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The Albanese government’s Defence Strategic Review heralded a shift away from the structure of a “Balanced Force” towards a “Focused Force”, marking a dramatic departure from the status quo, which while not all bad, does leave questions about if we’re getting this right.
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In the last 40 years, Australia, like the world, has undergone two major realignments of global economic, political, and strategic power with wide-reaching impacts on the posture, doctrine, and structure of the Australian Defence Force.
Beginning in the late-1980s with Paul Dibb’s review of Australia’s defence posture, culminating in the Defence of Australia white paper which advocated for a shift away from the post-Second World War doctrine of “Forward Defence” and the ensuing power projection focused force structure towards a more “balanced force’’.
Championed by Australian strategist Paul Dibb, the Defence of Australia white paper released in 1987 advocated “self-reliance” and a sense of “balance” between the individual services to maximise the deterrence and active response capabilities available to the Australian Defence Force and policymakers based on our limited materiel, financial and manpower resources.
Dibb’s white paper highlights this stating, “This government’s policy of defence self-reliance gives priority to the ability to defend ourselves with our own resources. Australia must have the military capability to prevent an enemy from attacking us successfully in our sea and air approaches, gaining a foothold on our territory, or extracting political concessions from us through the use of military force. These are uniquely Australian interests and Australia must have the independent military capability to defend them.”
While the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990 and the emergence of a monopolar world led by Australia’s primary strategic benefactor, the United States, was largely unexpected, the significantly scaled back delivery of what was originally proposed in the 1987 Defence White Paper was not unforeseeable in the elation of the “peace dividend” and the “End of History”.
As the potential for peer competitor conflict subsided and the Islamic terrorism became the priority, successive Australian governments embraced the peace dividend and significantly scaled back the nation’s investment in its defence capabilities and doctrines, despite rhetoric and maintaining spending at the vaunted 2 per cent of GDP (periodic exceptions notwithstanding).
However, with the benefit of hindsight, we now know that while much of the Western world was focused on disastrous interventions in the Middle East, equally ambitious, revisionist, and committed powers were quietly watching, investing, and positioning themselves to eventually replace the post-Second World War order.
Fast forward to the last five years and the material conditions of the world have changed dramatically.
The established global order led by the United States as the “indispensable nation” is not only in retreat, its legitimacy, its stability and its prosperity have all shown signs of fatigue, domestic political polarisation, and genuine disenfranchisement with holding the world together. While the previous government, through the 2020 Defence Strategic Update, identified, and in many ways, preceded the findings of the Albanese government’s Defence Strategic Review and the nation’s shift away from a “Balanced Force” towards a “Focused Force”.
This dramatic shift in the regional and global status quo and Australia’s response has created extensive debate in policy making, academic and military circles, however, one question seems to have been overlooked: In the case of a “Balanced Force” versus a “Focused Force”, have we chosen correctly?
Definitions are important
In order to answer this question (based on the publicly available information at least), we have to understand how both a “Balanced Force” and “Focused Force” are conceptualised and defined in the contemporary Australian context.
Beginning with the “Balanced Force”, the Defence Strategic Review defines it as: “A balanced force is designed to be able to respond to a range of contingencies when the strategic situation remains uncertain. This force design required that the ADF respond to low-level threats related to continental defence, regional operations in support of Australian interests and global support to our alliance partner, the United States.
“In this approach, while the balance of the force was primarily designed for the Defence of Australia, the broader purpose of the ADF was for it to be structured to respond to a range of contingencies. This conceptual approach to force structure planning, which has led to like-for-like replacements in military platforms in the ADF, is deeply ingrained in Defence’s culture,” the DSR explains.
This approach, as explained in the Defence Strategic Review, has undoubtedly resulted in some questionable acquisition decisions based on the “like-for-like”, or as has often been the case, the arbitrary approach (*cough* three Hobart Class destroyers to replace six Adelaide Class frigates *cough*) without accounting for even the potentiality of changing tactical and strategic realities.
Simply put, rather than studying history, we wholeheartedly embraced the “End of History” and naively believed that our “long holiday from history” would endure in perpetuity.
Conversely, the Defence Strategic Review defines a “Focused Force” thus: “This conceptual approach to force structure planning will lead to a force designed to address the nation’s most significant military risks. The capabilities required to address identified threats will also provide latent capability to deal with lower-level contingencies and crises.”
Seems simple enough to understand, right? Or, if like me, you’re left wondering why there is so little meat on the bones of what a “Focused Force” actually is when compared to a “Balanced Force”, then don’t worry, you’re not alone.
Equally, if a “Balanced Force” positioned the ADF to be “designed to be able to respond to a range of contingences when the strategic situation remains uncertain”, then surely, the ADF as a whole doesn’t need a root and branch overhaul, but rather requires some minor “rejigging” to maximise the capabilities we have and plan to field in coming years.
Or...
Are we actually completely missing the mark and leaving ourselves dangerously underprepared, under-equipped, and underfunded to face this new era of great power competition?
Are we getting this right?
Arguably for Australia, the stakes have never been higher.
We confront the reality that is the relative decline of main security benefactor in the United States, which continues to descend into domestic political chaos, coupled with mounting economic and financial concerns that continue to plague the United States.
Meanwhile, rising great powers in the Indo-Pacific, namely China, continue to assert their own interests, ambitions, and designs in this new world. Equally important is the acceptance that our region isn’t solely defined by one great power, rather we face a hotbed of geopolitical, religious, and ethnic competition, often based in historic grievances and animosities, each of which add an additional layer of complexity to Australia’s strategic and tactical planning.
Against this broader geostrategic backdrop, the question has to be asked, what is better placed to serve Australia’s tactical and strategic requirements in coming decades, a “Balanced Force” or a “Focused Force”? And what do these look like when accounting for the challenges?
In order to deliver this new “Focused Force”, the Albanese government embarked on additional reviews designed to supplement and ensure the delivery of the key findings of the Defence Strategic Review.
Army and Navy are at the epicentre of this structural realignment for the Australian Defence Force’s combat capabilities, meanwhile, the Air Force has seemingly been left in a state of limbo.
In fact just this week, the Albanese government announced the major restructuring of the Australian Army in line with the findings of the Defence Strategic Review, delivering a number of major changes for the Army.
At the core of this decision is, as the government announced, “1st Brigade will be light, agile, and quick to deploy in the littoral environment. Third Brigade will be an armoured brigade designed for amphibious operations with the Royal Australian Navy in order to secure decisive terrain. Seventh Brigade will be motorised and optimised to project by air and sea to respond to regional contingencies.”
Minister for Defence Richard Males reinforced the importance of this, stating, “These changes to Army are about responding to the recommendations of the Defence Strategic Review to maintain peace, security, and prosperity in our region.
“This will mean Army has a concentration of people and capabilities in Australia’s north, making it easier to deploy for training, major exercises or to support our partners and allies in the region,” the Defence Minister explained.
Acting Chief of Army Major General Richard Vagg expanded on the minister’s comments, explaining, “This is about organising Army to train as we would fight and making the most of the resources we have been assigned.
“These changes will deliver world class, relevant, and credible combat capabilities that are focused and optimised for operating in the littoral environments of our region, on land, at sea, and in the air," MAJGEN Vagg added.
Shifting to the other branch slated for a fundamental restructuring as part of the shift towards a “Focused Force”, the Navy, which is balancing the dual requirements of preparing to field a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines and the expected impact on the surface fleet.
Accordingly, the government announced the launch of a “short, sharp” review into the makeup of the nation’s surface fleet, conducted by United States Navy Vice Admiral (Ret’d) William Hilarides, assisted by former Secretary of the Department of Finance, Rosemary Huxtable, and former Commander Australian Fleet, Vice Admiral Stuart Mayer.
Again, we refer to comments made by Defence Minister Richard Marles who explains, “The independent analysis into Navy’s surface combatant fleet capability will help ensure our Navy’s surface combatant fleet is fit for purpose and appropriate for our strategic circumstances.”
Minister Marles added, “We will take the necessary time to consider this analysis to ensure we have an appropriately balanced surface fleet that contributes to a fully integrated and more capable Defence Force.”
Again, we have to remember that the government’s Defence Strategic Review also seems to leave Air Force “as is” with no planned, proposed, or rumoured, for that matter, expansion to the nation’s air combat capability, and only a marginal expansion of the nation’s airlift capabilities.
So, if all of this combines to create a “Focused Force” as prescribed by the government, what exactly is it focused on? Because as it stands, this “Focused Force” looks more like a budget constabulary force seeking to masquerade as a credible middle power’s military.
It should be reinforced that statement is not an indictment on the men and women who serve in the Australian Defence Force, rather it is an indictment of our national apathy and laziness when it comes to really taking responsibility for our own national security.
Final thoughts
The rapidly deteriorating geopolitical and strategic environment that is transforming the global and regional security paradigm requires a realistic analysis and assessment by Australia’s policymakers.
Equally, while taking shortcuts to end up with 50 per cent of something, as opposed to 100 per cent of nothing, as proposed by the government. is an admirable goal. However, ultimately, it will only prove more costly in the long run as we scramble to rapidly develop high-end warfighting capability.
Equally, both the Australian government and the Australian public have to accept and understand that we will need to dramatically increase spending in our national defence and do so over the long term, rather than short-term sugar hits or sleight of hand that push money out over the forward estimates and allow inflation to account for “increases” in spending, despite there being little-to-no new money in real terms.
Ultimately, this comes back to the government’s shift away from a “Balanced Force” towards “Focused Force” as championed in the Defence Strategic Review and the foundational problem that is our lack of clearly defined role and objectives for our own defence capabilities.
This reality equally fails to account for the planned increase in ADF personnel by 2040 and places ultimate hope in a series of as yet to be developed “wunderwaffe” or wonder weapons, like autonomous systems, cyber or tactical weapons like HIMARs and others that are being shoehorned into fulfilling “strategic” roles to provide both “impactful projection” and deterrence against “any potential adversary”.
Importantly, no one has said that defending the nation in this era of renewed and increasingly capable great power competition will be cheap or easy and we have to accept that uncomfortable reality.
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
