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With indications pointing towards a growing US presence in the eastern Mediterranean to provide unspecified support to Israel following the devastating attack by Hamas, questions have to be asked about America’s capacity and commitment to maintaining the global order.
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No matter where one looks, the global order upon which our wealth, security, and stability has been built over the last eight decades is under assault.
Whether it is on the steppes of eastern Europe, the rolling hills of the Holy Land or the vast waters of the Pacific, the blood is in the water and the sharks are circling.
Forgive the hyperbole, but events over the last week have only served to reinforce the uncomfortable reality that “the world” we knew is gone.
At the centre of this emerging new world order is the relative decline of the world’s once undisputed economic, political, and strategic hegemon, the United States, coupled with the emergence, or in some cases, re-emergence of once mighty historic powers with their own unique and often competing designs for the global order.
Where the United States once strode abroad victorious and unchallenged in the aftermath of the Cold War, optimism gave way to hubris and an expectation that the United States would unilaterally wield its immense power to solve the world’s problems.
From Somalia, Kuwait, Iraq, Kosovo, to Afghanistan, Iraq (again), Libya, and Syria, alongside longstanding commitments to global security across Asia and Europe, the United States really embraced its position as the de facto “World Policeman”.
For the most part, the world was happy to allow the United States to unilaterally fulfil this role; however, this wasn’t to last.
Behind the scenes, once great powers embraced the unrestricted economic opportunity and stability provided by the United States all the while beginning to fulfil their ultimate, ideological objective – the end of the post-Second World War global order.
As the US conducted operations, guided by the highest of ideals and objectives across the globe, in often case, destabilising otherwise relatively stable regions and governments (yes, Hussein and Gadaffi were despicable dictators, but can we realistically say those regions have benefited from US intervention?) becoming bogged down in costly “forever wars”.
Meanwhile, revolutionary powers like China, a resurgent Russia under Vladimir Putin, and other emerging global powers, including India, Brazil, and a number of others, across the “developing world”, are seeking to enjoy the economic opportunities enjoyed by the “developed world”.
This confluence of events provides a foundation for understanding the predicament which now faces the world as the United States has announced it will deploy the combined might of Carrier Strike Group 12, led by USS Gerald R Ford, to the eastern Mediterranean following Hamas’ devastating and horrific sneak attack on Israel.
Against this backdrop, The Australian Financial Review’s James Curran, in a piece titled, Another ‘forever wars’ distraction for America, raises concerns about America being potentially drawn into yet another “forever war” in the Middle East, which spells major issues for the already fraying global order.
Equally important to keep in the back of one’s mind is comments made by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on 22 December 2022, in which he highlighted concerns about the capacity of the United States to directly deter and engage a competing great power: “When it comes to Russia’s war against Ukraine, if we were still in Afghanistan, it would have, I think, made much more complicated the support that we’ve been able to give and that others have been able to give Ukraine to resist and push back against the Russian aggression.”
The real cost in blood and treasure
America’s involvement across the Middle East throughout the 1990s and into the 21st century proved to be immensely costly not only for the American treasury coffers but the lower and middle classes of the US, which were compounded by a hollowing out of the once mighty US industrial base in favour of cheaper, offshore manufacturing as part of the unrestricted globalisation of industry and trade.
The dualistic combination of these costs has only received some attention in public policy, academic and political circles, with most of the emphasis being placed heavily on the “blood and treasure” costs to the budget bottom line and manpower lost.
Critically, the real “at home” cost to America’s middle class and economic heartland has only served to ferment disillusion with the status quo, and most importantly, America’s role as the global policeman when conditions at home continue to worsen and successive generations of young men, in particular, are decimated by endless conflict.
This uncomfortable reality only becomes more important when considered against growing domestic US sentiment towards the continuing support of the Ukraine war and now announcements by the Biden administration that US special forces will provide advisory support to the Israeli Defense Force.
Curran explains, stating, “For Washington, the implications for its domestic politics and its foreign policy are once more acute. Republicans suddenly look even more indulgent now for causing legislative dysfunction in the US Congress, a state of affairs that will only feed the perception of an America adrift as the world continues to burn.”
Unpacking the impacts of this further, Curran adds, “Washington has been looking to free itself of commitments around the world in an effort to focus not only on its home front but on the China challenge. But such is the lot of the sole superpower; it now has wars to manage in the Middle East and Europe simultaneously as it gears up Asian allies for strategic competition with China.”
Against this, it is hard to see how the United States or the world would benefit from direct, kinetic, US involvement in the Middle East, particularly given the potential for the relatively contained conflict to become a much larger, regional conflagration.
Seeking to ward off any potential Iranian involvement, the US, seeing its own limited influence in the region already waning, has sought help from Beijing to help contain any potential spillover that could embroil the Middle East in an ethnic and religious conflict not seen since the Crusades.
Curran explains this, saying, “it [the US] is now looking to China for help. Beijing, which toughened up its statement on the Hamas attacks after visiting American lawmakers pointed out it lacked sympathy for Israel, would still have welcomed US entreaties for it to intervene with Iran. Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer emerged from a rare audience with the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, confident Beijing will use its influence with Tehran so the conflagration doesn’t spread”.
This, however, only reinforces the reality of America’s waning influence as the world’s unrestricted global hegemon, a reality that surely isn’t lost on China’s leadership.
Final thoughts
One can’t help but be drawn back to the comments of US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken when he revealed the uncomfortable reality that the emperor, indeed, has no clothes and has a long way to go before the wardrobe will be fully restocked.
Importantly for Australia’s policymakers and public, we are going to have to accept two uncomfortable realities. First, the United States, despite the best of intentions, may not be capable of actively defending the global order a scale and over a protracted period of time as it currently stands.
Second, Australia is in for a bumpy ride as the Indo-Pacific becomes the main battleground for geopolitical, economic, and strategic competition in the 21st century. We can’t escape it, so we had better plan accordingly.
Ultimately, we need to see Australia begin to play the long game to fully capitalise on the opportunities transforming the Indo-Pacific. The most important questions now become, when will we see a more detailed analysis and response to the challenges and opportunities facing Australia and when will we see a narrative that better helps industry and the Australian public understand the challenges faced and opportunities we have presented before us?
As events continue to unfold throughout the region and China continues to throw its economic, political, and strategic weight around, can Australia afford to remain a secondary power, or does it need to embrace a larger, more independent role in an era of increasing great power competition?
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
