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With the debate now swinging towards building a genuine Australian “sea control” capability, it’s time to ask what that ecosystem of forces and technologies should look like for shaping the nation’s future maritime security.
Throughout history, control of the sea has been a decisive factor in the prosperity and security of nations. The American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan observed in his seminal 1890 work, The influence of sea power upon history, that “whoever rules the waves rules the world”.
Mahan’s central thesis, that maritime power underpins both economic strength and strategic freedom, remains highly relevant to Australia, a nation whose geography and prosperity are inherently and inexplicably linked to the maritime environment.
Sea control, in its simplest form, refers to the ability to use the sea for one’s own purposes while denying its use to an adversary. Historically, this concept shaped the rise of empires, from Athens and Rome to the British Empire, and in the modern era, the United States.
Mahan argued that “the necessity of a navy, in the restricted sense of the word, springs ... from the existence of peaceful shipping and disappears with it”. With this in mind, for Australia, an island continent dependent on maritime trade, the implications are stark: the nation’s survival, security and economic prosperity are inseparably tied to the control of surrounding seas and access to global maritime routes.
The Indo-Pacific today is the centre of global economic dynamism and, increasingly, geopolitical competition. Roughly two-thirds of global trade passes through these waters, with critical chokepoints such as the Malacca Strait serving as the lifeline of international commerce.
As a trading nation, Australia relies heavily on secure sea lines of communication for both exports such as iron ore, coal and liquefied natural gas and imports, including fuel, manufactured goods and essential components for industry. Disruption to these flows would not only threaten the Australian economy but also rapidly erode national resilience in a crisis.
The regional security environment is undergoing rapid transformation. The rise of China as a maritime power, the modernisation of regional navies and intensifying competition over disputed waters have created a more contested and uncertain maritime domain.
This has direct and consequential implications for Australia, while the United States and its allies continue to uphold freedom of navigation – the prospect of coercion or denial of access to key sea routes is no longer abstract.
As Mahan warned, “control of the sea by maritime commerce and naval supremacy means predominant influence in the world”. If Australia is unable to assure its own maritime interests, it risks vulnerability to both economic pressure and military coercion.
Consequently, the importance of Australia developing credible capabilities to achieve sea control cannot be overstated. This does not mean aspiring to match larger powers ship-for-ship, but rather ensuring that the Australian Defence Force, particularly the Royal Australian Navy, is able to safeguard maritime approaches, protect shipping and contribute to allied operations in contested waters.
Critically in today’s interconnected world, contemporary sea control extends beyond traditional naval forces, encompassing air, cyber and space-based assets that together ensure situational awareness and the ability to deny adversaries freedom of action.
For Australia, a secure maritime domain is not simply a strategic objective, it is the foundation of national survival. Mahan’s insights, though articulated in the late 19th century, remain a warning for the 21st: without the capacity to control the seas that sustain it, a nation risks losing both economic independence and strategic freedom.
In the Indo-Pacific century, Australia’s prosperity and security will depend on how seriously it takes this enduring truth. With this in mind, how Australia responds, through its force structure and disposition, acquisition and diplomatic efforts will shape Australia’s security and prosperity well into the 21st century.
The road so far
Australia’s historic approach to sea control has always reflected its geography and reliance on allies. From Federation, Australian naval policy was shaped by the recognition that an island continent could not be secure without maritime protection.
Early Australian governments viewed control of the sea largely through the prism of imperial defence, with the fledgling Royal Australian Navy (RAN) established in 1911 to complement the Royal Navy.
During both World Wars, Australia relied heavily on Britain’s maritime supremacy to ensure secure sea lanes, although Australian ships played a vital role in convoy escort, anti-submarine warfare and amphibious operations.
The shift in strategic dependence from Britain to the United States after 1942 reinforced this reliance. While the RAN grew in professionalism and capability, including fielding one of the most well-rounded and robust naval fleets following the end of World War II, Australia continued to operate within a broader alliance framework rather than pursue independent sea control.
The Cold War further embedded this approach, with the RAN contributing specialist capabilities such as destroyers, submarines and patrol forces, all under the umbrella of US naval dominance. This history left Australia with a tradition of contributing to collective maritime security but limited emphasis on self-reliant sea control.
In the contemporary Indo-Pacific, this legacy has created real and often glaring capability gaps.
The RAN faces the challenge of a small fleet stretched across vast areas, limited ability to assure sea lines of communication independently and growing demands for presence in contested regions.
As the regional balance of power shifts, Australia must confront the reality that historic reliance on larger allies may no longer be sufficient to guarantee control of its own maritime approaches.
The question is how Australia confronts these challenges moving forward and what shape this takes as part of the Australian Defence Force’s shift towards an “integrated, focused force”.
A convoluted path forward
While for many Australians, it is clear that our planned fleet of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines will form the basis of our future sea control plans, particularly through our strategy focused on unilaterally deterring any nation as outlined in the 2023 Defence Strategic Review, submarines are a small part of a much larger equation.
However, in today’s interconnected economic, political and strategic environment, Australia’s efforts to secure sea control will require more than a relatively small (between five and eight, at this stage) conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines to deliver our maritime security in an era of great power competition close to home.
Rather, Australia will require an integrated web of capabilities that will help deliver true sea control across each of the warfighting domains, from land through to space and cyber space. One of the key challenges Australia is going to have to grapple with is the reality that the interests of many nations, particularly emerging, major powers both regionally and globally, may not necessarily intersect with our own.
This presents significant operating challenges, particularly for our shifting and evolving Army, which is being reshaped to become a littoral-focused force, capable of “long-range” fires through the introduction of platforms like the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System and the integration of Precision Strike Missiles, however, they will require a firing point, and in the event of conflict, that may not always (in fact almost certainly) be from Australian territory.
The same can be said for the Royal Australian Air Force’s limited range of strike platforms, which will stretch the air mobility and air combat capabilities of the RAAF’s fleet, despite the planned fielding of longer range munitions like the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile and it’s Extended-Range variant, respectively.
And herein lies the problem, our force structure, basing and dispositions and, indeed, our platforms, are focused almost exclusively on continental defence as outlined in the formative 1986 Dibb Report and supporting 1987 Defence white paper.
In response however, we have seen a continuation of the plans promoted by successive governments despite being badged up under the banner of “transformative” increases and investments in our national security.
The reality is, fundamentally and inescapably, even following the successful delivery of the force outlined in the 2023 Defence Strategic Review, 2024 Integrated Investment Program and National Defence Strategy and of course, the Independent Analysis into Navy’s Surface Combatant Fleet, Australia will ultimately and realistically still be where we should have been following the successful delivery of the 1987 Defence white paper.
Granted we will have a few shiny new bells and whistles, materially, the Australian Defence Force and the Navy, in particular, will be in the same position. So what does a true “sea control” Navy look like in this modern era?
A modern ‘sea control’ force
A contemporary Royal Australian Navy that is genuinely focused on sea control would look very different to the fleet we have today. Its primary purpose would be to ensure Australia can dominate the maritime battlespace in our region, not just protect our own waters but also guarantee the safety of our critical sea lines-of communication through Southeast Asia and into the broader Indo-Pacific.
Such a navy would not be about symbolic presence or purely constabulary duties. It would be about fighting for and holding control of the seas against adversaries ranging from regional powers through to a peer competitor.
For Australia, this means ensuring that no hostile fleet could move south through the Indonesian archipelago, challenge us in the South Pacific, or disrupt our vital shipping lanes to North Asia or across the Indian Ocean.
The backbone of this navy would be a balanced fleet of modern surface combatants and submarines. On the surface, the RAN would need at least a dozen “Tier One” destroyers (or similarly sized) and each capable of advanced anti-air, anti-submarine and long-range strike warfare, ultimately to be supported by a comparable fleet of “Tier Two” surface combatants, now to be evolved into Mogami Class frigates.
These ships would be equipped with systems on par with Aegis, able to integrate seamlessly with the RAAF’s F-35s and P-8s and armed with both land-attack and anti-ship missiles. Their role would be to project power, protect our task groups and contribute to a broader maritime denial strategy in partnership with the Air Force and allies.
Beneath the surface, submarines would form the sharpest edge of sea denial and broader missions of strategic deterrence. By the mid-2030s, this would mean a fleet of nuclear-powered attack submarines under AUKUS, able to range deep into the Pacific and Indian oceans.
Until then, upgraded Collins Class and potentially a handful of additional conventional boats would need to bridge the gap. In any high-end conflict, submarines would be indispensable in striking first, stalking adversary fleets and preventing them from operating freely.
This submarine force would be further sharpened with the acquisition of a large, attritable fleet of extra-large, large and smaller autonomous underwater vessels, like the Anduril Ghost Shark, C2 Robotics Speartooth, serving in conjunction with comparatively low-cost, surface vessels like the Ocius Bluebottle to serve as sentries for larger forces, partnered with P-8A Poseidons, MQ-4C Tritons, a fleet of long-range, armed, autonomous aerial vehicles (similar to the MQ-9B SeaGuardian), partnering with the MQ-28A Ghost Bat and, alongside space capabilities, the large-scale introduction of pseudo-satellite aerial vehicles (think Airbus’ Zephyr or BAE Systems’ PHASA-35).
Operating in greater numbers and closer to the northern approaches, these ships would act as distributed nodes in a wider defensive web, complicating any adversary’s ability to threaten Australian waters or slip through the archipelago unchecked.
However, contemporary sea control also demands the ability to sustain operations away from home bases, that is where aviation-capable ships and amphibious platforms come into play.
The Canberra Class LHDs, or (more as is likely) successors to them, would need to operate as light carriers embarking helicopters, drones and possibly short take-off fighters to provide their own defensive umbrella and extend strike reach. Together, these ships would give the RAN much needed flexibility to maintain sea control in contested environments even when land-based air cover was not guaranteed.
Additionally, these platforms would provide Australia with a greater degree of tactical and strategic independence from allied nations, meaning we wouldn’t have to depend on air cover provided by allied naval aviation assets.
The next layer down would be dependent on a complementary fleet of more numerous but smaller vessels that can, for the majority of their operational lives, be focused on performing maritime security and constabulary roles, but at short notice, like the US Coast Guard’s Legend Class National Security Cutters, can be rapidly retrofitted for combat roles, echoing the Second World War Bathurst Class corvettes.
All of this would only be possible with a robust logistics backbone. A sea control navy must be able to refuel, rearm and repair under pressure, which means more replenishment ships and hardened bases in northern Australia, as well as forward stockpiles of missiles, fuel and spare parts.
Without this, the fleet would struggle to remain on station in a prolonged fight.
In manpower terms, a fleet of this scale and complexity would need around 25,000 to 30,000 uniformed sailors, nearly double today’s strength. Doctrine and training would shift from constabulary patrols and humanitarian relief to the sharper business of maritime strike, anti-submarine warfare and integrated operations with the Army and Air Force.
If one were to look for examples, Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force offers the closest model, being a navy built for sea control in contested waters, with a balanced mix of destroyers, submarines and aviation ships. Singapore’s Navy provides inspiration on efficiency and technological integration, while the United States’ concept of distributed maritime operations shows how networks of smaller and unmanned vessels can add resilience and firepower to a fleet.
In short, a Royal Australian Navy built for sea control would be more balanced, more lethal and more sustainable than today’s. It would have the submarines to deny an adversary freedom of movement, the surface combatants to protect our own forces and strike at range, the aviation and amphibious ships to operate independently, and the logistics to keep them at sea.
Most importantly, it would be underpinned by doctrine, training and manpower designed for the hard business of winning control of the sea, not merely patrolling it.
Final thoughts
Despite ambitious promises from both sides of politics, the outlook for many Australians feels increasingly uncertain. Our nation is rich in natural resources and endowed with immense potential, yet there is little evidence that we are making full use of these unique national advantages.
Australians are living through a period of declining economic opportunity, a rapidly shifting global and regional balance of power, and a political environment in which even the everyday feels increasingly polarised. These trends have fuelled a sense of disconnection, apathy and helplessness among large parts of the community.
For much of modern history, Australia has been shielded from the harsher realities of global conflict. Few Australians alive today have endured food, fuel or medical rationing. Fewer still grasp the scale of economic and social upheaval such restrictions would impose on a society accustomed to one of the highest standards of living in the world.
If Australia is to safeguard its future, it must develop the capacity to act as an independent power. This means building strategic economic, diplomatic and military capabilities that align more closely with the expectations of a great power. Taking such a step would not only reinforce our sovereignty but also allow Australia to play a central role in sustaining security and prosperity across the region.
Breaking free from the prevailing attitude of “it’s all too difficult” would unlock new horizons of economic growth, diplomatic influence and strategic confidence.
As tensions in the Indo-Pacific intensify and China asserts its influence across the economic, political and military domains, Australia is faced with a defining choice: remain a secondary player or embrace the responsibilities and opportunities of a more independent role in an era of great power competition.
And at the core of these challenges is our relationship with our maritime environment, our dependence upon the sea and the unhindered, unchallenged access to the global maritime commons and Australia’s sovereign capacity to assert and defend our interests decisively and sustainably.
At the heart of this choice must be policies that expand opportunities for Australians, build economic resilience and reduce our vulnerability to coercion. Only by strengthening the foundations of a strong, dynamic and innovative economy can Australia deter threats to its interests and ensure the long-term security and prosperity of its people.
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
