Renewed concerns about the impact of ‘dysfunctional’ US

It goes without saying that no major nation has escaped the upheaval, disruption, and chaos of the last five years.

Least of all the world’s hegemon, the United States, which has increasingly faced a spectrum of challenges both foreign and domestic.

In particular, the mounting domestic political polarisation and division which is reaching fever pitch in the lead up to the 2024 general election, coupled with political brinkmanship over debt ceilings, have all served to highlight a superpower which doesn’t have its own house in order.

This uncomfortable reality has only been further reinforced by America’s unquestioningly disastrous Afghanistan withdrawal, and now the added complexities stemming from having to juggle the requirements of both Ukraine’s ongoing conflict against Russia and support for Israel in light of the surprise attack by Hamas.

Each of these factors ultimately combine to create an increasingly dysfunctional image of the United States with a range of impacts on the global balance of power, particularly in the Indo-Pacific.

Highlighting this is Graeme Dobell, senior fellow for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), in a piece titled, The dysfunctional US as great and powerful friend, in which he highlights the mounting concerns and impacts of America’s dysfunction on Australia’s security and stability in the Indo-Pacific.

Dobell draws heavily from a piece written by former defense secretary Robert Gates, titled, The Dysfunctional Superpower: Can a divided America deter China and Russia?, particularly for Australia against the context of the great power competition rapidly reshaping the world and our region.

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All of this is particularly important as Prime Minister Anthony Albanese heads to Washington next week.

Concerns about our ‘great and powerful friend’

Like any good partner, Australia is rightfully concerned about the health of its “great and powerful friend” as defined by Australia’s longest-serving prime minister and founder of the modern Liberal Party, Robert Menzies, following the formalisation of the ANZUS Treaty during the height of the Cold War.

For Dobell, this concern, stemming from the aforementioned range of factors, serves to shake Australia’s sense of security and trust in the stability of the United States, when he states, “Today’s dysfunction can divert and distract the superpower. Gates sees no ‘long-term strategy to ensure that the United States, and democratic values more broadly, will prevail’.”

While much of the concern stems from the increasingly polarised nature of American society and political discourse, the emphasis on the potential implications of a second Trump administration off the back of comments made by Gates equally highlights a detachment from reality about the realistic outcomes of Trump’s first term as president.

Sorry, I hate to say it, but I MUCH prefer mean tweets and a peaceful world, to the dumpster fire we now face.

Dobell does highlight that Albanese will seek to emphasise the importance of the relationship, while seeking to minimise any potential “hedging” by Australia in light of mounting concerns surrounding America’s enduring stability and cohesiveness.

“The hedging quandary will get no public attention as Anthony Albanese heads to the White House next week for his first visit as prime minister, offering his version of the totem: “The Australia–United States relationship is unique in scale, scope, and significance, reflecting more than 100 years of partnership between our nations,” Dobell states.

In doing so, Dobell states that this will allow Prime Minister Albanese to “lift his eyes above the Washington mayhem” to emphasise the nation’s enduring commitment to the relationship and not fall prey to the seemingly inherent chaos of the US system as it currently stands.

The need for a realistic view?

For Dobell, the necessity for Prime Minister Albanese to view the current reality of the US domestic and foreign political challenges through a Menzies-esque realistic lens will be increasingly important.

Dobell explains, “Albanese will hew to the familiar frame of the great and powerful friend, even if a prime minister from Labor’s left will never lift the phrase from the Liberal Party founder. Menzies, though, was a canny realist beneath the silver tongue and political carapace. And the calculations underpinning the three dimensions of his totem can take the alliance temperature in a time of feverish temper.”

This only becomes more important as the relative economic, political, and strategic power of the United States continues to stagnate at best and decline at worst when compared to the world’s rising superpowers, namely China.

Dobell states, “The economic element of power tells a tale of shifting relativities. Under the purchasing power parity metric, China overtook the US to become the world’s top economy in 2014. The US is still number one when measuring nominal GDP in US dollars. Which indicator you pick can depend on the argument you want to make about power.”

Unpacking this further, Dobell highlights the impact of dysfunction in US public policymaking in the Indo-Pacific, stating, “In the region that matters to Australia, a rich new era of Asian commerce arrives, yet US protectionism means it will have ‘fewer economic carrots to offer’ and US ‘economic and political sway will be diminished’, as The Economist notes. ‘America will retain influence over Asian security, but its economic importance will decline’.”

For Dobell, it is important to highlight that a realist view as presented by Menzies predetermines enduring US interest in the post-Second World War global status quo across the economic, political, and strategic domains.

Dobell explains, “The canny realist’s view was that the US had an abiding interest in maintaining the global balance. And these days, the global balance is set in the Indo-Pacific (even Europe quietly adjusts). Australia’s defence strategic review mentioned it as a simple statement of fact: ‘The Indo-Pacific is the most important geostrategic region in the world.’ The new geography of power adds extra value to the ‘friend’ dimension of the totem. What the Indo-Pacific demands of the US becomes the broad frame for the ANZUS friendship.”

Despite this, concerns about the stability of the United States remain, which will, as Dobell posits, no doubt figure strongly in Prime Minister Albanese’s mind during his visit to the United States, no doubt with major implications for the nation’s future.

Final thoughts

It is only by recognising the relative decline and accepting that the United States has limitations that Australia can truly begin to take stock of the challenges of operating in this increasingly multipolar world.

However, it is critical for us to understand that Australia’s security, prosperity, and stability will not be determined by events in Europe, nor will they be determined by circumstances in the Middle East, while they may influence circumstance, our national future will not be determined by these areas.

It is important to highlight that in the coming era of multipolarity, Australia will face an increasingly competitive Indo-Pacific. Indeed, separate to the People’s Republic of China, our immediate region is home to some of the world’s largest populations with its fastest-growing economies with their own unique designs and economic, political, and strategic ambitions for the region.

Rather, we have to accept that while the world is increasingly becoming “multipolar”, the Indo-Pacific, in particular, is rapidly becoming the most hotly contested region in the world, underpinned by the emerging economic, political, and strategic might of powers like China, India, Pakistan, Thailand, Vietnam, and the established and re-emerging capability of both South Korea and Japan, in particular, is serving to create a hotbed of competition on our doorstep.

Recognising this array of challenges and opportunities, both the Australian public and its policymakers need to look beyond the myopic lens that has traditionally dominated our diplomatic, strategic, and economic policymaking since Federation.

Ultimately, we need to see Australia begin to play the long game to fully capitalise on the opportunities transforming the Indo-Pacific. The most important questions now become, when will we see a more detailed analysis and response to the challenges and opportunities facing Australia and when will we see a narrative that better helps industry and the Australian public understand the challenges faced and opportunities we have presented before us?

As events continue to unfold throughout the region and China continues to throw its economic, political, and strategic weight around, can Australia afford to remain a secondary power or does it need to embrace a larger, more independent role in an era of increasing great power competition?

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..