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Despite the hype still settling following the AUKUS submarine announcement, our focus must shift to preparing to conduct a detailed analysis of the forthcoming Defence Strategic Review, with ANU’s honorary professor, Richard Brabin-Smith, presenting an interesting framework for assessing the DSR.
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The concept of “impactful projection” has emerged as one of the favoured terms and objectives for the Albanese government in response to the growing pace of the Indo-Pacific’s strategic realignment, with Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles leveraging the term to prepare the public and the defence ecosystem ahead of the release of the Defence Strategic Review (DSR).
This emphasis on developing Australian “impactful projection” has gained further traction following the government’s recent announcements confirming the acquisition of the fifth-generation Naval Strike Missile (NSM) for the Royal Australian Navy’s major surface combatants, and the much-anticipated acquisition of the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) which are much-needed transformational capabilities for the tactical strike capacity of the Australian Defence Force, culminating in the announcement of the roadmap to deliver SSN-AUKUS which will transform the strategic capabilities of the Navy.
In their purist sense, these new acquisitions serve as the linchpin of how the Deputy Prime Minister articulated his concept of “impactful projection” at a talk to the Sydney Institute and the way it will fundamentally reshape the ADF over the coming decades: “I think increasingly we’re going to need to think about our defence force in terms of being able to provide the country with impactful projection, impactful projection, meaning an ability to hold an adversary at risk, much further from our shores, across kind of the full spectrum of proportionate response. Now, that is actually a different mindset to what we’ve probably had before,” the Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles articulated.
As we turn our focus to the impending release of the Defence Strategic Review, it will become increasingly important to conduct a detailed analysis of the Defence Strategic Review — enter Richard Brabin-Smith, ANU Honorary Professor and former deputy secretary at the Australian Department of Defence, and former Chief Defence Scientist who has identified a framework for conducting this analysis.
Identifying the key factors facing Australia: Shifting focus from ‘core force’ and warning times
From our earliest days of sovereign strategic planning, Australia has emphasised the importance of “warning times” and establishing and maintaining a “core force” that is capable of delivering the key responses to low-intensity scenarios with a short response time, with higher intensity conflict scenarios naturally expected to have significantly longer “warning times”, with these concepts being institutionalised in the 1970s and 1980s as part of the Dibb Review and subsequent Defence of Australia Defence White Paper which has formed the foundation of the nation’s strategic posture ever since.
Brabin-Smith articulates this complex web, stating, “Since there’s no current summary of the factors that should drive Australia’s defence capabilities, I’ll start with the most recent one we have: the 1970s concept of a ‘core force’ and expansion base. Although it’s now out of date, the core force still casts a long shadow.
“Adopting this approach allows us to see the extent to which strategic factors have changed since the core force days, and to judge the extent to which the Defence Department and the review have recognised this.
“In brief, the core force and expansion base concept tied together three elements: credible contingencies, an ability to expand the Australian Defence Force, and governance mechanisms that would ensure that any such expansion would be timely. Since then, the context for all three of these elements has changed radically.”
Adding further context to this emphasis on a “core force” and critically shifting the emphasis away from the concept of “'warning times”, Brabin-Smith details the radical shift expected in the Defence Strategic Review, stating, “First, contingencies. The old idea was that only lesser contingencies were credible in the short term, and higher levels of contingency only in the longer term, after an extended period of strategic deterioration. As is now widely recognised, the rise of China’s economic and military strength, together with Beijing’s aggressive foreign policies, has rendered that idea invalid.
“This is the most important break with the past: the range of contingencies the ADF might face in the short to medium term include those that could require intensive use of high-technology capabilities.
“When it comes to readiness for such contingencies, it’s hard to imagine that a government would accept the need for standing forces capable of handling today’s contingencies without at least a degree of preparation. This is because some element of warning would still be expected, and because the additional costs would be significant and best avoided. That implies the need for a clear pathway for Defence to move to higher levels of readiness — for example, through mechanisms to increase levels of training, for both regular and reserve forces.”
Critically, Brabin-Smith also stresses the importance declining warning times will have to the capacity for the nation to sustain high-intensity combat operations, particularly those requiring advanced weapons platforms, namely guided munitions and any host of the ADF’s next-generation capabilities, be it the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, HIMARS or the Hobart Class destroyers that will require increasingly complex and large logistic tails to support sustained operations, stating, “Sustainability also needs attention. Even with a degree of warning, there would be insufficient time for major expansion of the ADF or for a significant increase in the level of sustainability stocks such as spare parts and advanced munitions. This means that action now to increase the ADF’s levels of sustainability should command priority.”
Force expansion and establishing an analysis framework
As the strategic environment continues to deteriorate and the complexity of the challenges that face Australia continue to evolve, the ADF will be required to undertake increasingly complex, high-intensity operations, potentially against peer competitors.
Doing so will require an increase not just in the complexity of the platforms and capabilities fielded, but also the manpower deployed, to enable the ADF to respond to threats reliably and consistently in our primary sphere of influence.
But what does this radically different ADF look like? With a planned increase of the ADF manpower by around 30 per cent by 2040, the ADF will begin to slowly build muscle, combined with the animosity towards high-intensity combat capabilities like armoured vehicles, tanks, and even some questioning the utility of major surface combatants. We seem to be left with more questions than answers.
It is clear that both the Australian Defence Force and the Australian people will need to become accustomed to a more robust military capability for the nation in the coming decades. However, we have to learn the lessons of the past, from both our own history and that of comparably sized and even great powers, lest we repeat the tragic mistakes that led to Australia’s abysmal state of preparedness in the lead-up to the Second World War.
This is highlighted by Brabin-Smith who states, “Now let’s look at force expansion. It is needed for two reasons: in the short term to remedy the deficiencies of today’s force structure, and in the longer term, given that on its current trajectory, China is likely to continue to modernise and expand its armed forces and to be in a position to expand further to meet future challenges.”
Going further, Brabin-Smith details the impact the hollowing out of the Western industrial base has had on nations like Australia and our capacity to prepare and resist not just conflict, but economic, political, and strategic coercion which may precede the outbreak of direct hostilities, stating, “Although force expansion has been an integral part of Defence’s conceptual framework for some 50 years, it has received little policy or analytical attention. In addition, what was achievable in the 1970s is now not so clear; as an example, compare today’s F-35 joint strike fighter with the Mirage jet fighter of the 1970s. Further and importantly, the defence industrial base of Western democracies is now much smaller than it was at the height of the Cold War. Quite simply, the West’s industrial capacity is no longer there. The difficulties of supplying weapon systems and munitions to Ukraine in its defence against Russia illustrate this.
“So, significant and timely force expansion as originally envisaged is not a viable concept today. What alternative kind of force expansion might now be feasible?”
Shifting gears, Brabin-Smith outlines the framework for assessing the forthcoming Defence Strategic Review and its impact on the Australian Defence Force moving forward, stating, “We should assess the Defence Strategic Review in the following terms:
- Does it propose a force structure that will meet the demands of today’s potential contingencies?
- Are the priorities and cost implications clear?
- Is there a clear and timely path for improving the readiness and sustainability of the ADF and the other contributors to national security?
- Will proposed modes for force expansion be both timely and effective?
- What steps should be taken to ensure that governance arrangements are capable of meeting contemporary challenges?”
Critically, for Australia to deliver meaningful deterrence and “risk” to a potential adversary, the ADF will need to get closer, before it gets further away, necessitating increased survivability and flexibility for the ADF, particularly the Army, begging the question if the media commentary is to be believed, is the DSR going to cut a much-needed capability at a time we can’t afford to cut it?
Navy and Air Force don’t escape these challenges either, especially given the limited number of aircraft, ships, and submarines that can be deployed through the region. This is particularly prominent with the ageing Collins Class submarines and the limited number of major surface combatants the Navy can call upon. Equally strained, Air Force has a limited capacity to generate and deploy enough sorties in depth and at range.
While it is hoped that the DSR will identify and respond to this perfect confluence of tactical and strategic geographic and operational realities, more of the same thinking, largely based on the now defunct “Sea-Air Gap” strategy underpinned by a limited expeditionary capability will severely impact the capability of the ADF to truly hold an adversary “at risk”.
Lessons for Australia’s future strategic planning
There is no doubt that Australia’s position and responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific region will depend on the nation’s ability to sustain itself economically, strategically and politically in the face of rising regional and global competition. Despite the nation’s virtually unrivalled wealth of natural resources, agricultural and industrial potential, there is a lack of a cohesive national security strategy integrating the development of individual, yet complementary public policy strategies to support a more robust Australian role in the region.
While contemporary Australia has been far removed from the harsh realities of conflict, with many generations never enduring the reality of rationing for food, energy, medical supplies or luxury goods, and even fewer within modern Australia understanding the socio-political and economic impact such rationing would have on the now world-leading Australian standard of living.
Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability serves as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia, this is particularly well explained by Peter Zeihan, who explains: "A deglobalised world doesn’t simply have a different economic geography, it has thousands of different and separate geographies. Economically speaking, the whole was stronger for the inclusion of all its parts. It is where we have gotten our wealth and pace of improvement and speed. Now the parts will be weaker for their separation."
Accordingly, shifting the public discussion and debate away from the default Australian position of “it is all a little too difficult, so let’s not bother” will provide unprecedented economic, diplomatic, political and strategic opportunities for the nation.
As events continue to unfold throughout the region and China continues to throw its economic, political and strategic weight around, can Australia afford to remain a secondary power, or does it need to embrace a larger, more independent role in an era of increasing great power competition?
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
