Is the US really a ‘dysfunctional’ superpower?

Oh how the mighty have fallen.

Where once, the United States stood apart from its other great power rivals and compatriots, today, the “indispensable nation” is now beset by a series of rival nations each with their own unique designs and ambitions for the global order.

Across the globe, the post-Second World War order, largely established and preserved by the United States, now finds itself facing the emergence of multiple independent centres of influence.

In Asia, China and India lead the pack, with other established and emerging powers including Japan and South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, and a myriad of other smaller, yet equally important, emerging nations.

In the Middle East, with long-held ethnic and religious tensions between Israel and Saudi Arabia now subsiding, the normally volatile region is coming to terms with a rather odd geostrategic predicament, whereby Israel and Saudi Arabia stand opposed to long-term global pariah, Iran.

Meanwhile, in Europe, the 20th century’s hotbed of kinetic geopolitical competition, the elation the swept the continent following the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War has given way to the pseudo-supranational state that is the European Union, now an increasingly contentious bureaucratic body largely seen as a successful attempt by Germany to control the destiny of the continent.

However, traditional European great powers, including France, Germany, Italy, and of course, the United Kingdom, continue to grapple with the reality that while important, they are no longer the world’s pre-eminent and central powers, something Putin’s Russia seems unwilling to relinquish.

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At the edge of both the Middle East and Europe, straddles Erdogan’s Turkiye, eager to rekindle the might, glory, and influence of the Ottoman Empire and expand its interests in both regions, respectively.

Meanwhile, both Africa and South America are both hotbeds for mounting geopolitical and strategic competition, characterised by a number of regional and emerging global great powers, including Brazil, South America, Argentina, Mexico, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Algeria.

Against this backdrop, the US confronts a myriad of domestic challenges, including economic concerns, declining industrial capacity, immense domestic political division, and an administration that is increasingly seen as a belligerent laughingstock by many former partners and adversaries alike.

Enter former US defense secretary, Robert Gates, in a piece titled, The Dysfunctional Superpower: Can a divided America deter China and Russia?, in which he sets out the costly implications of America’s increasing dysfunction on the global stage.

Gates, who served as defense secretary for both George W Bush and Barack Obama, begins his scathing analysis stating, “The problem, however, is that at the very moment that events demand a strong and coherent response from the United States, the country cannot provide one. Its fractured political leadership – Republican and Democratic, in the White House and in Congress – has failed to convince enough Americans that developments in China and Russia matter.

“Political leaders have failed to explain how the threats posed by these countries are interconnected. They have failed to articulate a long-term strategy to ensure that the United States, and democratic values more broadly, will prevail,” Gates explains further.

While the cat is away, the mice will play

As the old saying goes, when the cat is away, the mice will play, and nowhere is this a truer statement than on the global stage. For when the global hegemon becomes distracted, or as Gates would advocate, dysfunction only entices competitors to act.

This reality is only further reinforced by the growing global discontent with the post-Second World War order of multilateral organisations, including the United Nations, World Bank and World Health Organisations, the International Monetary Fund, and others with much of the discontent being characterised by being elitist, often racist organisations designed to keep the global south impoverished and subservient.

Gates explains this stating, “The problem is not merely China’s and Russia’s military strength and aggressiveness. It is also that both leaders have already made major miscalculations at home and abroad and seem likely to make even bigger ones in the future. Their decisions could well lead to catastrophic consequences for themselves – and for the United States.

“Washington must therefore change Xi’s and Putin’s calculus and reduce the chances of disaster, an effort that will require strategic vision and bold action. The United States prevailed in the Cold War thanks to a consistent strategy pursued by both political parties through nine successive presidencies. It needs a similar bipartisan approach today. Therein lies the rub,” Gates explains further.

All of this combines to result in a major realignment at a time when the US-led world order is under both direct and indirect assault, particularly following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine which has, in some ways, particularly when coupled with the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan, revealed the relative decline in the United States on the global stage, despite there being some “miscalculations” by the new contenders.

Gates explains, “Despite Xi’s miscalculations and his country’s many internal difficulties, China will continue to pose a formidable challenge to the United States. Its military is stronger than ever. China now boasts more warships than the United States (although they are of poorer quality). It has modernised and restructured both its conventional forces and its nuclear forces – and is nearly doubling its deployed strategic nuclear forces – and upgraded its command-and-control system. It is in the process of strengthening its capabilities in space and cyber space, as well.”

Shifting towards the non-military front, Xi Jinping’s China has been equally engaged in terms of building up its global influence and power through a range of economic, diplomatic, media, and foreign investment mechanisms across both the developed and developing world.

This concerted efforts, ranging from China positioning itself as the major trading partner for more than 120 nations, including Australia, coupled with infrastructure and diplomatic initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), have served to position Beijing and its interests at the core of many foreign policymakers’ minds.

Gates explains, “China is now the top trading partner of more than 120 countries, including nearly all of those in South America. More than 140 countries have signed up as participants in the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s sprawling infrastructure development program, and China now owns, manages, or has invested in more than 100 ports in some 60 countries.

Explaining the “soft” cultural initiatives championed by the Chinese, Gates adds, “Complementing these widening economic relationships is a pervasive propaganda and media network. No country on earth is beyond the reach of at least one Chinese radio station, television channel, or online news site. Through these and other outlets, Beijing attacks American actions and motives, erodes faith in the international institutions the United States created after World War II, and trumpets the supposed superiority of its development and governance model – all while advancing the theme of Western decline.”

Shifting focus to the European-theatre, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, coupled with the somewhat contentious and spasmodic response from the West has only served to reinforce the belief that the West is truly stale, declining, and generally incapable of resisting this new world order, particularly as the dependence on a “dysfunctional” superpower continues to dominate policy making.

Gates explains, “In pursuit of Russia’s lost empire, he [Putin] invaded Ukraine in 2014 and again in 2022 – with the latter adventure turning out to be a catastrophic miscalculation with devastating long-term consequences for his country. Rather than dividing and weakening NATO, Russia’s actions have given the alliance new purpose (and, in Finland and soon, Sweden, powerful new members). Strategically, Russia is far worse off now than it was before the invasion.

“As long as Putin is in power, Russia will remain an adversary of the United States and NATO. Through arms sales, security assistance, and discounted oil and gas, he is cultivating new relationships in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia ... Emboldened by his partnership with Xi and confident that his modernised nuclear arsenal will deter military action against Russia, he will continue to aggressively challenge the United States. Putin has already made one historic miscalculation; no one can be sure he will not make another,” Gates details.

A shadow of its former self

There really is no escaping it, America is in a period of relative decline, particularly when compared to its truly astronomical period of economic and industrial rise during the mid-20th century.

However, despite this, there is some glimmer of hope, according to Gates, who assesses that the US still has plenty of potential ahead of it, with Gates stating, “Business investment in new manufacturing facilities, some of it subsidised by new government infrastructure and technology programs, is booming. New investments by both government and business in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, robotics, and bioengineering promise to widen the technological and economic gap between the United States and every other country for years to come.”

For Gates, this potential is further reinforced by the suite of modernisation programs that are currently underway transforming the tactical and strategic capability of the US Armed Forces, which Gates states, “The US military has been healthily funded in recent years, and modernisation programs are underway in all three legs of the nuclear triad – intercontinental ballistic missiles, bombers, and submarines.”

This modernisation goes further, with the Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, and Space Force each respectively undergoing expansive modernisation and at least modest expansions of their respective arsenals, with next-generation capabilities including sixth-generation fighter aircraft, new armoured vehicles, hypersonic munitions, submarines, and cyber capabilities designed to regain the advantage in the peer-to-peer competitor domain.

Gates, who has intimate knowledge of the US defence industrial base and the capacity to innovate, with him explaining, “The Pentagon is buying new combat aircraft (F-35s, modernised F-15s, and a new, sixth-generation fighter), along with a new fleet of tanker aircraft for in-flight refuelling. The army is procuring some two dozen new platforms and weapons, and the navy is building additional ships and submarines. The military continues to develop new kinds of weapons, such as hypersonic munitions, and strengthen its offensive and defensive cyber-capabilities.”

Yet again, despite this seemingly “optimistic” outlook, the reality is that America is a shadow of its former self, with domestic political “dysfunction” and “policy failures” essentially undermining the enduring and long-term stability of the United States and its capacity to engage as the “indispensable nation”.

Gates adds, “America’s political dysfunction and policy failures are undermining its success. The US economy is threatened by runaway federal government spending. Politicians from both parties have failed to address the spiraling cost of entitlements such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. Perennial opposition to raising the debt ceiling has undermined confidence in the economy, causing investors to worry about what would happen if Washington actually defaulted.”

This uncomfortable reality is further expanded upon with both the Trump and Biden administrations in the crosshairs, with Gates adding, “Diplomatically, former President Donald Trump’s disdain for US allies, his fondness for authoritarian leaders, his willingness to sow doubt about the United States’ commitment to its NATO allies, and his generally erratic behaviour undermined US credibility and respect across the globe. But just seven months into the administration of President Joe Biden, the United States’ abrupt, disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan further damaged the rest of the world’s confidence in Washington.”

The public need to be brought on the journey

Gates is scathing in his attack on America’s political class over their respective years, if not decades of policy failure and partisan political brinkmanship and the implications on the nation’s industrial and economic capacity and most critically, the American public’s investment in the future of the nation and the order it has built.

Front and centre of this is the urban/rural divide which has become increasingly reflected in the political disengagement and division, driving the growing public fatigue, sentiment, and tendency towards isolationism.

Gates explains this, stating, “It is not surprising that after 20 years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, many Americans wanted to turn inward, especially given the United States’ many problems at home. But it is the job of political leaders to counter that sentiment and explain how the country’s fate is inextricably bound up in what happens elsewhere.”

This statement echoes the sentiments of 19th century American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan who summarised this belief in reference to the importance of the naval power on America’s future.

Stressing this importance, Gates explains, “Americans need to understand why US global leadership, despite its costs, is vital to preserving peace and prosperity. They need to know why a successful Ukrainian resistance to the Russian invasion is crucial for deterring China from invading Taiwan. They need to know why Chinese domination of the Western Pacific endangers US interests. They need to know why Chinese and Russian influence in the global South matters to American pocketbooks.”

Importantly for Gates, the message that needs to be conveyed is one of relative simplicity, with him explaining, “What is that message? It is that American global leadership has provided 75 years of great-power peace – the longest stretch in centuries. Nothing in a nation’s life is costlier than war, nor does anything else represent a greater threat to its security and prosperity.”

Going further, Gates explains the implications of declining or a complete failure on America’s part to get itself together and maintain its position as the global hegemon, with him saying, “A world without reliable US leadership would be a world of authoritarian predators, with all other countries potential prey. If America is to safeguard its people, its security, and its liberty, it must continue to embrace its global leadership role. As British Prime Minister Winston Churchill said of the United States in 1943, ‘The price of greatness is responsibility’.”

America isn’t alone in facing these challenges, as Australia’s repeated domestic, foreign, industrial, and defence policies of the last three decades (at least) come home to roost, leaving the nation dangerously exposed to the whims, ambitions, and designs of others in our immediate region.

Final thoughts

Only by recognising the relative decline of the United States (not a popular opinion to state out loud) and accepting that the United States has limitations can Australia truly begin to take stock of the challenges of operating in this increasingly multipolar world.

However, it is critical for us to understand that Australia’s security, prosperity, and stability will not be determined by events in Europe, nor will they be determined by circumstances in the Middle East, while they may influence circumstance, our national future will not be determined by these areas.

It is important to highlight that in the coming era of multipolarity, Australia will face an increasingly competitive Indo-Pacific. Indeed, separate to the People’s Republic of China, our immediate region is home to some of the world’s largest populations with its fastest growing economies with their own unique designs and economic, political, and strategic ambitions for the region.

Rather, we have to accept that while the world is increasingly becoming “multipolar”, the Indo-Pacific, in particular, is rapidly becoming the most hotly contested region in the world. Underpinned by the emerging economic, political, and strategic might of powers like China, India, Pakistan, Thailand, Vietnam, and the established and re-emerging capability of both South Korea and Japan, in particular, is serving to create a hotbed of competition on our doorstep.

Recognising this array of challenges and opportunities, both the Australian public and its policymakers need to look beyond the myopic lens that has traditionally dominated our diplomatic, strategic, and economic policy making since Federation.

Ultimately, we need to see Australia begin to play the long game to fully capitalise on the opportunities transforming the Indo-Pacific. The most important questions now become, when will we see a more detailed analysis and response to the challenges and opportunities facing Australia and when will we see a narrative that better helps industry and the Australian public understand the challenges faced and opportunities we have presented before us?

As events continue to unfold throughout the region and China continues to throw its economic, political, and strategic weight around, can Australia afford to remain a secondary power, or does it need to embrace a larger, more independent role in an era of increasing great power competition?

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..

Stephen Kuper

Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.

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