Walls of sand, iron and fire: Understanding A2/AD

From the earliest ranged weapons like spears and the English longbow, to the advent of the Gatling gun during the mid-1800s, and later incarnations of squad-level machine guns and large-scale, strategic artillery, bombers and missiles, technology has almost exclusively always favoured the defender.

As the technology has evolved, the balance of power between the attacker and defender has been countered by a combination of doctrine, bold command decisions, personnel and platforms that provide a quantum-leap in capability.

Contemporary A2/AD doctrine leverages both offensive and defensive platforms, ranging from integrated command and control, long-range land, air and sea-based precision fire and ballistic missile capabilities to, as Dr Malcolm Davis of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) summarises: prevent the uncontested access to its air and maritime approaches by potential adversaries.

Successfully developing a capable A2/AD system requires an intimate understanding of a potential adversary’s strengths and weaknesses, while maximising one’s own key technological, geographic and doctrine advantages to dictate the momentum of a confrontation.

Most recently, the rising Asian titan China has sought to introduce a sophisticated web of A2/AD capabilities to counter potential coercion, while enhancing the nation’s long-term strategic agenda in Indo-Pacific Asia.

For China, the catalyst for such developments came in the form of the uncontested US response to renewed Chinese aggression towards Taiwan in the mid-1990s. The arrival of two US carrier strike groups highlighted the limitations of the People’s Liberation Army.

In response, China redoubled efforts throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s with a two-pronged approach to military modernisation and capability development:

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1. The development of high-intensity, force projection focused conventional capabilities supported by a growing nuclear triad; and
2. A strategic A2/AD capability to establish a defensive buffer in the western Pacific and into south-east Asia.

Great Wall 2.0 

However, as if taking a page from the post-Second World War Soviet strategic planning playbook, modern China sought to establish a series of strategic buffers between potential adversaries in the western Pacific and mainland China.

The apex of these buffers is the series of island reclamations throughout the Spratly Islands and Fiery Cross Reef in the South China Sea.

As an economic corridor, the South China Sea is the lifeblood for much of south-east Asia, with about US$3 trillion in trade flowing through the region annually, much of which is driven by China’s own voracious appetite.

China’s island-building program, while according to Beijing is peaceful, has drawn international condemnation, particularly following the militarisation of facilities and increasing hostility by the Chinese Armed Forces in recent years.

Developments at both the Spratly Islands and Fiery Cross Reef have seen the construction of immense military facilities, accommodating nuclear-bomber capable airfields, deep water ports for Chinese naval vessels, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance facilities and batteries of advanced anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) and advanced integrated air and missile defence systems.

Dr Davis explained: "2018 has been an interesting year in the South China Sea. It started fairly early on with the basing of anti-ship cruise missiles on reclaimed islands in the SCS, the basing of the upgraded, H-6K nuclear capable bomber on Woody Island and more recently the USS Decatur (DDG-73) incident really reinforces that China is not backing down from its territorial ambitions."

Multi-domain A2/AD

The development of these reclaimed island fortresses evokes memories of the bloody island battles of Tarawa, Palau and Okinawa during the Pacific campaign against Japan, however these prickly fortresses are just the front line of an A2/AD system focused on strategic depth, attrition and deterrence.

Behind the protective front line provided by these strategic buffers and supported by a growing Chinese force projection capability lies the true force multiplier.

China’s growing arsenal of advanced, road-mobile anti-ship and traditional ballistic missile systems designed to effectively target US and allied surface ships, while inflicting massive damage and casualties on key facilities ranging from Guam and Okinawa to Hawaii.

The successful testing and introduction of capabilities including the ‘carrier killer’ Dong-Feng 21 (DF-21) and the Dong-Feng 26 (DF-26) anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) and the growing proliferation of hypersonic weapons systems, in conjunction with the introduction of upgraded strategic bombers, including a rumoured H-20 stealth bomber, serve as additional components of this broader web of capabilities.

Further to this, the introduction of fifth-generation combat aircraft in the J-20 and JF-31 and the nation’s growing force projection focused ‘blue water’ navy including aircraft carriers, attack and ballistic missile submarines and advanced destroyers all serve as integral parts of the kill-chain.

Each of these capabilities individually form a part of a broad tapestry of capabilities. Knitting them together into an integrated system provides China with the ability to project force and influence throughout the region with minimal chance of repercussion beyond all out conflict.

Further enhancing this system is China’s already immense cyber warfare, space and anti-space capabilities of the Chinese Armed Forces, each of which target traditional strengths of adversaries, effectively blunting any counter thrust.

This multi-domain approach to A2/AD takes what began thousands of years ago and places the advantage firmly in the hands of the defender, just as the machinegun did during the First World War.

The ability of such systems to provide a long-range strike and deterrence capability combined with the ability to hinder or in some cases completely halt a counter offensive radically rewrites the strategic calculus.

Dug in like a tick

These fortress islands and their combination of capabilities present a series of challenges for US and allied forces, including Australia.

With direct threats to forward bases in both Guam and Japan, and potentially Hawaii, China’s introduction of an effective A2/AD perimeter appears to severely limit, if not completely negate the effectiveness of traditional force projection and long-range strike doctrines.

With the walls manned, the gates closing and the moat increasingly filled with crocodiles, tipping these scales back in the favour of the attacker in the event of the unthinkable is a major challenge.

This challenge is one that will require both the US and regional allies like Australia and Japan to adapt traditional capabilities and doctrines, while developing and introducing new ones to counter the mounting challenges.

Stephen Kuper

Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.

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