iscover
The time has come for me to call time. After nearly four years with Defence Connect (this time) and nearly a decade in total, I will be leaving the team, so I figured it was worth having a look at my five favourite pieces of the last few years.
Over the past three and a half years, I have had the opportunity to cover, analyse and discuss a period of strategic change unlike anything Australia and much of the Western world has experienced since the end of the Cold War.
Writing for Defence Connect has allowed me to explore an extraordinary range of developments: from the return of major conventional warfare to Europe and the intensification of great-power competition to the remilitarisation of the Indo-Pacific and Australia’s increasingly urgent search for strategic resilience. Across hundreds of articles, analyses and conversations, one theme has consistently emerged: many of the assumptions that shaped Australian defence, foreign and strategic policy for decades are rapidly being overtaken by events.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine provided, perhaps, the clearest early warning. It demonstrated that large-scale, industrialised conventional warfare had not disappeared despite years of assumptions to the contrary. Instead, the conflict has reinforced the importance of ammunition stockpiles, industrial capacity, drones, missiles, electronic warfare, satellite networks and national resilience.
It has also forced Western nations to confront an uncomfortable reality: technological superiority alone cannot compensate for insufficient mass, limited production capacity or an inability to sustain a prolonged conflict.
At the same time, much of my work has focused on the Indo-Pacific, increasingly the central theatre of strategic competition. China’s continued military modernisation, expanding naval power and increasingly assertive regional posture have sharpened longstanding questions about the future balance of power. For Australia, these developments have coincided with AUKUS, renewed investment in long-range strike and guided weapons, the growth of autonomous and uncrewed systems, and the historic prospect of acquiring nuclear-powered submarines.
However, my coverage has never been solely about China, Russia or the United States. The rise of India and Indonesia, the ambitions of middle powers, continuing instability in the Middle East, and the growing connections between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theatres have all reinforced my view that the strategic challenges confronting Australia can no longer be understood in isolation.
Australia’s own response has been one of the most persistent themes running through my work. From debates about the size and structure of the Australian Defence Force to the future of the defence industrial base, sovereign capability, technological innovation and national resilience, I have repeatedly returned to one central question: is Australia adapting quickly enough to the world emerging around us?
That question has become increasingly complicated as the United States itself undergoes political and strategic change. The return of Donald Trump to the White House has again forced America’s allies to consider the durability of US commitments and the greater responsibilities they may increasingly need to assume themselves.
For me, the past three and a half years have been a story of accelerating change: old certainties fading, new powers rising and governments confronting decisions that can no longer be indefinitely postponed.
Through my work at Defence Connect, I have sought not simply to catalogue these developments but to explore what they mean for Australia, our allies and the increasingly uncertain strategic world taking shape around us.
While sometimes I have felt like an angry old man yelling at the cloud (hence the appropriate picture of Abe Simpson), I thought it would be appropriate to have a look back at my favourite pieces over the past few years.
The article argued that Australia can no longer rely on the assumptions, institutions and strategic settings that shaped the post-Second World War era. As the global order becomes increasingly multipolar and the Indo-Pacific emerges as the central arena for economic, political and military competition, Australia requires a comprehensive, whole-of-nation National Security Strategy capable of integrating defence, economics, industry, technology and social resilience.
At its centre is the idea of pursuing an “Australian Century”: a long-term national project designed to position Australia as a resilient, competitive, sovereign and influential Indo-Pacific power. The strategy would provide a clear national narrative, measurable objectives and a framework capable of mobilising government, industry and the broader community.
The article identified five principal challenges: intensifying great-power competition; economic and supply-chain vulnerabilities; workforce and skills shortages; climate and resource security; and declining social cohesion amid cyber threats, misinformation and foreign interference.
In response, it proposed five priorities. Australia should strengthen strategic sovereignty, industrial capability and energy security; diversify and modernise the economy through advanced technologies and investment; expand diplomatic and strategic influence across the Indo-Pacific; develop sovereign skills and encourage national service and civic participation; and reform governance to improve coordination between federal and state governments, industry and society.
Ultimately, the article contended that national security cannot be treated primarily as a defence issue. Australia’s future security will depend upon its economic strength, industrial competitiveness, technological capability, workforce, social cohesion and ability to act with greater strategic independence. In an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific, the country must decide whether it is prepared to remain a secondary player or embrace a more ambitious and influential role.
2. Reversing the decline: Growing calls for pollies to take the nation’s future seriously
The article argued that Australia is confronting a slow but increasingly obvious national decline, driven by deteriorating living standards, weak productivity, declining economic complexity and a political system seemingly incapable of delivering meaningful long-term reform. Against the backdrop of intensifying great-power competition and a rapidly changing multipolar world, it warned that Australia cannot continue to rely on complacency, good fortune and the assumptions of the post-Cold War era.
A central theme is the growing sense of disconnection and pessimism felt by many Australians, particularly younger generations. Rising living costs, declining economic opportunity, housing unaffordability and uncertainty about employment, family formation and national security have weakened confidence in the traditional promise of the “Australian Dream”.
The article suggested that this economic and social malaise risks undermining national resilience and Australians’ willingness to invest in the country’s future.
It is highly critical of both major political parties, arguing that successive governments have allowed Australia’s productivity, competitiveness and living standards to stagnate. Migration and government spending may have helped sustain headline economic growth, but they have also failed to address deeper structural problems, including housing shortages, excessive regulation and weak investment in productive capacity.
The article ultimately called for Australians and their political leaders to “break the mould”. It argued for a new social contract that restores opportunity, bridges generational divisions and encourages greater ambition, responsibility and participation. Economic strength and resilience, it concluded, are fundamental to national security: without a prosperous, competitive and cohesive society, Australia will struggle to fund its defence, resist coercion or maintain its sovereignty in an increasingly dangerous Indo-Pacific.
3. Responding to the return of ‘self-interested’ national policy making
The article argued that the return of great-power competition, economic coercion and geopolitical fragmentation is forcing Australia to reconsider the idea that national policymaking should be detached from overt self-interest. Rather than viewing “self-interested” policy as isolationist or selfish, it contended that Australia should place its own economic security, strategic autonomy and social resilience at the centre of long-term decision making.
A major focus is Australia’s declining economic and industrial complexity. Decades of de-industrialisation, weak productivity and an excessive reliance on globalised supply chains have left the country vulnerable to external shocks and coercion. The experiences of COVID-19 and China’s trade restrictions highlighted these weaknesses. The article argued that Australia should not attempt to compete directly with low-cost mass-production economies but instead rebuild sovereign capability in strategically important and technologically advanced sectors while working with trusted partners through a more deliberate international division of labour.
The article also called for greater strategic sovereignty. With the United States increasingly distracted by simultaneous challenges in Europe, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific, Australia must become more capable of independently deterring threats to its territory and interests. This requires strategy to drive defence spending rather than budgets determining strategic ambition.
Finally, the article linked national security to domestic cohesion. Declining living standards, housing affordability, limited career opportunities and widening generational divisions risk weakening Australians’ attachment to the nation and willingness to contribute to its defence.
Ultimately, it argued that Australia must abandon short-termism and unapologetically pursue policies designed around the long-term interests of Australians. Economic strength, industrial capacity, social cohesion and credible military power are presented as mutually reinforcing foundations of national sovereignty in an increasingly contested multipolar world.
4. If Japan could use an economic security strategy, shouldn’t Australia consider one also?
The article argued that Australia needs to rethink the relationship between economic policy and national security as great-power competition, geopolitical instability and supply-chain disruption increasingly blur the traditional distinction between the two. Drawing heavily on Japan’s experience, it argued that economic security should become a core component of Australia’s broader national security architecture.
Japan provides an important model. Its Economic Security Promotion Act established four pillars: strengthening supply-chain resilience, protecting critical infrastructure, developing emerging technologies and safeguarding sensitive intellectual property. These measures are complemented by an industrial strategy built around “promote, protect and partner” – developing domestic capabilities while cooperating with trusted international partners.
The article argued that Australia faces an even stronger imperative. Despite possessing enormous natural resources, agricultural capacity and technological potential, the Australian economy remains comparatively concentrated around raw-resource exports, agriculture, property and services. This leaves the country vulnerable to external shocks, economic coercion and disruptions to critical imports.
While initiatives such as the Future Made in Australia program represent steps towards reindustrialisation, the article contended that Australia requires something considerably more comprehensive: an overarching economic security strategy that coordinates government, industry and investment around clearly defined national interests.
Such a strategy would identify critical industries and technologies, strengthen domestic manufacturing and supply chains, encourage sovereign capability and work with trusted partners where Australia cannot realistically achieve self-sufficiency. Importantly, the article argued that Australia should go beyond Japan’s model by incorporating commercialisation and export capacity, allowing domestic industries to achieve economies of scale and become globally competitive.
Ultimately, economic resilience is presented as a fundamental pillar of national security. Australia cannot guarantee its sovereignty or deter coercion without the economic, industrial and technological capacity to withstand external shocks.
5. Don’t be fooled: ‘Might makes right’ is the universal rule, so prepare accordingly
The article argued that the notion of “might makes right” never truly disappeared from international affairs. While the post-Second World War order attempted to constrain the use of force through institutions such as the United Nations and the broader rules-based international system, military, economic and political power has continued to determine outcomes when major interests are at stake. The emergence of a more contested, multipolar world is now making this reality increasingly difficult to ignore.
The article highlighted the evolution of “might” beyond conventional military power. Economic coercion, sanctions, trade restrictions, technological controls and diplomatic influence have become increasingly important tools through which powerful states pursue strategic objectives. Australia’s experience of Chinese trade restrictions during the COVID-19 period is presented as an example of how economic power can be employed against a middle power to impose political costs.
At the same time, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, growing Chinese assertiveness in the Western Pacific and the emergence of alternative international groupings such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation demonstrate the increasing fragmentation of the global order. For Australia, this presents a particularly difficult challenge because the country remains heavily invested in an international system whose traditional guarantors are facing increasing competition.
The article ultimately argued that Australia must abandon strategic complacency. As the Indo-Pacific becomes the centre of great-power competition, Australia needs to strengthen its economic, technological, industrial, diplomatic and military capabilities while developing a much more ambitious long-term national strategy. Rather than remaining a secondary power dependent upon others, Australia should seek greater strategic independence and leverage its position, resources and capabilities to play a more influential role in shaping the emerging regional order.
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below or get in touch at
Want to see more stories from trusted news sources?
Make Defence Connect a preferred news source on Google.
Click here to add Defence Connect as a preferred news source.