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With renewed focus on the Defence estate and infrastructure across northern Australia to better support the delivery of “impactful projection” throughout the region, is it time to shift the posture of our bases from “passive” to “active” players in their own defence?
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When compared to deployed personnel, fighter jets or potent symbols of maritime power projection like aircraft carriers, domestic, fixed infrastructure is probably high on the list of “unsexy” defence capabilities right behind Defence ICT (don’t hate me, we all know it’s true).
Yet, like Defence ICT, base infrastructure, particularly the critical facilities across northern Australia, are fundamentally critical to supporting both the delivery of the government’s doctrine of “impactful projection” and allied operations throughout the Indo-Pacific.
Highlighting the centrality of this fundamental input to the nation’s defence capability, the government’s own Defence Strategic Review (DSR) reinforced this, stating, “We must posture for the protection of Australia and for integrated defence and deterrence effects in our immediate region.
“The key line of forward deployment for the ADF stretches across Australia’s northern maritime approaches. Integral to this sovereign Australian posture is the network of bases, ports and barracks stretching in Australian territory from Cocos (Keeling) Islands in the north-west, through RAAF bases Learmonth, Curtin, Darwin, Tindal, Scherger and Townsville,” the DSR highlights.
Equally important and central to the government’s pivot towards greater resilience across our northern Defence infrastructure is a series of follow-on statements through the DSR, namely, “The priority for this network is the series of critical airbases. This series of northern airbases must now be viewed as a holistic capability system and managed as such by the Chief of Air Force. There must be immediate and comprehensive work on these airbases undertaken in the following areas:
- Hardening and dispersal;
- Runway and apron capacity;
- Fuel storage and supply;
- Aviation fuel supply and storage;
- GWEO storage;
- Connectivity required to enable essential mission planning activities;
- Accommodation and life support; and
- Security.”
These key points, particularly in the security domain are further reinforced by the government’s (albeit vague) commitment to greater integrated air and missile Defence capability across the continent, particularly in response to the mounting challenges and threats presented as a result of the increasing proliferation of advanced precision munitions throughout the Indo-Pacific.
Again, this is reinforced in the DSR which states, “Defence must deliver a layered integrated air and missile defence (IAMD) operational capability urgently. This must comprise a suite of appropriate command and control systems, sensors, air defence aircraft and surface (land and maritime) based missile defences.”
Yet, despite all of this lofty and ambitious rhetoric, there are still questions about whether or not Australia’s critical northern infrastructure network will remain passive actors in their own defence or if they will get some teeth and become more active in their own defence.
Concrete and steel is cheap, people, vehicles and planes aren’t
Separate to capability acquisition, Australia’s geographic isolation and size presents a series of operational and strategic challenges for implementing a layered system of continental defence.
Nevertheless, the increasing proliferation of highly capable ballistic and cruise missiles throughout the region, most recently with announcements of a successful precision-guided, long-range ballistic missile by North Korea and the increasing capability of China’s own ballistic and cruise missile systems places Australia’s northern bases well within the danger zone.
While details remain thin in terms of what constitutes an actual “hardening” of our northern basing infrastructure, the reality is that concrete and steel are both cheap and plentiful while people, vehicles, ships, planes, and other capabilities in this increasingly interconnected world aren’t and we need to begin actively increasing the self-defence capabilities of this critical infrastructure beyond simply pouring more reinforced concrete.
This becomes an increasingly attractive option when pairing a suite of “effectors” ranging from something as simple as any of the potentially soon-to-be retired Phalanx Close in Weapons Systems (CIWS), the battlefield-proven Iron Dome or a Rolling Airframe Missile system, through to more permanently based NASAM installations, or larger, more complex Patriot systems with existing programs, namely, AIR 6500, the Air Force’s program to field a continental-based integrated air and missile defence and integrated battlespace command system (IBCS).
Supporting the introduction of the AIR 6500 program is the $1.2 billion AIR 2025 Phase 6 upgrade of JORN, which will focus on enhancing the capability of the JORN system to provide 24-hour military surveillance of the northern and western approaches to Australia, maximising the nation’s “defence in depth” capabilities.
JORN — Australia’s world-leading over-the-horizon technology, provides wide area surveillance at ranges of 1,000 to 3,000 kilometres and plays a vital role in supporting the ADF’s air and maritime operations — paves the way for developing a uniquely Australian layered defence system combining an IAMD and IBCS capabilities with multi-domain, anti-access, area denial (A2AD) capabilities.
Again, these programs are reinforced by the government’s AIR 6502 program, designed to operate either independently or while integrated with the Joint Air Battle Management System (JABMS) and other elements of the ADF’s IAMD capability to counter a range of current and emerging air and missile threats — with an estimated investment of between AU$4.9 and $7.3 billion, Defence intends to deliver the initial components of MRGBAD system in the late 2020s with the intention to build on the capability over the coming decades.
Equally, this aggregation of capabilities provides critical economies of scale for levels of in-country manufacturing for a suite of “effectors” as part of the larger, multi-billion-dollar Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance Enterprise, along with enhancing the value-add proposition for Australian industry within the allied supply chain context.
Final thoughts
Enhancing the resilience of our critical northern basing infrastructure will serve to provide the nation and forward deployed allied forces with a critical tactical and strategic edge over potential adversaries, while providing much needed depth to our national industrial capacity through commonality across critical platforms, weapons systems, and the associated economies of scale.
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
