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For decades, the Middle East and Western Asia were the focal points of US defence and foreign policy. However, in the era of great power competition and uncertain policy from the White House, the US risks ceding its traditional alliances and hard power in the region to Russian and Chinese interests.
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Since Kissinger, the US fostered and supported their regional allies with cutting-edge military technology, defence assurances as well as soft-power – facilitating the competitive control of their allies and advancing US interests. This policy soon morphed into a more brazen exercise of undertaking regime changes in hostile territories, and then into broad counterinsurgency operations.
However, the haphazard evacuation of allied troops from Afghanistan and the pivot in public discourse toward Russia and China has left a perceived vacuum in the region. This perception will both guarantee that America’s traditional allies will second guess US military might, and potentially join the Russian-Chinese sphere of influence fearing American apathy.
To combat this, the US requires clear and direct messaging to both their allies and adversaries in the region to ensure that the US does not cede regional interests.
This is the theory examined by Morgan Kaplan, American Statecraft Program fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in War on the Rocks this week.
Despite the White House pledging continued support for their allies and promising to continue presence in the region to uphold traditional American interests, malaise and “confusion” due to incoherent policy and recent military calamities has beset some allies. Kaplan warns that without strong public messaging from the US, many regional actors may hedge their bets and “to pursue policies that are incongruous with America’s interests.”
“What US allies (and adversaries) need to know are what America will and will not fight for, what expectations it has of its allies (and adversaries) to stay in good standing, and what goals it hopes to achieve for the region in the next 10 to 15 years,” Kaplan explained.
“If America’s state and non-state partners are uncertain of Washington’s level of commitment to their security, they will face increasing incentives to hedge support from Russia, China, and even Iran. In the security sphere, Russia has already made notable inroads with traditional American partners in the region.”
Not only may traditional partners be swayed to work more closely with the US’ adversaries, but a military vacuum following decades of conflict would set a signal to foreign powers to expand into the region.
“A lack of strategic focus in the Middle East may send a signal to America’s adversaries that they have the initiative to push their influence deeper into the region with minimal opposition. The recent uptick in rocket attacks from Iranian-backed militias in Iraq is a clear case of such probing,” Kaplan notes.
Further, Kaplan argues that there appears to be “ambiguity” in how the US applies human rights policy in the region. While the Biden administration has held back $130 million in security support for Egypt, other partners haven’t had such a policy applied equally to them. Such favouritism will isolate actors and lose US support.
In light of this, Kaplan suggests competing with Russian and Chinese influence in the Middle East by executing a more “wholistic” approach to building influence in the region, including economic development.
“To maintain continued influence in the region, the United States should diversify its goals, and this means forwarding a more comprehensive diplomatic and economic strategy. For example, the administration has hinted something along these lines with the introduction of 'Build Back Better World', but the further details have not yet been disclosed,” Kaplan noted.
The “Build Back Better World” program has been billed by analysts as an American-led response to the Belt and Road Initiative.
“In a time of heightened US-China competition, US President Joe Biden and his G7 counterparts agreed in June to launch Build Back Better World (B3W) — a values-driven, market-led, high-standard, and transparent infrastructure partnership to help narrow the $40+ trillion infrastructure gap in the developing world by 2035,” Mordechai Chaziza wrote in the Middle East Institute in July 2021.
“The B3W initiative aims to mobilise bilateral and multilateral as well as private-sector capital for investment in climate, health and health security, modernised digital technology, gender equity, and equality. The B3W is intended to be global in scope and to cover low- and middle-income countries.”
Further, the United States can help to facilitate grand coalitions in the region by bridging diplomatic chasms such as the Abraham Accords. Such coalitions not only advance US interests, but enable countries to undertake their own security without requiring costly assistance of entire US expeditionary forces.
Until a clear and concise policy has been communicated from the White House, the US is nevertheless at risk of losing its regional allies and thus threatening significant American economic interests in the region.
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