Login
iscover
The era of disorder is upon us, the post-Second World War order is fraying, and our “long holiday from history” is now over as Australia and the world settle into a “new normal”.
To continue reading the rest of this article, please log in.
Create free account to get unlimited news articles and more!
Throughout history, the geopolitical environment has been the story of the rise and fall of empires and the ensuing periods of order and disorder that characterised these ebbs and flows.
Whether it was the intense competition between Rome and Carthage, Britain’s struggle with Napoleonic France, and in lived memory, the economic, political, and strategic competition between the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War.
By far, the most common characteristic of this history is the utter dominance of a small number of nations, empires or kingdoms over others, which created what is often described as a lopsided approach to the geopolitical concept of polarity, making the world a tricky environment in which to operate, particularly for middle and emerging powers.
The reality of our modern world is no different, this is despite the post-Second World War dominance of the United States over the global leavers of power, institutions, and commons.
Indeed, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, in particular, established the world as a “multipolar” environment in spite of the widely-held belief that the United States was the global hegemon, particularly following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, which required considered and measured diplomacy by all parties involved, particularly the global hegemon.
However, in recent years, the post-Second World War global order has come under assault both directly and indirectly as emerging powers like China and India, backed by established powers, including a resurgent and increasingly belligerent Russia, are all combining to begin building a parallel network of economic, political, and strategic organisations and arrangements to challenge the post-war global order.
At the core of this push is the intent to directly undermine the legitimacy and reputation of the United States and the post-war order as an increasingly elitist, unjust, and “Western-centric” at the expense of the Global South.
Leading the charge for this new, increasingly contested multipolar world is Mao’s, and now Xi’s China, seeking to leverage its now immense economic, political, and strategic might to right the wrongs of the past, namely the “Century of Humiliation” at the hands of colonial empires, with its eyes firmly set on usurping the global status quo.
In contrast for the United States, the incumbent global hegemon, the last three decades of unrivalled dominance and optimism post-Cold War have equally seen a hollowing out of the once-unrivalled US economic and industrial base, with disastrous forays in military adventurism in the Middle East and Central Asia, all the while, the world’s emerging powers rapidly develop their own immense economies and strategic capabilities to reshape the world in their image.
The evolving or rather deteriorating nature of this new global paradigm ultimately results in one thing: an increasingly disrupted and contested global environment that will directly impact global economic, political, and strategic security and for nations like Australia, which now finds itself at the epicentre of global competition and disruption to our prosperity, security, and stability in a new, multipolar world.
However, no matter where we look, the “long holiday from history” – that much of the West enjoyed following the end of the Second World War – is now over, with disorder, competition, and conflict no matter where one looks.
For the president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, Richard Haass, the new world order is one of disorder and it is something we had better get used to.
The US-China competition is the main show, but...
By now, we have all come to terms with the rapidly deteriorating state of international relations and the competition that’s underway between the world’s established and emerging orders, spearheaded by the United States and the People’s Republic of China, respectively.
However, this new multipolar world goes beyond the competition between the United States and China, with hundreds, if not thousands of years of religious, cultural, and ethnic competition, animosity and disdain colouring the relationship between many of the world’s established and emerging powers.
Typifying this paradigm-defining shift is organisations like the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) economic and political bloc, which is itself rapidly evolving into an anti-post-Second World War bloc, alongside other emerging multilateral organisations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) that are actively engaging in the undermining of the post-Second World War economic order and the US-dollar-centric international order in particular.
This reality is further complicated by policies and programs, namely the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as we have seen across our own region, Beijing extending its influence and reach through the South Pacific, across the Indian Ocean, in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and across much of sub-Saharan Africa. Beijing now effectively controls much of the critical infrastructure, resource deposits, and political leadership through its Belt and Road Initiative and other forms of foreign direct investment, which like the old adage of “all roads lead to Rome”, seeks to establish Beijing as the 21st century’s imperial centre.
Haass explains the deteriorating global situation, stating, “Much the same could be said of the state of the world today. As global leaders gathered in New York for the 78th annual session of the United Nations General Assembly – with the notable exceptions of Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and French President Emmanuel Macron – there were many reasons to be concerned.”
Without a doubt however, the competition between the United States and China is the “main event” on the global “fight card”, something that Haass explains, “The US–China relationship, arguably the most important of this era, is in poor shape despite a recent increase in the pace of diplomatic exchanges.
“The US goal is for the two major powers to establish a floor for bilateral ties. At best, however, the two governments will be able to avoid a crisis. But that is made more difficult by China’s refusal to resume military-to-military communications and establish a crisis communication channel. Even optimists don’t foresee a path for the two to cooperate meaningfully on pressing regional or global challenges in the near future,” Haass details.
China’s collapsing economic and demographic challenges equally present serious challenges to the global economic, political, and security paradigm, with much of the developed, and indeed developing world, dependent upon the economic mass and voracious appetite of the Middle Kingdom.
Haass details the impact of this declining economic performance, stating, “Meanwhile, China faces significant economic challenges, largely due to its own policy shortcomings. But even if the problems are homegrown, it doesn’t mean the consequences will remain confined to China. At a minimum, what happens there will impede global economic growth. At worst, there’s the possibility that China’s leadership will be tempted to act more aggressively abroad to distract from its domestic economic woes.”
Broader global concerns
While much of the global analysis and focus is firmly on the US-China “situationship”, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and ongoing troubles in Africa and the Middle East all serve to highlight that this new era of disorder is a truly global affair.
Haass highlights this truly global era of disruption, stating, “Another concern is that Ukraine’s counteroffensive, which was launched roughly three and a half months ago, has made limited progress. Well-fortified Russian forces still control large swathes of Ukraine’s east and south. This reality, along with Russia’s ability to boost its wartime weapons production – despite the US-led sanctions – and import arms from Iran and North Korea, suggests that the war, now well into its second year, will continue for some time.
Unpacking the global impacts further, Haas adds, “In Afghanistan, it’s increasingly clear that the new Taliban resembles nothing so much as the old Taliban. The real question is to what degree they will again allow their country to become a launchpad for terrorism. Then there’s the question of how much the Taliban will contribute to the instability that has exacerbated Pakistan’s vulnerabilities. And speaking of weak states suffering from poor governance, weak institutions and limited capacity, their number is growing in Africa and Latin America.”
Shifting to the Middle East, the outlook is mixed, despite the positive outlook between Saudi–Israeli relations following an effort to promote a “normalisation” of the relationship between the two once firm enemies, as competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran becomes more heated and direct.
This outlook in the Middle East is only further compounded by Beijing’s increasing influence in the Middle East, particularly with the expansion of the BRICS multilateral economic bloc. Haass explains this, saying, “In the Middle East, Iran recently released five American prisoners in exchange for Washington giving Tehran access to US$6 billion in frozen assets, on the condition that the funds be used only for food and medicine. The two countries also appear to be working on an arrangement – albeit not a formal pact – whereby Iran would accept some limits on its nuclear activities in return for sanctions relief.
“Similarly, negotiations appear to be making some headway on a US-brokered deal that would normalise relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia. If signed, this agreement has the potential to strengthen Saudi Arabia’s defences against Iranian aggression and provide Israeli–Palestinian diplomacy with some much-needed momentum,” Haas adds.
Bad news outweighs the good
While it is easy to dismiss the rising disruption as separate and isolated issues in geographically disparate locations, that would truly be a disastrous outcome for the United States and partners, including Australia, particularly as much of the global south are among the fastest-growing economies and largest populations in this newly emerging global order.
Whether India, Indonesia or South Africa, Brazil or developing nations across the former Soviet Bloc, or even NATO members like Erdogan’s Turkey, the global south is rapidly developing and seeking to shape their spheres of influence according to their ambitions, designs, and often ancient rivalries and ethnic tensions in accordance with their own transactional vision of the world, often where might makes right.
Ultimately, despite some good news on the global stage, for Haas, “there’s no getting around the reality that the bad news outweighs the good”, spelling trouble for nations like Australia which have increasingly hitched their wagon to the ongoing stability and prosperity of the post-Second World War order.
Final thoughts
Only by recognising the relative decline of the United States (not a popular opinion to state out loud) and accepting that the United States has limitations can Australia truly begin to take stock of the challenges of operating in this increasingly multipolar world.
However, it is critical for us to understand that Australia’s security, prosperity, and stability will not be determined by events in Europe, nor will they be determined by circumstances in the Middle East, while they may influence circumstance, our national future will not be determined by these areas.
It is important to highlight that in the coming era of multipolarity, Australia will face an increasingly competitive Indo-Pacific. Indeed, separate to the People’s Republic of China, our immediate region is home to some of the world’s largest populations with its fastest-growing economies with their own unique designs and economic, political, and strategic ambitions for the region.
Rather, we have to accept that while the world is increasingly becoming “multipolar”, the Indo-Pacific, in particular, is rapidly becoming the most hotly contested region in the world. Underpinned by the emerging economic, political, and strategic might of powers like China, India, Pakistan, Thailand, Vietnam, and the established and re-emerging capability of both South Korea and Japan, in particular, are serving to create a hotbed of competition on our doorstep.
Recognising this array of challenges and opportunities, both the Australian public and its policymakers need to look beyond the myopic lens that has traditionally dominated our diplomatic, strategic, and economic policy making since Federation.
Ultimately, we need to see Australia begin to play the long game to fully capitalise on the opportunities transforming the Indo-Pacific. The most important questions now become, when will we see a more detailed analysis and response to the challenges and opportunities facing Australia and when will we see a narrative that better helps industry and the Australian public understand the challenges faced and opportunities we have presented before us?
As events continue to unfold throughout the region and China continues to throw its economic, political, and strategic weight around, can Australia afford to remain a secondary power, or does it need to embrace a larger, more independent role in an era of increasing great power competition?
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
