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Opinion: Anthony Albanese’s victory on 3 May 2025 marked a crossroads for Australian national security. With a secured majority, Albanese can reshape Australia’s geopolitical future, confronting strategic dilemmas Canberra has long avoided, explains strategic analyst Shay Gal.
It is now time for Australia to openly and pragmatically consider nuclear deterrence as a central pillar of its national security strategy.
Though Albanese hasn’t previously endorsed nuclear weapons, his advancement of AUKUS and AU$368 billion commitment to nuclear submarines signals openness to strategic shifts.
Surveys show 75 per cent of Australians perceive China as a military threat within two decades. Although 60 per cent view a Taiwan conflict as critically dangerous, most favour neutrality – highlighting complex public opinion. Yet Labor maintains nuclear abstinence.
China’s militarisation of artificial islands and coercion towards Taiwan involve immediate military capabilities: China’s approach to the Indo-Pacific resembles a controlled escalation strategy, incrementally advancing its dominance without provoking decisive response – mirroring Iran’s tactics. Beijing’s rapidly modernising navy, about 395 warships in 2025, will reach 435 by 2030.
Its nuclear arsenal includes approximately 600 warheads and advanced DF-41 intercontinental missiles, capable of striking Australia directly.
Labor must acknowledge that nuclear propulsion through AUKUS already positions Australia in the nuclear sphere – denying this is unrealistic. If nuclear technology is strategically acceptable below the waves, why not seriously debate its use as a credible deterrent above them?
Lessons from Ukraine: The perils of relying on external guarantees
Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine was a stark global wake-up call. Ukraine surrendered nuclear weapons under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum but found assurances worthless when Russian tanks rolled towards Kyiv. Ukraine’s tragedy shows clearly: without independent deterrence, diplomatic promises cannot guarantee security.
Australia stands today in a perilously analogous situation. Canberra currently relies exclusively on US security guarantees, reminiscent of Kyiv’s tragic miscalculation. While Washington remains a critical ally, total reliance on external protection in an era of unpredictability – especially given recent political volatility in America – is a dangerous gamble.
Australia’s historical stance on nuclear abstinence must now be revisited. Since signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1973, Labor has consistently championed nuclear disarmament, reaffirming its support for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) as recently as 2023. This tradition underscores the internal tension the Albanese government must navigate.
Australia’s legal environment poses challenges, requiring repeal of Sections 10 and 140A (ARPANS, EPBC Acts), risking challenges from anti-nuclear groups, and conflicts with state bans in Victoria and Queensland. These domestic legal hurdles must be balanced against the strategic imperative of ensuring national sovereignty.
Yet transitioning to nuclear deterrence would demand substantial investment. Estimates, based on India’s nuclear program costs, indicate that developing a minimal nuclear deterrent could cost AU$50–100 billion initially, covering uranium enrichment facilities, missile delivery systems, research and development, and ongoing security and maintenance. These costs, though significant, must be weighed against the catastrophic economic risks of strategic vulnerability, such as Chinese naval blockades disrupting 90 per cent of Australia’s maritime trade.
China’s intercontinental ballistic missiles underscore Australia’s vulnerability, given the limited capability of its existing missile defence systems. Without credible nuclear deterrence, Australia risks severe economic disruption from potential Chinese naval blockades.
Australia’s strategic crossroads: Courage or complacency?
Australia could consider adopting a policy of nuclear ambiguity, mirroring Israel’s long-standing strategy, which successfully deters adversaries while mitigating diplomatic fallout. Such ambiguity would allow Australia strategic flexibility without immediately triggering severe regional backlash.
Prime Minister Albanese faces a historic choice: maintain outdated nuclear abstinence or courageously debate nuclear deterrence. Adopting nuclear deterrence carries regional and domestic risks but outweighs dangers of strategic vulnerability. Such a shift could provoke sharp international criticism or diplomatic repercussions, particularly from neighboring states such as Indonesia.
Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam may see Australia’s nuclearisation as destabilising, risking regional arms races or jeopardising AU$150 billion annual ASEAN trade. These risks must be weighed against the strategic need for enhanced deterrence.
To be clear: the argument here is not reckless nuclear proliferation. Rather, it is a call for rigorous, mature and transparent debate on a restrained, credible, second-strike capability aimed purely at deterrence. The threat of overwhelming nuclear retaliation would significantly diminish China’s incentives for direct military coercion or conflict – effectively safeguarding Australian sovereignty in a profoundly uncertain era.
This nuclear debate must be part of a strategic doctrine emphasising realism, autonomy and decisive action. Alliances alone cannot indefinitely secure Australia’s interests. Sovereignty demands independent strategic capability.
Labor’s mandate empowers Albanese to recalibrate Australia’s security posture, recognising sovereignty and deterrence as inseparable.
Canberra must recall lessons from Ukraine, Kuwait and Taiwan: international approval offers little comfort when survival is at stake.
Recognising this vulnerability, Canberra has significantly increased preparedness through the 2023 Defence Strategic Review, prioritising nuclear-powered submarines and advanced military technologies.
Moreover, developing an indigenous nuclear capability would require Australia to swiftly surmount significant scientific and technical challenges, including uranium enrichment facilities costing AU$10–50 billion, secure storage compliant with IAEA standards, ballistic missile integration and training 1,000+ specialised nuclear scientists, based on India’s decades-long nuclear program timeline. These hurdles must be balanced against the strategic imperative of autonomous deterrence.
Australia must transparently debate nuclear deterrence, weighing economic, geopolitical and security implications. The Albanese government should initiate an independent expert evaluation of nuclear deterrence, examining economic feasibility, diplomatic impacts and public discussion.
Breaking Australia’s nuclear taboo is not aggression – it’s a strategic necessity, essential for safeguarding Australia’s sovereignty, security, future and regional stability. Ultimately, any decision must secure broad public legitimacy through rigorous democratic consultation.
Shay Gal is a strategic analyst and adviser specialising in international security, diplomatic strategy and geopolitical crisis management. He advises senior government and defence leaders.
Previously, Gal served as vice president of external relations at Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), overseeing strategic initiatives in defence policy, international cooperation and security diplomacy.
