Renewed concerns about ‘overstretched’ capacity of superpower US

In late October 1980, Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan addressed the American people, outlining his plan for “A Strategy for Peace in the 80s”, during which he reminded the American people, “Whether we like it or not, it is our responsibility to preserve world peace because no one else can do it.

“We cannot continue letting events and crises get out of control, we must, through sound management and planning, be in control so as to prevent being confronted by a crisis. This requires a sound economy, a strong national defence, and the will and determination to preserve peace and freedom.”

In trying to re-energise a dejected American people, Reagan spoke to the ideals that impregnated American society since the earliest days of the Republic and sought to highlight the opportunities that could come from America’s role as the “Leader of the Free World”.

Today, America is a far cry from the heights of its post-Second World War glory, at home, the nation is politically polarised, and abroad, the “indispensable nation” is now beset by a series of rival nations each with their own unique designs and ambitions for the future of the global order.

Across the Indo-Pacific, China and India lead the pack, with other established and emerging powers including Japan and South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, and a myriad of other smaller, yet equally important, emerging nations.

In the Middle East, often ancient ethnic and religious tensions have been reignited following Hamas’ devastating attack on Israel in early-October, serving to set back the “normalisation” of relations between Israel and much of the Muslim world.

This renewed conflict in the Holy Land has also served to stoke the embers of regional competition and enflame the already “cold” rivalry between Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and Iran, serving to once again draw the United States into a potential devastating regional conflict.

VIEW ALL

Finally, in Europe, the elation the swept the continent following the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War has given way to intense competition between the member states within the increasingly contentious, pseudo-supranational, bureaucratic state that is the European Union, and in the face of mounting external threats.

This has largely been driven by the reluctance of traditional European great powers, namely France, Germany, Italy, Putin’s Russia, and the United Kingdom, to come to terms with the fact that while important, they are no longer the world’s pre-eminent and central powers.

Perhaps most concerningly, this has often brought these nations and US “allies” into direct opposition to the plans of the United States for the post-Second World War order which have only increased the shock and economic, political, and strategic impact of direct provocations, namely Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Based on this “tale of the tape”, it is clear to see how even the United States, for all of its seemingly limitless economic, industrial, political, and strategic power, as the world has witnessed since the end of the Cold War, is a superpower that is increasingly “overstretched” by the emergence of the new, contested multipolar world.

Highlighting the confluence of these factors and its impact on the United States is The Economist in an analysis piece, titled, The overstretched superpower, stressing the impact of the new multipolar paradigm.

Facing a new, all-encompassing multipolar paradigm

By now, it is no secret, at least to most of the national security, international relations, and public policy community, that the world of the unipolar, post-Cold War world dominated by the United States no longer exists.

While there are some corners of the public and political communities that refuse to accept this uncomfortable reality, particularly in Australia where large portions of both our political leaders and public seem to live in a state of arrested development when it comes to the reality and implications of this new multipolar world, even large portions of the American community are beginning to accept the limitations on their power.

Highlighting this, The Economist states, “President Joe Biden is thus turning into an unlikely wartime president. He was not exaggerating when he told Americans in a recent televised address that the world was at an inflection point. When America acted to help Ukraine resist Russia’s invasion, many asked whether it had the wherewithal to deter a looming Chinese assault against Taiwan.

“Yet academics debate whether and when the ‘unipolar’ world, in which America bestrode the globe after the cold war, reverted to a ‘bipolar’ one, in which America is challenged by China rather than the Soviet Union; or whether it is already a ‘multipolar’ world. Joseph Nye, a Harvard academic, defined national power in three dimensions: military, economic and ‘soft power’, i.e., the ability, among other things, to co-opt others to do your bidding,” The Economist explains.

However, today’s multipolar world and its competition is considerably more “holistic” and “all encompassing” than the Cold War, with more in common with the competition between European great powers from the 15th century through to the end of the Second World War.

The Economist further explains this new reality, explaining, “In military terms, America remains a colossus. Economically, the world is bipolar in a way it never was during the Cold War, with China’s economic output somewhat smaller than America’s at market exchange rates, and surpassing it at purchasing-power parity (though Americans remain far richer than Chinese). Soft power is harder to measure, but it is probably fair to say the world is more multipolar.”

As part of the renewed US push to face down this new contested, multipolar world, both the Biden, and its preceding, Trump administrations have sought to “fortify” America’s economic, industrial, and diplomatic capacity across the globe through a number of policy mechanisms.

At the core of the economic and industrial aspect of this is the rise of “homeland economics” as defined by Callum Williams where he explains, “Homeland economics wants to protect the world from similar shocks in the future. It wants to keep the benefits of globalisation, with its emphasis on efficiency and low prices, but avoid the downsides: the uncertainty and unfairness of the previous system. This requires meshing national security and economic policy.”

Shifting back to the relevance of this in the context of the “overstretched superpower” and the multipolar world, The Economist articulates the impacts of the two administrations on the multipolar world, “In office, Mr Biden’s priority has been revitalising the American economy. He borrowed the protectionist mindset of his predecessor, Donald Trump ... Abroad, Mr Biden sought to revitalise alliances that Mr Trump had either neglected or threatened to undo ... [Yet] much of this has gone awry for Mr Biden ... America’s chaotic departure from Afghanistan allowed the Taliban to return to power instantly. In the Gulf, meanwhile, China took the plaudits for the restoration of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, appearing to fill a vacuum left by American indifference.”

Rather than disproving the gloating statements made by President Biden following his election that “the adults were back in charge” and that the US would once again begin to assert itself on the global stage to reinforce the values, principles, and the structures that built and maintained the post-Second World War order, the rapid devolution of the world has only served to reinforce the uncomfortable reality that we live in a multipolar world.

What is the impact of these competing interests?

As previously mentioned, many American allies and partners are now beginning to ask questions not only about the commitment of the United States to maintain global order, but also whether they can continue to be the “world’s policeman” when facing the perfect storm of disruption, polarisation, and competition at home and abroad.

Highlighting this, The Economist, citing Kori Schake of the American Enterprise Institute, states, “America’s allies around the world, especially in Asia, ask two seemingly contradictory questions ... First, will American resources and attention be diverted to the Middle East? Second, will America’s resolve in one or other crisis fail? If we allow the security of Europe to be destabilised by Russian aggression, or allow Israel to suffer a terrible terrorist attack, they will believe that we don’t care about any other problem.”

All of this only becomes more relevant and worth of consideration when one considers the recent expansion of the BRICS organisation, coupled with the limited efficacy of US sanctions against Russia following the invasion of Ukraine, mounting tensions over Taiwan, and Hamas’ barbaric attack on Israel, all serve to highlight that while the “cat is away, the mice will play”.

Against this backdrop, it is easy to become nihilistic and defeatist in the face of mounting peer and emerging near-peer challenges. It is important to recognise that America’s defeat in Vietnam did not precipitate an American abandonment of Europe during the height of the Cold War, nor did the loss precipitate a loss of confidence in the capacity of the US to defend Western Europe from hostile Soviet actions, in fact, if anything it had a counter effect.

However, it is equally important to understand, that as previously mentioned, the circumstances of this new multipolar era are vastly different to that of the Cold War and the competition contained within that era and that the United States faces far more capable adversaries today.

The Economist articulates the impact of these factors, stating, “America’s reliability as an ally comes down to both credibility and capacity. Given America’s many alliances, academics have long debated the importance of credibility: does a failure to live up to obligations to one ally affect commitments to others?

“America must supply weapons to Ukraine, Taiwan and now Israel. That raises doubts about whether its defence industries can meet their needs as well as its own. In general, America sends different weapons to the three countries, but some demands overlap. For instance, 155mm artillery shells are in short supply, and America is reported to have diverted a consignment intended for Ukraine to Israel. The war in Ukraine has shown how big state-on-state conflicts consume vast quantities of munitions. War games suggest that, in a war over Taiwan, America would quickly run out of the long-range anti-ship missiles that would be most useful in repelling a Chinese invasion of Taiwan,” The Economist articulates.

Enter former US defense secretary Robert Gates, in a piece titled, The Dysfunctional Superpower: Can a divided America deter China and Russia?, in which he sets out the costly implications of America’s increasing dysfunction on the global stage.

Gates, who served as defense secretary for both George W Bush and Barack Obama, begins his scathing analysis stating, “The problem, however, is that at the very moment that events demand a strong and coherent response from the United States, the country cannot provide one. Its fractured political leadership – Republican and Democratic, in the White House and in Congress – has failed to convince enough Americans that developments in China and Russia matter.

“Political leaders have failed to explain how the threats posed by these countries are interconnected. They have failed to articulate a long-term strategy to ensure that the United States, and democratic values more broadly, will prevail,” Gates explains further.

This reality is only further reinforced by the growing global discontent with the post-Second World War order of multilateral organisations, including the United Nations, World Bank, and World Health Organisations, the International Monetary Fund, and others with much of the discontent being characterised by being elitist, often racist organisations designed to keep the global south impoverished and subservient.

Gates explains this stating, “The problem is not merely China’s and Russia’s military strength and aggressiveness. It is also that both leaders have already made major miscalculations at home and abroad and seem likely to make even bigger ones in the future. Their decisions could well lead to catastrophic consequences for themselves – and for the United States.

“Washington must therefore change Xi’s and Putin’s calculus and reduce the chances of disaster, an effort that will require strategic vision and bold action. The United States prevailed in the Cold War thanks to a consistent strategy pursued by both political parties through nine successive presidencies. It needs a similar bipartisan approach today. Therein lies the rub,” Gates explains further.

All of this combines to result in a major realignment at a time when the US-led world order is under both direct and indirect assault, particularly following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine which has, in some ways, particularly when coupled with the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan, revealed the relative decline in the United States on the global stage, despite there being some “miscalculations” by the new contenders.

America isn’t alone in facing these challenges, as Australia’s repeated domestic, foreign, industrial, and defence policies of the last three decades (at least) come home to roost, leaving the nation dangerously exposed to the whims, ambitions, and designs of others in our immediate region.

Final thoughts

Fundamentally, where much of the analysis falls short is as a result of the lens through which many analysts and commentators view foreign affairs, mainly through an almost romantic, “gentlemanly” lens where the realpolitik is done behind the scenes, while empty platitudes, pointless press conferences, and joint communiques are the status quo.

This romantic world view often leaves us vulnerable as a result of viewing the world as they would like it to be, rather than how it actually is. The world, whether we like to admit it or not, is a jungle and the law of the jungle is one of when the lion is hungry, he eats.

The uncomfortable reality is something we are now witnessing in real time with the chaos sweeping across the world in the face of the seemingly weak Biden administration.

In this era of renewed competition between autarchy and democracy, there is a conversation that needs to be had in the open with the Australian people, as ultimately, they will be called upon to help implement it, to consent to the direction, and to defend it should diplomacy fail.

If we are to achieve this, Dr Ross Babbage of the Centre for Strategic Budgetary Assessments told Defence Connect, “I think what we’ve got to show what’s the vision for Australia, you know, what can we achieve and what you know if we go on the trajectory we are on at the moment. I’ll tell you what, you know, a lot of people, a lot more people in a decade’s time are likely to be either in really dumb jobs or maybe not have jobs at all, and in the society be a lot weaker and will be a lot less prosperous.

“So what we want to say is, look, there’s plenty of scope for doing more and smarter things, encouraging investment to do that, and then there will be some very, very interesting additional jobs and opportunities, a lot of high tech, and so on, I can tell you that, you know, talking to foreign investors, they’re quite keen on principle to work here, and do a lot more here and provide a lot more good jobs for Australians,” he explained.

This requires a greater degree of transparency and a culture of collaboration between the nation’s strategic policymakers and elected officials and the constituents they represent and serve – equally, this approach will need to entice the Australian public to once again invest in and believe in the future direction of the nation.

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..