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Will the rapid evolution of uncrewed systems on the battlefields of Ukraine force the Australian Defence Force to rethink how it develops, acquires and sustains military capability?
This question was asked by a new Australian Army Research Centre paper, Drones in modern warfare (2024–2026): Lessons learnt from the war in Ukraine, authored by Dr Oleksandra Molloy and published on 3 August this year.
It examined how drones have evolved from relatively niche battlefield tools into a central component of modern combat. However, the report’s findings also raise questions about whether Australia’s traditional approach to defence acquisition is sufficiently agile enough for a battlefield where technology, tactics and countermeasures can change within months, weeks and even days.
“The evidence is unambiguous; uncrewed systems will shortly achieve persistent presence across every operational domain. The establishment of a dedicated Unmanned Systems Force within the Armed Forces of Ukraine marks a crucial advancement in military organisational design, with implications extending well beyond the Ukrainian theatre,” the report said.
“Uncrewed systems have become embedded across the full spectrum of contemporary combat operations: reconnaissance UAVs, ground robots, surface and underwater vessels, loitering munitions and multirotor bombers, as well as middle- and deep-strike capabilities. These systems now constitute an integrated capability set rather than a collection of stand-alone tools.
“Approximately 80 to 90 per cent of enemy targets on the front line are now engaged by drones, while casualty evacuation is carried out almost exclusively by ground robotic systems. Battlefield isolation, disruption of logistics, and strikes on supply depots are achieved through middle strikes.
“In Ukraine, several hundred stable defence technology manufacturers have emerged, effectively covering almost the entire ecosystem – from communications, interceptors and guidance software to UGVs and naval drones.
“Among them are companies already working on solutions that may become operational within a few years – laser and electromagnetic weapons, AI-enabled autonomous systems, and software for rapid multi-sensor data processing.”
Drone revolution
The war in Ukraine has provided an unprecedented demonstration into the military utility of uncrewed systems. Drones are now being used across almost every layer of the battlefield: intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, targeting, communications, logistics and strike effects.
Small first-person-view drones have become particularly important at the tactical level, providing relatively inexpensive precision effects against personnel, vehicles and other battlefield targets between dug-in Ukrainian and Russian trench lines.
At the same time, larger systems are being employed for longer-range intelligence collection, medical evacuation and strike missions well past those lines, while uncrewed surface vessels have demonstrated the ability to threaten sophisticated maritime forces and even low-flying aircraft.
The result is a battlefield where relatively inexpensive systems can generate effects previously associated with much more expensive platforms. For the ADF, the lesson may be less about acquiring a particular type of drone and more about understanding how uncrewed systems are changing the relationship between sensors, weapons and personnel.
“Between 2024 and 2026, drone warfare was reinforced as a constant adaptation contest under intense electronic warfare,” the report said.
“Widespread jamming and spoofing drove rapid innovation in fibre-optic control, repeaters, alternative navigation methods and autonomy-assisted targeting.
“No technical advantage proved enduring without continuous modification. Despite the remarkable advantages of drone technology, it brings new challenges the adversary can exploit.
“Thousands of drones with operators dispersed across different units saturate the battlefield to the point where distinguishing between the friendly and enemy drones can be challenging. It requires careful planning and effective coordination.”
A question of adaptation
One of the most significant lessons from Ukraine is the speed at which the technology is evolving.
The Australian Army Research Centre paper highlighted a cycle of development in which systems are continually modified in response to battlefield experience and enemy countermeasures.
A drone that is effective today may become vulnerable tomorrow; industry and Defence must ensure that electronic warfare systems, air defences or other counter-UAS capabilities can adapt.
These rapid changes have created an ongoing contest between drones and the systems designed to defeat them.
Case in point, we can see that conventional radio-controlled drones have become increasingly vulnerable to jamming. In response, operators and manufacturers developed new approaches such as autonomous navigation and, crucially, fibre-optic control.
Fibre-optic drones are able to use a physical cable rather than a conventional radiofrequency link, skirting the issue of jamming entirely with a new technological adaptation.
“Individual optical fibres can be drawn to diameters comparable to a human hair while retaining substantial tensile strength and delivering data throughput of approximately 32 terabytes per second – properties that, when applied to drone guidance architectures, produce a control link fundamentally impervious to EW disruption,” the report said.
“The operational introduction of fibre-optic controlled FPV platforms in the Ukrainian theatre was first documented on 7 March 2024 … (It was) identified that Russian FPV kamikaze drone variants were operating via a thin fibre-optic cable rather than conventional RF broadcast signals – eliminating the electromagnetic signature that EW systems depend upon to detect, intercept and suppress.
“A week later, Ukrainians replicated this capability. Because control is transmitted through a physical hardwire connection rather than through the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), no EW countermeasure is capable of disrupting the guidance link; the platform can only be defeated through physical interception or destruction.
“In January 2026, the typical operating range for Ukrainian and Russian fibre-optic FPV drones was between 15–25 kilometres. Reported cases indicate that the operational range of fibre-optic FPV systems has since increased to approximately 40–50 kilometres, while Russia are reportedly extending this range to as far as 65 kilometres to strike Ukraine’s logistical nodes.”
For Australia, this kind of rapid military change presents a difficult challenge because our traditional defence acquisition model is designed to supply a relatively small number of high-investment, major platforms intended to remain in service and potentially be upgraded for decades.
Low-cost, expendable assets
The drone war between Ukraine and Russia is demonstrating the value of an alternative model, where systems can be rapidly developed, deployed, modified and replaced. A relatively cheap uncrewed system can potentially force an adversary to employ a significantly more expensive missile, aircraft or electronic warfare capability to defeat it. In response, a layered counter-UAS network of capabilities is required for detecting, tracking and defeating drones.
On the flip side, attacking a target using large numbers of relatively inexpensive autonomous systems could provide commanders with additional options for surveillance, deception and strike while reducing the risks associated with putting high-value platforms and personnel into contested environments.
However, the report stressed that drones are not a “magic bullet” for modern warfare.
“Despite the revolutionary tactical impact of drones, Ukraine’s war underscores that drones alone do not win wars,” it said.
“They have not delivered unilateral strategic victory (as yet); rather, they have become an indispensable element within a combined arms framework.
“The enduring determinants of operational outcome – terrain control, logistics endurance, troop morale and command resilience – remain decisive, though uncrewed systems now exert profound influence over each of these factors.
“Military strategists should resist the temptation to view uncrewed systems as a panacea; instead they are force multipliers that must be integrated with doctrine, training and force development.
“What is clear is that rapid technological adaptation and sustained innovation in uncrewed systems will be a decisive determinant of military effectiveness in future warfare.
“By sustaining an accelerated cycle of innovation and systematically incorporating the lessons generated in Ukraine, nations including Australia and its allied partners will retain a genuine opportunity to maintain advantage over potential adversaries and ensure readiness for the contemporary and future strategic challenges that uncrewed systems warfare now presents.”
A course of action
Report recommendations for Australia included the following:
- The creation of a formal unmanned systems force with a unified mandate and senior leadership within the Australian Defence Force.
- Adopting a doctrine of continuous adaptation rather than waiting for post-conflict certainty, pursuing engagement with the Armed Forces of Ukraine and facilitating a secondment of Ukrainian combat commanders (or veterans) to Australian PME institutions to assist with doctrine and training development.
- The appointment of an ADF “champion” with unified mandate and authority to act to synchronise funding, strategy, capability development, resources and industrial engagement across all services. In addition, this champion should initially work to resolve current conflicts between small, tactical, attritable UAS being subject to the same regulatory and legislative burden as crewed aircraft.
- Leapfrogging to Ukraine’s 2026 capability baseline plan instead of a 2022 baseline of the Ukraine conflict; allowing the adoption of current 2026-validated capability such as tactical data links, AI-enabled targeting, EW-resistant drone architectures, communication software and long-range uncrewed systems across all domains.
Another key recommendation cited the integration of psychological dimension of drone threat into training design. Fighter personnel should be trained regarding the fear response triggered by drone noise alone and its impact on troop behaviour and decision making, which has been seen extensively in Ukraine.
Final thoughts
Of course the Ukrainian experience should not be considered a definite blueprint for Australian defence planning. Australia operates in an entirely different strategic and geographic environment with different industry capability and legislative restrictions.
However, the potential for change is the same. It would be wise for Australia to have the ability to readily adapt its autonomous systems quickly under an agile industrial base in the event of an Indo-Pacific conflict.
In communications and direction alone, the Ukrainian government currently has infinitely closer relationships with its military operators, procurement agencies and defence manufacturers. Those relationships are required for it to make fast changes and deliver with much shorter development cycles.
We should assess that the wars of tomorrow might not necessarily belong to the force with the most sophisticated individual platform but rather a force designed to out-produce and out-adapt those sophisticated weapons.
For the Australian Defence Force, the question is whether Australia can develop that capability before it’s forced to face an already-equipped adversary on the battlefield.
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