Common AUKUS-designed submarine would be best industrial and economic option

Both current designs, and their replacements (SSNR and Block VI, respectively), are already in planning.  

To do so is like buying a new car in a “run out sale” when everyone else is buying the new model. In Australia’s case, it would be a 30 or 40-year-old “new submarine” design, to be in service for a further 50 years.  

New submarine designs will prioritise their use by Special Forces, and fitting of longer life reactors, but their physical design will depend on four main concerns:

• Operational requirements/use of the boats on deployment.
• Size and requirement envelope of each power plant (pressurised water reactor – PWR).
• Weapon configuration, now (planned), when boats are built (near future), and the longer-term future.
• Hydrodynamic considerations (noise, speed, and depths [shallow and deep] of operational envelope).

The AUKUS SSN option is often viewed as large and complicated engineering assets. 

But, they need to be broken down into general areas so Australia can make an informed decision on how to build and then sustain them, specifically: hull, reactor, propulsion, and weapons, together with, command and control (C&C) systems:

1) Hull: To establish very heavy engineering facilities for a short-term limited build, for example, doesn’t make any economic or sustainable sense, for example to form and forge eight sets of pressure hull plates. 

But being able to weld them together does — technology involved would be an advancement on current abilities and useable in other projects going forward, as well as supporting SSN sustainment.

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2) Reactor: Australia has already declared it will not build these and they will remain sealed on installation for 35 to 50 years (their expected life expectancy). They will be built by either Westinghouse (USA) or Rolls-Royce (UK).  Both the USA and the UK have either done away, or will shortly do so, with SSN refuel requirements (unlike French SSN fleet support requirements). 

3) Propulsion: This will either be electric motor (US boats) or mechanical gearboxes (UK boats), either option is “fixed” once installed as part of the build. Either option would use existing Australia skills. An upskilling program would be required and used to maintain the boats going forward.

4) Weapons and C&C systems: These are for national/defence policy to determine, and may be “Australian”, and not one or either from the USA or the UK.  Australia may decide to use a mix of weapon configurations from both countries, and/or with the natural advancements beyond that already installed in existing Collins Class boats. This may require some adjustments to the final Australian version of hull design, but not significantly enough to blow out build costs.

The main challenge for the AUKUS SSN option is to convince the other two national partners to consider a common design, and for each to make parts/components for the other builders. The years of work involved in the final build and assembly fitouts would then be undertaken locally (Adelaide). This is aligned to various government commitments to build the next submarines in Adelaide and benefit our industrial capabilities.

All AUKUS countries need to address their current delivery and governance issues urgently. This would have a near immediate and significant improvement in earned value and benefit realisation of their taxpayer-funded defence projects. 

It is crucial to learn from past projects and implement effective governance, assurance, risk management, and program planning. 

This would ensure positive benefits for taxpayers and support genuinely sustainable industries economically. Critical learned lessons from the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lighting II fighter program, and with a common design in the “spirit” of AUKUS, would reduce uneconomical industrial nationalism and cost blowouts. 

Complex projects do not need to be complicated and private industry with improved governance, risk, and earned value management should improve delivery performance and value for money, for both our taxpayers and warfighters. 

An important caveat is a need to be on top of governance, expenditure assurance, and “earned value” reporting during the contracted delivery process.

Being able to enhance what we know we can do best to contribute to the SSN-AUKUS construction partnership and which skills can be improved by direct government investment does make economic sense and would provide long-term sustainable and economically competitive industries for Australia.

Australia should be a full contributing partner-builder, and not just a purchaser of either old design UK/US submarines. 

A common design and divided major manufacturing (with each boat being built locally) across all three AUKUS partners makes better sense and provides long-term sustainable and economically competitive industries for Australia.

Chris Stevens has had a broad career focused on delivery of complex projects. His grounding has been in many line and project management positions in the UK Ministry of Defence (Navy), with “hands-on” responsibility for large projects.  

Specifically, as a mechanical marine specialist/subject matter expert and project manager for nuclear submarine (SSN) First Level Systems, mechanical, ex-reactor, with direct experience as a complex project and program implementer. Leadership involved coordinating multi-trades, mid-life refuel (now no longer required in later generation SSNs) and update refits. 

Resulting issues from this work resulted in his research to solve problematic utilisation of scarce skilled labour resources, in the refit of SSNs. Using computer modelling and complex network schedules, he simplified how to plan and better use scarce labour resources used within a multi-stream submarine refit facility (SRC) at the Royal Naval Dockyard Devonport, UK.

Chris currently focuses on how organisations can reduce risks and costs of delivering strategies and programs. He is a strong proponent that properly implemented portfolio and program management, with good governance and risk management really does work. The best laid strategies become worthless, and expensive, if they can’t deliver on expectations. He provides help so organisations can improve their delivery execution, maximise their value for money utilising practical governance, and how to mitigate strategic risk.

He recently spent time within Defence, not related to SSNs, working on a “program of interest”.  

Chris has a bachelor of science, with honours in systems and management, and a PhD in systems science, both from City, University of London.