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While the concept of “impactful projection” is expected to form the foundation of the much anticipated Defence Strategic Review, some strategic thinkers, like Austin Wyatt and Marigold Black of RAND Corporation, have asked if our thinking around responding to the regional challenges is correct?
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The concept of “impactful projection” has emerged as not only one of the favoured terms for the Albanese government, but one of the priority objectives for the forthcoming Defence Strategic Review (DSR), with Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles leveraging the term to prepare both the public and the broader defence ecosystem for the challenges ahead.
At its core, impactful projection, as defined by Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles, will not only reshape the Australian Defence Force for the first time since the Dibb Review and Defence of Australia White Paper, but also the nation’s strategic approach to the increasingly fluid and contested power dynamics of the Indo-Pacific.
Marles explains this impact as, “I think increasingly, we’re going to need to think about our defence force in terms of being able to provide the country with impactful projection, impactful projection, meaning an ability to hold an adversary at risk, much further from our shores, across kind of the full spectrum of proportionate response. Now, that is actually a different mindset to what we’ve probably had before.”
It is no secret that the basis for Australia’s Defence Strategic Review and the proposed strategic realignment is based on two key factors, the increasing assertiveness of China, coupled with its unprecedented military build up and militarisation of the South China Sea, combined with increasing concerns about not only the reliability of the United States, but also the capacity of the nation’s major strategic benefactor to actively maintain the regional and global order.
By putting an end to the often-ancient rivalries between varying imperial powers, the United States, through its post-war might, guaranteed the freedom of the seas and promoted an explosion of free trade across the globe paving the way for the modern, interconnected global economy and period of innovation we enjoy today.
Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Western Europe have served as the major beneficiaries of this new globalised world and radically new approach, ironed out at the Bretton Woods Conference, and then more drastically implemented through policies like the Marshall Plan to reconstruct Europe following the devastation of the Second World War, this golden era of the Pax Americana is now coming to an end.
This new paradigm is explained by The Australian’s foreign editor, Greg Sheridan, who states, “We are living through a hinge moment in history. The era of globalisation is coming to an end. Is globalisation dead? Maybe not quite dead, but like a COVID virus it’s mutating into something new and different. Deglobalisation, decoupling, democracy versus dictatorship, Cold War 2.0, national resilience economies, national security conservatives, renewed military alliances, grey zone conflict, regional wars, free markets lacking advocates or post-globalisation – whatever you call it, we are rushing into the third era of history after World War II.”
Sheridan’s explanation is further reinforced by US geostrategic analyst and author Peter Zeihan, who adds: “Today’s economic landscape isn’t so much dependent upon as it is eminently addicted to American strategic and tactical overwatch ... Globalisation was always dependent upon the Americans’ commitment to the global order and that order hasn’t served Americans’ strategic interests since the Berlin Wall fell in 1989. Without the Americans riding herd on everyone, it is only a matter of time before something in East Asia or the Middle East or the Russian periphery (like, I don’t know, say, a war) breaks the global system beyond repair.”
However, some strategic policy experts have raised questions about how Australia has approached the Defence Strategic Review and the factors that have been used to not only justify certain decisions, but to equally inform the review process and the outcome.
Front and centre are Austin Wyatt and Marigold Black of RAND Corporation, who have used a piece titled, Is Australia's Defense Strategy based on a mistaken assumption?, in which they open with a particularly poignant question: “The concept of ‘impactful projection’ — defined as the ‘ability to hold an adversary at risk, much further from our shores, across the full spectrum of proportionate response’ — has become a topic of heightened interest in the Australian strategic discourse, as pundits wait on further information from the Defense Strategic Review. But is the concept underpinned by a fundamentally mistaken assumption?”
Have we got it wrong?
Beijing has undoubtedly been the principle focus and driving force for Australia’s Defence Strategic Review and the nation’s pursuit of increasing self-reliance and strategic capacity to “deliver combat power through impactful materiel and enhanced strike capacity — including over longer distances”.
However, for Wyatt and Black, this heavy focus on Beijing has seemingly seen Australia gloss over the sovereignty concerns of its neighbours across the near region. Something they unpack, stating, “Simply assuming that countries in the region will acquiesce with the intrusions inherent in its enhanced strike capability initiatives could be a mistake.
“Yet the strategic calculus of countries in the near region does not seem to feature in Australia’s perceptions of future conflict. Policymakers have repeatedly declared Canberra’s commitment to diplomacy and defensive intentions as Australia pursues a strategy based on projection beyond its shores ... But has Australia’s strategy been complemented by a clear and fulsome understanding of the perceptions, concerns, and intent of affected regional partners?” the pair ask.
This is a particularly important question to ask, particularly in the wake of the recent AUKUS announcement and the pathway to Australia’s nuclear-powered submarine fleet given some of the concerns raised by a number of Australia’s neighbours, particularly throughout Southeast Asia.
However, equally important to ask, is if these nations, who have some of the largest economic growth, coupled with immense populations and historic interests and conflicting views of regional affairs, would pay us the same level of respect and decency that Australia has shown them through the public announcements of the AUKUS agreement and subsequent road map for acquiring nuclear-powered submarines.
This question becomes increasingly important as the post-Second World War order and balance of power shifts away from a US-led and dominated, monopolar world, toward an increasingly multipolar world, driven by the domestic and international ambitions, anxieties, and interests of these rising powers.
I will go one further to this, how should Australia plan for a world that is no longer as benevolent as we have been used to for the past 80 years? Simply put, how will emerging powers like Indonesia, India, Thailand, Vietnam, and others treat Australia and our concerns when their respective economic, political, and strategic clout simply overshadows our own and the relative regional power of our primary strategic benefactor?
This transactional view of our place and relationships flies in the face of the way in which Australia operates and has traditionally operated.
Despite these questions, both Wyatt and Black believe Australia has shown, to some degree, an element of bad faith in their handling of AUKUS, stating, “Given repeated proclamations that Australia is a transparent middle power committed to investing in regional partnerships, Canberra should know better than to disregard the sovereignty of these states. It would also be a mistake for Australia’s strategic planning to dismiss them in the pursuit of great power deterrence. However, in recent years, both errors seem to have become part of Australia’s diplomatic and strategic DNA.”
I must also ask, would these nations tell Australia either directly through diplomatic means or at the formal political level if they were pursuing a strategic capability?
Lessons for Australia’s future strategic planning
There is no doubt that Australia’s position and responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific region will depend on the nation’s ability to sustain itself economically, strategically, and politically in the face of rising regional and global competition.
Despite the nation’s virtually unrivalled wealth of natural resources, agricultural and industrial potential, there is a lack of a cohesive national security strategy integrating the development of individual, yet complementary public policy strategies to support a more robust Australian role in the region.
While contemporary Australia has been far removed from the harsh realities of conflict, with many generations never enduring the reality of rationing for food, energy, medical supplies or luxury goods, and even fewer within modern Australia understanding the socio-political and economic impact such rationing would have on the now world-leading Australian standard of living.
Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability serves as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia, this is particularly well explained by Peter Zeihan, who explains:
"A deglobalised world doesn’t simply have a different economic geography, it has thousands of different and separate geographies. Economically speaking, the whole was stronger for the inclusion of all its parts. It is where we have gotten our wealth and pace of improvement and speed. Now the parts will be weaker for their separation."
Accordingly, shifting the public discussion and debate away from the default Australian position of "it is all a little too difficult, so let’s not bother" will provide unprecedented economic, diplomatic, political and strategic opportunities for the nation.
As events continue to unfold throughout the region and China continues to throw its economic, political and strategic weight around, can Australia afford to remain a secondary power, or does it need to embrace a larger, more independent role in an era of increasing great power competition?
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
