US is central to Australia’s strategic security, but what if they’re not available?

It is an undisputable fact that much of the peace, prosperity, and stability of the post-Second World War paradigm came as a direct result of the US-led global order.

In putting an end to the often-ancient rivalries between varying imperial powers, the United States, through its post-war economic, political and most importantly, strategic might, guaranteed the freedom of the seas and promoted an explosion of free trade across the globe paving the way for the modern, interconnected global economy, and period of innovation we enjoy today.

Through this might, both conventional in its strategic arsenal, the United States established what has become known as a “strategic umbrella” where for greater input into their ally’s security policy and easier access to their markets, the United States would do the heavy lifting on the global geostrategic stage.

Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Western Europe have served as the beneficiaries of this new globalised world and radically new approach, ironed out at the Bretton Woods Conference, and then more drastically implemented through policies like the Marshall Plan to reconstruct Europe following the devastation of the Second World War — this golden era of the Pax Americana is now coming to an end.

This epochal end was reinforced by comments made by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on 22 December 2022, when he stated: “When it comes to Russia’s war against Ukraine, if we were still in Afghanistan, it would have, I think, made much more complicated the support that we’ve been able to give and that others have been able to give Ukraine to resist and push back against the Russian aggression.”

Ready or not, this new paradigm presents new challenges for Australia’s geostrategic policy community and the planning surrounding the Defence Strategic Review (DSR) as for the first time in lived memory, both we, and our great and powerful friend, the United States, face an increasingly contested and competitive world.

Despite the challenges presented to both Australia and the United States, the DSR still highlights the centrality of the United States to our national defence planning, with former defence minister Kim Beazley, in an ASPI piece titled US the critical ’top cover’ for the defence of Australia, articulates reinvigorated role imagined for the United States in our national defence planning.

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However, this position not only fails to account for the growing limitations of the United States relative to the number of challenges emerging not only in the Indo-Pacific, but more broadly, across the globe which require the attention of the US, as the world’s only truly “indispensable nation”, it also flies in the face of a particularly important line, articulated in the government’s DSR:

“Australia does not have effective defence capabilities relative to higher threat levels. In the present strategic circumstances, this can only be achieved by Australia working with the United States and other key partners in the maintenance of a favourable regional environment. Australia also needs to develop the capability to unilaterally deter any state from offensive military action against Australian forces or territory,” the DSR states.

So my question becomes, which is it? Are we depending on the United States for the strategic freedom they impart? Are we developing our own “unilateral” capacity to deter “any state” and using them as a fall back in the event our “strategic” capabilities fail?

Don’t underestimate the importance the alliance

Beazley reinforces the first part of the DSR’s aforementioned most interesting quote, while also highlighting the flexibility the United States has afforded Australia, stating, “The US alliance has provided us with excellent intelligence, training, and access to essential weapons. Also, ANZUS hovering in the background was a further deterrent to any local power contemplating interference with Australia.”

Unpacking this further and detailing the true impact of the US acting as Australia’s “big brother” on the school yard, particularly following the 1987 Defence White Paper which saw the nation’s transition from “Forward Defence” towards the continental strategy of the “Defence of Australia”, which continues to shape the nation’s defence and national security posture to this day, Beazley adds, “In our case, the advantage lay with the US, and we wanted the US to comprehend that. The US provided useful diplomatic and military cover for our involvement in the East Timor crisis without Washington paying a heavy price.”

However, things have changed. The relative rise of the People’s Republic of China comparative to the apparent decline of the United States, coupled with the rise of other regional powers like Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, India and the resurgence of Japan among others, all serve to reinforce the growing multipolarity of the world.

Beazley highlights the importance of this, stating, “All that is changed now. Australia no longer in a strategic backwater. China’s emergence as a military power and the South China Sea being contested paint a very different picture. Our redefined area of military interest incorporates that zone. We see it as vital.

“China’s rise has completely changed the concept of warning time and it’s of no value in calculating the emergence of a major threat to our interests and approaches. That can be mounted now from capabilities within the region,” he states.

However, Beazley cautions Australia’s strategic policy community from falling into the trap of viewing the economic, political, and strategic facing the United States through the prism of its domestic challenges, saying, “Our view of the capacity of the US is constantly caught up in the cacophony of its domestic politics and foreign policy errors, leading some of our commentators to constantly question American ability. That misses the underlying capacity of the US military, the inventiveness of its research community and its massive resources. We are deeply embedded in the US military, national security agencies and weapons acquisition programs. They have a resilience that the day-to-day politics might not reflect.”

In spite of this, this author would highlight the importance of preparing for the worst, and here we return to this portion of the DSR, “Australia also needs to develop the capability to unilaterally deter any state from offensive military action against Australian forces or territory,” because we return to that all important question, what does that look like?

If the US declines, prepare for massively expanded defence spending

Whether Australia’s political and strategic leaders want to admit it or not, the post-war era of economic prosperity and political and strategic stability is dependent upon a transactional relationship between the United States and smaller powers, whether they be traditional “great powers” like the United Kingdom, or middle powers like Australia, with this new era spelling trouble for the future.

This is perhaps best explained by US geostrategic analyst and author Peter Zeihan, who explains, “Most people think of the Bretton Woods system as a sort of Pax Americana. The American Century, if you will. But that’s simply not the case. The entire concept of the order is that the United States disadvantages itself economically in order to purchase the loyalty of a global alliance. That is what globalisation is. The past several decades haven’t been an American Century. They’ve been an American sacrifice.”

This is particularly troubling for the US-led world, as an increasing number of countries begin to shift away from the dollar-backed trading system, driven by growing uptake by the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) economic, quasi-security bloc that continues to expand its influence across the Middle East, Africa, South America and to a lesser extent, Southeast Asia, effectively undermining the economic balance of power much of the world has become dependent upon.

The true impact of this fragility, is highlighted by Beazley, who states, “Moving away from the US as uncertainties mount in our region accrue would be extraordinarily risky. If other powers in the region decide that access to our resources or land would solve their problems, we wouldn’t have the means to handle it. If a gutted US does emerge, prepare for a defence outlay massively north of 2 per cent of GDP.”

While Zeihan and Beazley both paint a particularly grim picture of the US strategic umbrella, particularly for the US as the leading strategic benefactor for the global order, Australia can learn from the weakness of the US-designed system, while leveraging its strengths, providing the United States with a period of respite to regather its strength and resilience.

Such a shift in Australian doctrine requires a dramatic shift in thinking, relationship building and most importantly, policymaking across domestic, industrial development and competitiveness, defence, and foreign affairs beyond what was outlined in the DSR — with massive potential benefits for Australia’s economic prosperity, national security, and resilience in the face of mounting geopolitical competition.

Final thoughts

There is no doubt that Australia’s position and responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific region will depend on the nation’s ability to sustain itself economically, strategically, and politically in the face of rising regional and global competition.

Importantly, if Australia is going to truly respond to the challenges and opportunities presented by the global shift in the balance and centre of economic, political, and strategic power to our immediate region, we, as a nation, need to collectively take responsibility for our own future.

We also need to address the domestic challenges we confront, namely, the social and economic disenfranchisement and disconnection many young Australians face, because if our young people don’t feel invested in our nation, then they definitely won’t step forward to defend the nation and our values.

Preparing the nation to truly face these challenges requires a unifying, inspirational Grand Strategy which not only articulates our values and principles, but equally identifies a vision at both the macro and micro level, with clearly defined objectives and metrics for delivering provides the nation with the capacity to resist the traditional and hybrid challenges of great power competition in the Indo-Pacific.

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..