Login
iscover
The long-awaited release of the government’s Defence Strategic Review has moved to reorientate Australia’s primary area of focus and responsibility. While more details about implications for the force structure is expected in the coming weeks and months, the question has to be asked, will it be enough to sate the plate we have set ourselves?
To continue reading the rest of this article, please log in.
Create free account to get unlimited news articles and more!
After many months of waiting, we finally have the public findings of the Albanese government's Defence Strategic Review with some interesting outcomes and decisions made that will fundamentally reshape the Australian Defence Force and the way it will protect and further our national interests in the coming decades.
Setting the scene, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese stated at the launch of the DSR, “We confront the most challenging strategic circumstances since the Second World War, both in our region and indeed around the world. That’s why we’re investing in our capabilities and we’re investing, too, in our relationships to build a more secure Australia and a more stable and prosperous region.
“It is the most significant work that’s been done since the Second World War, looking in a comprehensive way at what is needed. It demonstrates that in a world where challenges to our national security are always evolving, we cannot fall back on old assumptions,” Prime Minister Albanese said.
At the core of the Defence Strategic Review is the broader reorientation of Australia’s tactical and strategic focus, away from Coalition-supported counterinsurgency operations in the Middle East or, low-intensity, humanitarian interventions across the South Pacific towards a broader focus and conceptualisation of the Indo-Pacific.
While this emphasis on the Indo-Pacific has its origins dating back to the 2013 Defence White Paper, the new government’s focus is far broader, far more direct, and far more ambitious in its scope.
This renewed focus on a broader concept Indo-Pacific is driven in large part by a number of key findings in the Defence Strategic Review, namely, “Australia’s strategic circumstances and the risks we face are now radically different. No longer is our alliance partner, the United States, the unipolar leader of the Indo-Pacific. Intense China–United States competition is the defining feature of our region and our time. Major power competition in our region has the potential to threaten our interests, including the potential for conflict. The nature of conflict and threats have also changed.”
While it is a major driver, great power competition, namely that between the United States and China isn’t the only source of potential conflict or challenge to Australia’s economic, political, and strategic interests across this diverse region, as the Defence Strategic Review states: “Regional countries continue to modernise their military forces. China’s military build-up is now the largest and most ambitious of any country since the end of the Second World War. This has occurred alongside significant economic development, benefiting many countries in the Indo-Pacific, including Australia.
“This build-up is occurring without transparency or reassurance to the Indo-Pacific region of China’s strategic intent. China’s assertion of sovereignty over the South China Sea threatens the global rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific in a way that adversely impacts Australia’s national interests. China is also engaged in strategic competition in Australia’s near neighbourhood.”
The government and the review’s recognition that the world has rapidly changed in the last decade has resulted in a major realignment of the Australian Defence Force, which Defence Minister Richard Marles explained during the launch of the review, stating, “for the first time in 35 years, we are recasting the mission of the Australian Defence Force, which will have five elements to it. Firstly, to defend our nation and our immediate region.
“Secondly, to deter through denial, any adversary that seeks to project power against Australia or our interests through our northern approaches. Thirdly, to protect Australia’s economic connection to the region and the world. Fourthly, with our partners, to provide for the collective security of the Indo-Pacific. And fifthly, with our partners, to provide for the maintenance of the global rules-based order.
“Now, most of those objectives, as part of the new mission of the Australian Defence Force, are well beyond our shores. And so we need to have a Defence Force which has the capacity to engage in impactful projection through the full spectrum of proportionate response,” the Deputy Prime Minister explained.
This reinvigorated and radical shift from previous Australian strategy and doctrine is based in the fundamental reimagining of the Indo-Pacific as a region, and more centrally, Australia’s place and role within the dynamic region.
National Defence and the ‘new’ Indo-Pacific
Right off the bat, the government’s review articulates the growing importance of the Indo-Pacific, stating, “The Indo-Pacific is the most important geostrategic region in the world. It is a region whose stability and global integration has ushered in decades of prosperity and enabled the incredible growth of regional economies, including China.”
In order to understand the importance of this statement, it is equally important to understand the definition and characterisation of the Indo-Pacific. The traditional “definition” of the Indo-Pacific has been through a number of incarnations since the term was first coined in the 1920s, with the late Japanese prime minister, Shinzo Abe, describing the Indo-Pacific in a broad conceptualisation as the “confluence” of the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
The government’s new definition and understanding of the Indo-Pacific presents a broad characterisation and definition of the Indo-Pacific: “For military planning, in terms of our strategic geography, the primary area of military interest for Australia’s National Defence is the immediate region encompassing the north-eastern Indian Ocean through maritime Southeast Asia into the Pacific. This region includes our northern approaches.”
Going further, the Defence Strategic Review expands, stating: “Australia’s immediate region encompassing the north-eastern Indian Ocean through maritime Southeast Asia into the Pacific, including our northern approaches, should be the primary area of military interest for Australia’s National Defence.”
The government's emphasis on “National Defence” equally broadens the nation’s response to the mounting challenges facing Australia. The most notable shift is that of the departure from the Dibb Review’s “Defence of Australia” policy in favour of the Defence Minister’s concept of “impactful projection”, best described: “It requires re-examining the traditional notion of the Defence of Australia concept. That doctrine is no longer suitable. There is a requirement for a new, holistic approach to Australian defence planning and strategy. We must adopt a new strategic conceptual approach of National Defence, which encompasses the defence of Australia against potential threats arising from major power competition, including the prospect of conflict.
“National Defence must be part of a broader national strategy of whole-of-government coordinated and focused statecraft and diplomacy in our region. This approach requires much more active Australian statecraft that works to support the maintenance of a regional balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.”
Meanwhile, the combination of this shift towards “National Defence” and a new conceptualisation of the Indo-Pacific broadens Australia’s area of strategic responsibility, in a long, overdue manner, particularly as a result of the growing economic importance of the Indian Ocean begins to rival that of Australia’s northern approaches and Southeast Asia.
However, the government also identified that while there are some initial force structure implications across the services, there will be some major reviews into the force structure of the broader Australian Defence Force, with Navy front and centre.
Are we actually confronting our challenges?
The restructuring of the Australian Army is now well and truly known, as the force will be reshaped to capitalise on the introduction of precision, long-range munitions that will enable it to keep an adversary at longer distances, particularly through the nation’s northern approaches, with some major changes to the broader make up of the Army.
Army seemingly will solidify its amphibious capabilities, while seeing its combined armed forces scaled back in favour of the emphasis on precision, long-range strike capabilities.
Both Navy and Air Force meanwhile are emerging as the great unknowns.
Indeed, Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles stated during the press conference, “But I do want to highlight that the review makes a recommendation, which the government accepts, of establishing a short, sharp review into Australia’s surface fleet, and that is a review that we will undertake, and it will report in the third quarter of this year.”
The heavily maritime nature of the Indo-Pacific necessitates that Australia has a highly capable, flexible, and rapidly deployable naval surface fleet which will complement the introduction of the Australia’s nuclear-powered submarine fleet.
This is in large part driven by the shift from conventionally powered submarines to nuclear-powered ones, best articulated by Minister Marles, who said, “The first is that the surface fleet, as it’s currently constructed, was determined at a time when Australia was still pursuing a diesel electric-powered submarine. Now that we are going to be operating a nuclear-powered submarine, that is a dramatically different capability, and it obviously has some implication in terms of the overall structure of the Navy, not only as we think about the next decade, but as we think about the next three decades.
“And the second is that the Defence Strategic Review has observed that navies around the world are moving in the direction, to put it kind of crudely, of having a larger number of smaller vessels. Now, with those two ideas in mind, we are thinking about the long-term structure of our surface fleet.”
This assertion by the Defence Minister isn’t entirely accurate, as both the US Navy and Royal Navy have indeed begun shifting away from smaller, less survivable, less heavily armed vessels, like the littoral combat ships for the US Navy and the River Class offshore patrol vessels for the Royal Navy towards larger vessels like the Constellation and Inspiration Class general purpose frigates, respectively.
The proposed review articulates this as, “An enhanced lethality surface combatant fleet, that complements a conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine fleet, is now essential given our changed strategic circumstances.”
Delivering this, the government and the review believes such a force structure should incorporate “Tier 1” and “Tier 2” surface combatants to provide for “increased strike, air defence, presence operations and anti-submarine warfare”.
Going further, the review reinforces this, “Enhancing Navy’s capability in long-range strike (maritime and land), air defence, and anti-submarine warfare requires the acquisition of a contemporary optimal mix of Tier 1 and Tier 2 surface combatants, consistent with a strategy of a larger number of small surface vessels.”
This shift seemingly isn’t being reflected by the Australian government, at least based on the statements from the Defence Minister and equally fails to account for the fact that both of these navies utilise a “balanced” force comprising larger, more capable warships and a fleet of smaller, less capable warships for lower end operations such as maritime security, long-range patrol and presence operations — the very epitome of “impactful projection”.
Meanwhile, Air Force, the traditional frontline of the nation’s long-range strike capability, the Royal Australian Air Force, has by far and away emerged as the biggest loser in what the government has defined as the most “consequential” review into the nation’s strategic and defence capabilities since the Second World War.
The vague comments articulated by government’s review articulates that “the Royal Australian Air Force must be optimised to fight all aspects of air warfare. The support of maritime, littoral, and sustainment operations form Australia’s northern base network will be a high priority”.
Final thoughts
Despite the wait and a clarification of Australia’s primary area of strategic responsibility, there still appears to be more questions about the future direction and long-term development of tactical and strategic military capabilities.
The important question now becomes, when will we see a more detailed explanation of the Australian Defence Force’s force structure to better help industry and the Australian public understand the challenges faced and opportunities we have presented before us?
As events continue to unfold throughout the region and China continues to throw its economic, political, and strategic weight around, can Australia afford to remain a secondary power, or does it need to embrace a larger, more independent role in an era of increasing great power competition?
To find out more about the impact and opportunities of the government's Defence Strategic Review, join us at the Defence Connect DSR Summit Day, reserve your tickets here.
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
