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Opinion: The concept of “deterrence” sits at the core of the 2024 National Defence Strategy; however, achieving a true deterrent capability is a journey and Australia is still a while from getting to the destination. So, what exactly are we missing, asks Air Marshal (Ret’d) John Harvey AM.
Deterrence – specifically deterrence by denial – is at the heart of the 2024 National Defence Strategy (NDS24), which states, “The National Defence Strategy will see a Strategy of Denial become the cornerstone of Defence planning. This approach aims to deter any conflict before it begins, prevent any potential adversary from succeeding in coercing Australia through force, support regional security and prosperity and uphold a favourable regional strategic balance.”
The NDS24 rightly acknowledges that Australian forces alone cannot achieve the desired deterrence outcomes. It therefore highlights broader forms of deterrence, notably:
- Collective deterrence, pursued in concert with the US and key partners: “…focusing Defence’s international engagement efforts on enhancing interoperability and collective deterrence”.
- Extended nuclear deterrence, relying on US capabilities: “…Australia’s best protection against the increasing risk of nuclear escalation is US extended nuclear deterrence and the pursuit of new avenues of arms control”.
The missing link – international deterrence
Absent from the NDS24 is the concept of international deterrence – an extension of collective deterrence. International deterrence refers to the role of the broader international community – outside of formal alliances – in dissuading aggression through coordinated political, diplomatic and economic pressure. It is grounded in the idea that a potential aggressor may be deterred by the prospect of facing unified global condemnation and economic or diplomatic isolation.
While this concept held promise in the immediate post-Cold War period, its effectiveness has since been eroded. States such as Russia, China, Iran and North Korea – sometimes referred to collectively as an “Axis of Resistance” or more colloquially the “Rectangle of Ratbags” – have demonstrated a willingness to undermine international norms. For example, efforts to enforce sanctions on Russia following its illegal invasion of Ukraine were actively circumvented by members of this bloc.
Recent policy changes by the US in relation to Ukraine, and resulting tension with other Western nations, have further eroded the potential effectiveness of international deterrence.
Despite these limitations, international deterrence remains an important tool. It can bolster legitimacy, build coalitions and provide the diplomatic groundwork for more formal responses. For Australia, advancing international deterrence will require the lead of agencies beyond Defence – particularly the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade – to align diplomatic initiatives with broader security objectives.
The bigger omission – integrated deterrence
Of greater significance is the absence of a clear commitment to integrated deterrence – a concept formally introduced by the United States in 2021. Integrated deterrence recognises that deterrence is not achieved through military power alone but by synchronising all tools of national power:
“Integrated deterrence entails developing and combining our strengths to maximum effect, by working seamlessly across warfighting domains, theatres, the spectrum of conflict, other instruments of US national power and our unmatched network of alliances and partnerships. Integrated deterrence is enabled by combat-credible forces, backstopped by a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent.”
In essence, integrated deterrence is a strategic approach that incorporates military, diplomatic, economic and informational instruments of national power to discourage adversarial behaviour. International deterrence, as discussed above, can be considered a component of this broader framework.
While the NDS24 does not explicitly refer to integrated deterrence, it does acknowledge the importance of a whole-of-nation approach, “…this new strategic reality requires a fundamentally new approach to Australia’s defence – one that leverages and coordinates all arms of national power to achieve an integrated approach to Australia’s national security”.
Translating this concept into practice, however, is far from straightforward. Implementation will require sustained coordination, clear policy frameworks and significant investment. To approach this complexity systematically, integrated deterrence should be examined through four key lenses.
Four lenses for considering integration
1. National and international participation – At the national level, Australia must integrate all its elements of national power – military, diplomatic, economic and informational – to enhance deterrence. This is a whole-of-government challenge and requires a dedicated national security strategy and a resilient domestic base to underpin national power.
At the multinational level, Australia must decide how best to integrate with allies, partners and the broader international community. Should integration be bilateral, multilateral or via a “hub-and-spokes” model centred on the United States? Should it occur only within or also across warfighting domains?
2. Degree of integration – Integration is a term used often and loosely. The term “integration” is generally accepted to mean the bringing together of disparate elements to achieve an optimum – or at least improved – outcome. It exists on a spectrum of increasing cooperation, as shown below:
- Uncoordinated
- Deconflicted
- Coordinated
- Integrated
- Fused
Understanding where elements of Australian national power and those of its allies and partners sit on this continuum is essential to developing realistic goals and assessing progress.
3. Level of application – Integration must also be considered across different levels of security planning, both internally and with its allies and partners:
- Strategic
- Operational
- Tactical
- System
The level of integration also needs to be considered within warfighting domains and across warfighting domains and in relation to other components of national power.
4. Elements of national power – Effective deterrence depends on elements of national power employed and how they are combined. These elements of national power include:
- Military
- Diplomatic
- Economic
- Informational
In Australia’s case, the potential and limits of integration will differ across these elements and will also vary between allies and partner nations. Understanding where integration is feasible or desirable in each element is a precondition for effective planning.
Conclusion – A suggestion for NDS 2026
Preparation of NDS26 is already underway. To effectively implement the strategy of deterrence by denial, the NDS26 must move beyond a defence-centric approach. It should embrace integrated deterrence as a core organising principle and embed it within a broader national security strategy.
While the conceptual case for integrated deterrence is compelling, implementation is inherently complex. However, addressing integration systematically using the four lenses outlined above provides a structured framework for strategic planning. It offers a means of setting realistic targets, actions to be taken and identifying current capabilities and measuring progress.
John Harvey is a retired Air Marshal in the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). His ADF career spanned more than 30 years, with early emphasis on employment as a navigator and weapons officer in Canberra and on F-111 aircraft and later in more diverse roles such as technical intelligence, military strategy, visiting fellow Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University, program manager for the Joint Strike Fighter Project for Australia and Chief of Capability Development Group. He also served as NSW defence advocate from June 2016 to September 2021.
