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One of the key announcements of the government’s DSR is that our surface fleet would be subject to yet another review into its force structure slated for release later this year, but have we asked ourselves, what sort of fleet do we need?
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Whether it is for our raw resource or agricultural exports, or the critical import of liquid fuel or consumer goods like cars, as an island nation, Australia’s future prosperity and security is intrinsically linked to our unmolested access to the global maritime commons.
This reality is critically important in the light of mounting regional and global naval build ups and is the driving force behind the nation’s pursuit of the trilateral AUKUS agreement which will deliver the nation’s nuclear-powered submarine fleet, which has drawn extensive attention both at home and abroad.
Meanwhile, the Albanese government’s long-awaited Defence Strategic Review has shed light on the long-term direction of the nation’s defence posture and ensuing capability development pathways in the context of what Prime Minister Anthony Albanese explains, “We confront the most challenging strategic circumstances since the Second World War, both in our region and indeed around the world. That’s why we’re investing in our capabilities and we’re investing, too, in our relationships to build a more secure Australia and a more stable and prosperous region.
“It is the most significant work that’s been done since the Second World War, looking in a comprehensive way at what is needed. It demonstrates that in a world where challenges to our national security are always evolving, we cannot fall back on old assumptions," Prime Minister Albanese said at the formal announcement of the DSR in late April at Parliament House.
A key pillar for delivering this is the Royal Australian Navy and its surface and submarine fleets respectively, in recognising this, the DSR identifies the need to establish: “An enhanced lethality surface combatant fleet, that complements a conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine fleet, is now essential given our changed strategic circumstances ... Australia’s Navy must be optimised for operating Australia’s immediate region and for the security of our sea lines of communication and maritime trade.”
To this end, the Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister, Richard Marles, articulated the need for a “short, sharp” review into the make-up of the Australian Navy’s surface fleet, to reshape it into a flexible, future-proofed force capable of meeting the tactical and strategic operational requirements placed upon the service by the nation’s policymakers.
Explaining the logic behind the need for this review, the Deputy Prime Minister explained: “We do feel, as the review has recommended, that there is merit in having a short condition check at this moment in time about the future shape of our surface fleet. And there are a couple of reasons for that. The first is that the surface fleet, as it’s currently constructed, was determined at a time when Australia was still pursuing a diesel electric-powered submarine.
“Now that we are going to be operating a nuclear-powered submarine, that is a dramatically different capability, and it obviously has some implication in terms of the overall structure of the Navy, not only as we think about the next decade, but as we think about the next three decades. And the second is that the Defence Strategic Review has observed that navies around the world are moving in the direction, to put it kind of crudely, of having a larger number of smaller vessels. Now, with those two ideas in mind, we are thinking about the long-term structure of our surface fleet.”
But how will this shape the Royal Australian Navy and what sort of fleet do we actually need in light of the changing strategic circumstances?
Dual priorities — our immediate region and our sea lines of communication
The DSR identifies that “Australia’s Navy must be optimised for operating Australia’s immediate region and for the security of our sea lines of communication and maritime trade”, however these two, vastly different areas of responsibility necessitate a radical departure from the nation’s established surface fleet force structure, and I would argue the argument put forward by the Defence Minister.
In articulating this, the review establishes the need for: “An enhanced lethality surface combatant fleet, that complements a conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine fleet, is now essential given our changed strategic circumstances.”
Explaining further, the government and the review believes such a force structure should incorporate “Tier 1” and “Tier 2” surface combatants to provide for “increased strike, air defence, presence operations and anti-submarine warfare”, the review unpacks this, stating: “Enhancing Navy’s capability in long-range strike (maritime and land), air defence, and anti-submarine warfare requires the acquisition of a contemporary optimal mix of Tier 1 and Tier 2 surface combatants, consistent with a strategy of a larger number of small surface vessels.”
This seemingly indicates an expansion of the Royal Australian Navy’s surface fleet, bulking the fleet out with smaller, corvette style vessels to provide a continuous, regional presence, with vessels that aren’t as focused on high-intensity conflict, but still capable of adding something to any prospective fight.
These “Tier 2” vessels would be complemented by larger, more complex “Tier 1” vessels, similar to the Hobart Class and Hunter Class, respectively — adding to this, the review states: “This would significantly increase Navy’s capability through a greater number of lethal vessels with enhanced long-range strike (maritime and land) and air defence capabilities, together with the ability to provide presence in our northern maritime approaches."
There does appear to be a very large, very distinct elephant in the room, that is that the two priorities, being Australia’s immediate region and the security of our sea lines of communication and maritime trade require VASTLY different solutions.
This does become even more important when you account for the government’s “new” understanding of the Indo-Pacific and Australia’s role in it, namely, “For military planning, in terms of our strategic geography, the primary area of military interest for Australia’s National Defence is the immediate region encompassing the north-eastern Indian Ocean through maritime Southeast Asia into the Pacific. This region includes our northern approaches ... Australia’s immediate region encompassing the north-eastern Indian Ocean through maritime Southeast Asia into the Pacific, including our northern approaches, should be the primary area of military interest for Australia’s National Defence."
These two areas are made up of vastly different geographic realities, ranging from deep, open ocean through to tight, shallow littoral environments, confined by archipelagic states each with their own rapidly growing naval capabilities presenting unique, yet distinct challenges to be overcome.
But how will this shape the Royal Australian Navy and what sort of fleet do we actually need in light of the changing strategic circumstances?
Are we robbing Peter to pay Paul?
The Deputy Prime Minister’s insistence that much of the world is shifting away from larger surface combatants towards a numerically larger fleet of smaller vessels isn’t an entirely accurate statement.
The United States Navy is shifting from the maligned littoral combat ships towards larger, heavier armed guided missile frigates in the Constellation Class, meanwhile, the Royal Navy is maintaining its order for the anti-submarine warfare City (Type 26) Class frigates, while scaling back its smaller River Class OPVs to emphasise, larger, general purpose patrol frigates in the Inspiration Class.
Meanwhile, the People’s Liberation Army Navy is equally doubling down on its mass production of large, highly capable surface combatants, namely guided missile destroyers, frigates, cruisers, and of course, amphibious warfare ships and aircraft carriers, while balancing those domestic requirements with increasing numbers of large, long-range ocean-going corvettes for use in “maritime security” and coast guard duties.
Many commentators have sought to highlight the suitability of platforms like an up-gunned variant of the Arafura Class or Navantia’s Avante Class corvettes with their comparatively smaller operational ranges as viable solutions to adding much needed bulk to the Navy’s surface fleet at the cost of larger, more costly vessels like the Hunter Class frigates.
Both of these solutions present vessels designed for long-range patrol, in an offshore patrol environment, not for delivering high-end warfighting capabilities to the Navy, raising a particularly important question, namely, if we were to pursue one of those options, are we actually delivering “real” capability to the Navy?
Would it perhaps be better to indeed up-gun the Arafura Class but reduce the order from the original 12 to six, to serve as complements to the evolved Cape Class vessels being procured by the Navy for offshore maritime patrol missions — effectively minimising the maritime border patrol responsibilities of the Navy. With savings redirected towards beefing up the high-end warfighting capabilities of the surface fleet, or do we cancel the maligned Hunter Class program and buy an off-the-shelf design and cut out the middle man?
Going further, BAE Systems Australia has presented a solution to Navy, providing a modified version of the Hunter Class, reconfigured to serve in an air warfare destroyer role to complement the existing Hobart Class, while maintaining the original nine ship build as planned. Meanwhile, Navantia Australia has pitched an additional three Hobart class destroyers to be built either in Australia, Spain or a hybrid to add additional missile cells to the fleet.
Or is there a middle path? Can we balance our nuclear-powered submarine ambitions with a fundamental reshaping and expansion of the surface fleet?
The answer is yes, however, we need to be strategic in our thinking and requests of Navy.
Final thoughts
The best way to effectively expand the combat power of the Royal Australian Navy is to focus on combat vessels, not up-gunned constabulary vessels. This means a reduction by half of the Arafura Class order, while up-gunning the remaining order, adding extra fire power to the base design and maintaining a scaled back mine countermeasures and hydrographic support order will fulfil those operational requirements, with savings being redirected to accelerate the acquisition of the Naval Strike and Tomahawk missile systems.
Furthermore, adding an additional three Hobart Class vessels, including a modular block in the form of a “Hobart payload module” expanding the number of missile cells installed on the “Block II” vessels, with the “Block I” vessels, HMAS Hobart, Sydney and Brisbane, respectively, receiving the technology insertion as part of the planned combat system enhancements and upgrades.
Meanwhile, cutting three Hunter Class from the planned order would be an initial shock to BAE, however, the currently in development Type 83 destroyer program would provide incentive for the Australian government to continue the development of the Hunter Class hull as a longer term replacement for the Hobart Class, with savings put into the new block of Hobart Class ships and an additional Supply Class replenishment vessel at the cost of the Joint Support Ship program under SEA 2200.
Mothballing or selling HMAS Choules and joining the British Littoral Strike Ship program could equally provide an enhanced amphibious and humanitarian relief presence to complement the planned acquisition of more littoral manoeuvre vessels without impacting the combat vessel production line or costs.
Finally, working with the New Zealand government to establish the production line for a lighter, long-range general purpose patrol frigate with minimal changes (stop reinventing the wheel every chance you get Defence) to replace the ageing Anzac Class vessels in a shorter-term time frame, thus providing greater capability and long-range presence.
Rationalising the type of vessels, combined with the number of vessels also serves to build economies of scale, support a continuous naval shipbuilding program and support the broader national resilience and economic diversity. But those are just my thoughts.
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch
