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While much of the focus on the AUKUS trilateral agreement has been centred on the plans to deliver Australia’s nuclear-powered submarine fleet, the agreement provides unique opportunities for expanding the aggregated long-range strike capability of the US, the UK, and Australia, so why haven’t we launched a joint development program?
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There can be no doubt that 2023 has been a massive year for Australia’s defence and national security posture and capability development trajectory. The double whammy of our AUKUS pathway to delivering the nation’s future nuclear-powered submarine fleet, coupled with the long-awaited findings of the Defence Strategic Review (DSR), have set out the narrative and positioned the nation to move forward, albeit with some delays.
While much of the emphasis has been placed on the government’s restructuring and reorientation of the Army, shifting away from close, combined arms combat supported by heavy ground combat vehicles and comparatively short-range gun batteries towards a long-range, precision fires emphasis underpinned by platforms like the HIMARS and long-range strike missiles, respectively.
At the core of this reorientation is the government’s shift towards “impactful projection”, as defined by Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles. This approach will not only reshape the Australian Defence Force for the first time since the Dibb Review and Defence of Australia White Paper, but also the nation’s strategic approach to the increasingly fluid and contested power dynamics of the Indo-Pacific.
Marles explains this impact as, “I think increasingly, we’re going to need to think about our defence force in terms of being able to provide the country with impactful projection, impactful projection, meaning an ability to hold an adversary at risk, much further from our shores, across kind of the full spectrum of proportionate response. Now, that is actually a different mindset to what we’ve probably had before.”
The government, through both the DSR and subsequent engagement, highlights the central role of Australia’s future SSN-AUKUS fleet at the cutting edge of the nation’s long-range strike capabilities, however, the traditional frontline of the nation’s long-range strike capability, the Royal Australian Air Force, has been left largely high and dry, at a time when the government is seeking to maximise the strategic impact Australia has across the broadly redefined Indo-Pacific.
Repeated rhetoric from the government has sort to emphasise the historic importance of the Defence Strategic Review and its broader implications for the shape and role of the Australian Defence Force. It is equally no secret that the basis for the DSR and the proposed strategic realignment is based on two key factors, the increasing assertiveness of China, coupled with its unprecedented military build-up and militarisation of the South China Sea, combined with increasing concerns about not only the reliability of the United States, but also the capacity of the nation’s major strategic benefactor to actively maintain the regional and global order.
Highlighting Air Force’s role in this new strategic and geopolitical paradigm, the DSR articulates that, “The Royal Australian Air Force must be optimised to fight all aspects of air warfare. The support of maritime, littoral, and sustainment operations form Australia’s northern base network will be a high priority.”
Yet, despite the reality of our strategic circumstances and the rhetoric, by far, the biggest elephant in the room is the decision to not replace the long-range strike capability of the venerable F-111, with the government categorically ruling out an Australian acquisition of the B-21 Raider. This approach seemingly emphasises a “business as usual” approach to the nation’s execution and delivery of air power in the contemporary context, with little in the way of new or expanded acquisitions to markedly increase Australia’s air combat or air lift capabilities, beyond what has been announced.
This is highlighted in the DSR, which states, “The review has undertaken detailed discussions in Australia and the United States in relation to the B-21 Raider as a potential capability option for Australia. In light of our strategic circumstances and the approach to Defence strategy and capability development outlined in this review, we do not consider the B-21 to be a suitable option for consideration for acquisition.”
While this sounds rather definitive, there is a work around that doesn’t appear to have been considered, at least publicly.
AUKUS as a mechanism to co-develop a loyal wingman for the Raider
Boeing Defence Australia has been at the cutting edge of autonomous, loyal wingman aircraft following the release of its MQ-28 Ghost Bat in 2019, with the still developmental platform seemingly under consideration with the Royal Navy for operation off their Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers following proposed modifications that will install catapults and arrested landing capabilities, and potentially with the US Air Force where it is competing against the Kratos XQ-58 Valkyrie for the Skyborg program.
Yet most of the public emphasis has been placed on developing a platform that complements and supports fighter-sized aircraft, but nothing seems to have been developed to not just escort and complement the B-21 Raider, but to build an aggregated fleet of survivable, long-range strike, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms for the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia.
Capability aggregation across the three nations provides with a host of advantages to rapidly develop, test, and field a capability that can fill long-range strike and ISR roles in a contested environment, without detracting from the larger B-21 program, but equally drawing skills, experience, and expertise from the three partner nations.
Indeed, as highlighted in Pillar 2 of the AUKUS agreement framework, the emphasis on advanced technologies provides a mechanism to rapidly accelerate collaboration and partnerships between the three nations to meet a critical capability gap across all three nations.
The joint communique from the three leaders announcing the optimal pathway for the delivery of SSN-AUKUS highlighted the role collaboration between the three nations would play in shaping the subsequent stages of the agreement, stating, “AUKUS partners have made strong progress in the four advanced capabilities that the president and prime ministers identified in September 2021, and have recently initiated work in four additional areas. As we mature trilateral lines of effort within these and other critical defence and security capabilities, we will seek to engage allies and close partners as appropriate.”
Equally important is Pillar 2’s priority areas focusing on advanced artificial intelligence and autonomy and innovation providing the perfect test bed for the three partners to develop and deliver a loyal wingman-type platform to complement and support the limited numbers planned for the B-21 Raider fleet.
Value adding, economies of scale and taking greater responsibility for strategic security
There can be no doubt that the US, like many nations, is facing well-documented limitations on its industrial and strategic and tactical capability to project power and influence on the global stage. This is particularly true of the nation’s strategic bomber fleet, currently made up of the venerable B-52, B-1 and B-2 aircraft, with the latter two aircraft slated to be replaced by B-21 Raider, effectively resulting in a cut in the available strategic bomber force.
This is exemplified by former US Air Force vice chief of staff, General (Ret’d) John Loh, who has identified the key challenges facing America’s declining bomber force as a result of ageing airframes, shrinking budgets, and the narrowing qualitative and quantitative gaps between American and peer/near-peer competitor platforms.
“America’s bomber force is now in crisis. In the Air Force’s fiscal 2021 budget request, one-third of the B-1 fleet is set for retirement, B-2 survivability, modernisation is cancelled and the new B-21 is at least a decade away from contributing significantly to the bomber force. The venerable B-52 requires new engines and other upgrades to be effective,” Loh explains, setting the scene.
“The number of bombers are at their lowest ever, but demand for bombers increases every year, particularly in the vast and most-stressed region of the Indo-Pacific. Bombers are the preferred weapon system there because of their long range and huge payload capacity,” Loh explains.
Meanwhile, both Australia and the United Kingdom have a glaring capability gap in the area of conventional long-range strike following the retirement of the F-111 and the Avro Vulcan bomber respectively, significantly impacting the capability of these nations to implement “impactful projection” and maintain deterrence doctrines from a conventional lens in the era of renewed great power competition.
Final thoughts
While Beijing has undoubtedly been the principal focus and driving force for Australia’s Defence Strategic Review and the nation’s pursuit of increasing self-reliance and strategic capacity to “deliver combat power through impactful materiel and enhanced strike capacity — including over longer distances”.
This point becomes more important as the post-Second World War order and balance of power shifts away from a US-led and dominated, monopolar world, towards an increasingly multipolar world, driven by the domestic and international ambitions, anxieties, and interests of these rising powers.
I will go one further to this, how should Australia plan for a world that is no longer as benevolent as we have been used to for the past 80 years?
Simply put, how will emerging powers like Indonesia, India, Thailand, Vietnam, and others treat Australia and our concerns when their respective economic, political, and strategic clout simply overshadows our own and the relative regional power of our primary strategic benefactor?
In the face of a rapidly evolving global and regional paradigm, Australia’s strategic capabilities will need to be more diverse, putting all our eggs in the single basket, in this instance, the nuclear-powered submarines, and we certainly shouldn’t be making such categorical statements, without leaving the door open for further consideration, particularly when we have failed to provide any additional material transformation or capability to the ADF.
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
