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Australian defence preparedness is likely headed towards a disastrous strategic failure amid a looming global conflict, according to a newly published risk report.
The report, titled Is the Australian Defence Force match-fit for the prospect of a coming conflict? The need for a ‘Spearhead Gradient’ within the Australian Defence Organisation, alleges that Australia’s defence system is currently “unfit for purpose” and significant reforms are needed to shift the top-heavy institution into a combat-effective force led by empowered warfighters.
The independent white paper, published earlier this month and authored by NWE Strategic Risk Management principal Peter Robinson, examined whether the Australian Defence Organisation is “match-fit” for a coming conflict.
“Australia will be expected to proactively engage in the upcoming turmoil and contribute meaningfully as a true Middle Power. The current anaemic state of our military makes this a near impossibility,” Robinson said.
“Defence bureaucracy has been allowed to flourish unchecked for decades and needs a deep, dramatic reset in order to allow an agile, flexible, scalable military capability to be developed and employed by our professional warfighters.
“This analysis has been conducted on behalf of the warfighter … (for) those serving personnel that we, as a nation, demand go into harm’s way to enact violence on behalf of our collective interests.
“It is also for the taxpayer; with over AU$55 billion (US$34 billion) each year currently expended on Defence, you deserve a more muscular military force.”
The white paper used current benchmarking to compare the national security, infrastructure and battle preparedness of Australia with peers such as Russia, Italy and Japan.
“When compared with Italy, a Western nation of similar economic scale and military expenditure, Australia falls notably short in terms of output, with Italy having three times the military personnel and 50 per cent more kit despite spending 13 per cent less,” Robinson said.
“Our defence expenditure is roughly half that of Russia (based on 2021 pre-Ukraine war figures) yet we would be optimistically be described as one-tenth as capable based on a relative ORBAT (Order of Battle).
“Despite an economy that is double the size of Australia, Defence spending in FY24 by Japan was a modest 1.6 times (US$56 billion versus our US$35 billion). Yet overall, their military capability could be considered two to three times more robust than that of the ADF.”
“In the land domain, Japan’s relative fleet size (of main battle tanks, armoured vehicles, air defence, artillery) was double or better across almost all categories. In the maritime domain, Japan is more robust on almost every measure … this is especially the case with their highly capable aircraft carrier and numerically superior patrol boat and submarine fleets.”
Bureaucracy or warfighting
The report places the blame squarely on the department’s internal structure. It argues that the ADO is not built for combat readiness, but rather for administrative self-preservation. Over the past two decades, more than 60 official reviews have identified the same recurring issues: diffuse leadership, excessive reliance on committees, redundant structures, low morale and an obsession with process over outcomes.
Robinson argued that the rise of the “Cult of Joint” has undermined service-specific expertise by prioritising integration over operational effectiveness.
The white paper highlighted that the civilian-led public service bureaucracy now dominates decision making – senior military leaders are “infantilised” and stripped of authority. In addition, service chiefs are considered powerless within the current system, despite their responsibility in training and sustaining Australia’s combat force.
In particular, Robinson argued that Australia’s unique “diarchy” dual leadership model, in which the chief of the Defence Force and the secretary of Defence jointly run the department, is a failed experiment never adopted by any other Western military.
“Australia has the only legislated diarchy in the Western world, so it is clearly far from best practice. It has been in place for over 50 years and yet not one other nation has followed our lead and picked it up as a formal construct,” Robinson said.
“To quote a former head of the prime minister and cabinet, Max Moore-Wilton, (who said) ‘I’m no fan of the diarchy. It has diffused decision making to a series of joint-committee type structures.’
“The reliance on committees promotes obfuscation of personal accountability and infantilises our leaders, providing a security blanket against career and/or reputational risk.
“The fear of subsequent scrutiny by a damning ANAO report or a theatrical senator looking to score cheap points in Senate estimates is palpable for the senior leaders in Defence.
“The low-risk appetite/tolerance within the organisation is facilitated and nurtured through the committee process.”
Do we need a ‘Spearhead Gradient’?
Robinson outlines that Australia should adopt Spearhead Gradient reform as a viable, but bold solution. The concept reorganises Defence to place warfighters, serving on the front lines, at the top of a newly flattened command structure. It would instead attempt to reverse decades of bureaucratic creep by returning core control of personnel, training, logistics sustainment, and infrastructure to the service chiefs.
Key proposals include dissolving the diarchy by establishing the chief of the Defence Force as the singular, uniformed head of the department.
Reducing senior executive roles, particularly within support and enabling divisions and realigning them under uniformed leadership.
Stripping centralised agencies such as the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group of their control over sustainment, logistics and personnel, refocusing them on acquisition only.
Migrating civilian roles to uniformed personnel, with an estimated 5,500 positions targeted for conversion. In addition, prioritising Navy roles in light of the strategic maritime focus.
Implementing a phased reform timeline, beginning with legislative changes and organisational redesign within six months, and culminating in a full structural transition over 18 months.
Urgent need for cultural shift
Robinson also calls for a cultural reckoning to end the excessive risk aversion, encouraged by committee decision making and fear of public accountability, which has stifled innovation and delayed critical projects. Examples such as the 15-year pilot training program debacle and the over-budget Type 26 frigate procurement are known failures, he said.
“Morale is poor, with faith in senior leadership at an all-time low. This is primarily a structural issue as the military leaders have been denuded of authority and are forced into a position of ‘learned helplessness’,” he said.
“Key trades and technical roles have atrophied within the services as functions migrated to industry. Heavy contractor dependence creates single points of failure in a conflict. All this depth and flexibility was willing yielded by the government under the promise of savings that have never been fully assessed or tracked.
“The excessive influence of the public service culture needs to be addressed wholesale. Whilst there are many high-performing public servants, this is not the norm. Armour-plated protection of employment conditions under the Public Service Act 1999, one-eyed defence of poor performers by the Public Service Union and the primacy of ‘attendance-over-outcomes’ encourages a culture denuded of any urgency to deliver.”
Final thoughts
Conflict in the Indo-Pacific is no longer a distant possibility but a looming reality, Robinson forecasts.
“The main threat to Defence over the last few decades has been Australian National Audit Office, the Department of Finance and a multitude of Senate inquiries, all of which has driven unparalleled risk aversion within the multifarious levels of leadership of the organisation,” he said in the white paper.
“That threat will soon change, with the once-in-a-generation instability in the geopolitical landscape driving the distinct probability of direct conflict with a superior and/or peer enemy.
“Politicians, mandarins, analysts and senior bureaucrats … will no doubt consider many of the revolutionary elements of this paper as a clear threat to their role, status, fiefdoms and pensions.
“To those individuals I would entreat them to put their personal ambitions aside and be empathetic to the warfighter first and foremost.
“Unless of course, you are prepared to don a uniform, pick up a weapon and put yourselves in harm’s way at the forward edge of the battlespace during conflict.”
