear-powered submarine fleet is anything to go by, we can only anticipate that South Korea introducing a nuclear capability will elicit a similar response from the regional community, particularly from North Korea and China in as the regional power dynamics continue to evolve.
However, this chicken and egg situation is only serving to undermine the regional paradigm, as Davis explains, “The threat from North Korea is front and centre in driving Seoul down this path. Pyongyang is seeking to rapidly develop tactical nuclear weapons that can be used to threaten South Korea directly.
“Seoul can’t ignore that growing threat. A seventh North Korean nuclear test remains likely and Pyongyang continues to develop ballistic missiles that can deliver tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has called for ‘exponential’ expansion of his country’s nuclear capabilities,” Davis explains.
This predicament is further exacerbated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent impact on Europe’s strategic paradigm, which Davis details, saying, “That threat is emerging against a background of Russian nuclear threats against NATO, which many believe undermine traditional norms that de-emphasise nuclear weapons.”
At the core of these concerns is an apparent declining trust in the commitment to the US strategic umbrella, namely the extended deterrence capability of the US strategic nuclear arsenal in the era of great power competition. Davis unpacks this theory, stating, “uncertainties about how US extended nuclear deterrence guarantees are applied, and there are concerns in Seoul and Tokyo about the resilience of those guarantees in the face of threats from Moscow, and the prospect of such coercion by China in a future crisis over Taiwan. South Korea’s government is in effect asking whether the US will be prepared to risk trading Seattle or San Francisco for Seoul or Busan.
“Added to this is the potential for a return of Donald Trump as US president after 2024, which must resuscitate concerns in Seoul over whether Washington would continue to support the alliance even in the face of a growing nuclear threat from Pyongyang,” Davis explains.
South Korea’s high level of technological and industrial development and capacity positions the nation well to rapidly respond to any real or perceived decline in the US strategic umbrella, or its continuing commitment to strategic benevolence — with a tactical or strategic nuclear capability well within the nation’s capacity to rapidly develop to secure its interests, however in doing so, South Korea would effectively destroy the global non-proliferation agenda.
“To get the bomb, Seoul would have to leave the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), dramatically weakening it. North Korea left the NPT in 2003 to pursue nuclear weapons, but for a liberal democracy to follow suit would be a heavy blow to the treaty’s perceived role as the inviolable centrepiece of nuclear non-proliferation. Might Tehran then seize its own opportunity, and would other states follow suit?
“After all, if Russia were to demonstrate the effectiveness of nuclear threats and North Korea acquired many tactical nuclear weapons without cost, that would reinforce the legitimacy of nuclear weapons in the eyes of some actors. How many states walking away from the NPT would deal it a death blow?” Davis posits.
Most concerning, South Korea’s pursuit and implementation of a nuclear weapons capability would rapidly accelerate the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other advanced capabilities throughout the Indo-Pacific, dramatically reshaping the geostrategic environment and the major power players as established and existing powers jockey to build their own strategic arsenals to insure their own interests and sovereignty.
Could South Korea’s strategic situation soon be ours?
So what building blocks does Australia need to lay in order to provide a regional strategic umbrella? Well in this instance, success leaves clues, and thankfully, historical forebears have identified the key “hard power” factors that underpin a “strategic umbrella”, namely:
- Conventional military capabilities – including air, land and sea-based power projection capabilities;
- Strategic deterrence capabilities – including but not limited to a nuclear triad, strategic bomber, and naval strategic force multipliers; and
- Economic power – focused on maintaining strategic industries with a focus on being globally competitive across manufacturing, resource and energy, innovation, and research and development.
Let us know in the comments if you’d like us to take a closer look at each of these factors in the Australian context for how they can be leveraged to maximise Australia’s geopolitical impact, economic resilience, and national security.
Lessons for Australia’s future strategic planning
There is no doubt that Australia’s position and responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific region will depend on the nation’s ability to sustain itself economically, strategically and politically in the face of rising regional and global competition. Despite the nation’s virtually unrivalled wealth of natural resources, agricultural and industrial potential, there is a lack of a cohesive national security strategy integrating the development of individual, yet complementary public policy strategies to support a more robust Australian role in the region.
While contemporary Australia has been far removed from the harsh realities of conflict, with many generations never enduring the reality of rationing for food, energy, medical supplies or luxury goods, and even fewer within modern Australia understanding the socio-political and economic impact such rationing would have on the now world-leading Australian standard of living.
Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability serves as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia, this is particularly well explained by Peter Zeihan, who explains: “A deglobalised world doesn’t simply have a different economic geography, it has thousands of different and separate geographies. Economically speaking, the whole was stronger for the inclusion of all its parts. It is where we have gotten our wealth and pace of improvement and speed. Now the parts will be weaker for their separation.”
As events continue to unfold throughout the region and China continues to throw its economic, political and strategic weight around, can Australia afford to remain a secondary power, or does it need to embrace a larger, more independent role in an era of increasing great power competition?
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
