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Canada, like Australia, has a shared history of reliance upon global great powers for strategic security. This dependence has resulted in an often myopic approach by Canada’s political leadership towards the nation’s strategic policy development, serving as a model for Australia, with lessons to be learned from our closest comparable global neighbour.
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Much like its colonial cousin Australia, Canada’s historic defence and strategic planning policy has been defined by the geographic isolation of the country, its enduring strategic relationships with global security benefactors like the British and French Empires and the US, and, unlike Australia, direct integration and involvement with international alliance frameworks such as NATO.
For Australia's political leaders, Canada's history of partisan political jockeying in relation to the nation's defence policy, industry development and long-term planning serves to echo that of its own approach to national security strategy and planning. However, Canada's geo-political realities and proximity to major centres of global power in the US and western Europe, combined with the nation's reliance on global alliance frameworks, serve as major factors contributing to Canada's largely apathetic approach to long-term strategic defence planning.
Despite these differences, Canada and Australia share a number of similarities in this modern global geo-political and strategic environment, with partisan politics and policy makers playing a significant role in the development of Australia's long-term strategic policy in an increasingly challenging geo-political and strategic environment in Indo-Pacific Asia.
From fireproof house to pivotal North American defender
While Canada’s involvement in the First World War as part of the wider Commonwealth supporting Britain’s war would serve to slightly shake the nation’s approach to strategic policy making, it wasn’t until World War Two and the increasing capabilities of both the German and Japanese militaries did Canada finally recognise the importance of a sovereign defence posture.
Despite this, Canada’s strategic and political decision makers, much like those of Australia, continued to view the nation as Canadian senator Raoul Dandurand described: "a fireproof house, far from the sources of conflagration".
Canada’s active engagement in the European theatre of the Second World War and post-war occupation NATO obligations in allied occupied Germany, in conjunction with the increasing competition with the Soviet Union in Europe, served to reshape the nation’s defence and strategic planning policy and, as a result, its domestic industry capability.
The emergence of the US as the premier global economic and military power and its own strategic rivalry with the Soviet Union placed the Canadian homeland at risk of destruction for the first time in the nation’s history.
Canada’s strategic position wedged between the Soviet Union and US placed the nation at the very epicentre of North America’s continental defence and placed its sovereignty and security at risk, as both of the nuclear armed superpowers jockeyed for a successful first strike capability.
This precarious position resulted in a joint US-Canadian policy for collective defence of North America, culminating in the North American Air Defence (NORAD) agreement in 1957-58, which along with a wider continuation of the alliance with the US would form the basis for the nation’s defence and security posture.
However, unlike the US throughout this period and as a reflection of Canada’s position as a global ‘middle power’, the nation went through several cyclical periods of defence build-up and scaling back directly impacted by the government at the time, which Canadian military historian Desmond Morton explains, saying, "Armed Forces strength, which had dropped from 120,000 to 100,000 in the Pearson (Liberal) years, was slashed by the Trudeau (Liberal) government to 78,000 men and women in the regular forces and less than 20,000 in the reserves.
"Re-equipment programs languished until the late 1970s when pressure from Washington and NATO allies forced the government to buy new fighter aircraft – the CF-18 Hornet – and long-range patrol aircraft. By 1984, many Canadians were embarrassed by the weakness and obsolescence of their defences… The Mulroney (Conservative) government pledged expansion and modernisation, partly to restore national pride, partly to reassure the Reagan administration."
The role of partisan politics and the end of the Cold War
This natural shift between the Conservative and Liberal Canadian governments highlighted the inability of nation’s defence and strategic policy to identify key priorities beyond contributions to the US-Canadian and broader NATO alliance in the face of renewed Soviet aggression during the 1980s.
This was further complicated following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the radical redrawing of the international balance of power and the increasing prevalence of smaller, regional conflicts such as the first Gulf War again served to reshape Canada’s role in the world and, accordingly, its defence and strategic policy priorities.
In spite of the new global power paradigm and the seeming shift away from traditional state v state conflict, consensus was reached between the Liberal and Conservative parties as capability modernisation became a priority, at least on paper, with Morton explaining this partisan shift on Canada's strategic policy and capability development, saying, "The emphasis of Liberal and Conservative governments on modernising the navy and air force was reflected in the small contingent sent by Canada to the Gulf War, 1990-91 – three ships and a squadron of CF-18s, which saw service without significant incident or casualty. However, the chaotic post-Cold War world suggested that Canada’s busiest service would be its shrunken, ill-equipped army."
As the 1990s progressed and global peace keeping and humanitarian interventions became the operational norm, Canada’s strategic and defence policy makers became driven by government deficit reduction, which translated to a significant reduction in defence expenditure, capability and wider impacts upon the nation’s operational capabilities.
The September 11 attacks and the rise of global terrorism and related asymmetric threats, however, served to dramatically shake Canada’s policy makers as, once again, external factors dictated the future strategic direction of the nation.
Active, yet somewhat limited Canadian participation in the US-led operations in Afghanistan and a more substantial commitment to the Iraq conflict served to highlight the decades of policy inadequacy, limitations of force structure and equipment as the nation responded to calls from both the United States and its wider NATO allies.
Despite this, Canada’s conservative Harper government committed in 2011 to withdrawing Canada from the quagmire that was the Afghanistan mission and placed the nation’s position within NATO, the US-Canada alliance and the wider world at a precipice and posed important questions about the future of the nation’s direction when it came to strategic and defence policy.
The changing balance of power
However, as with the preceding decades, the international power paradigm shifted, while smaller regional counter-insurgency, peace keeping and humanitarian operations would continue to play a part in Canada’s strategic calculus, the renewed state-v-state tensions, particularly in eastern Europe with a resurgent Russia and north-west Asia with an emerging China and increasingly reckless North Korea, are serving to dramatically reshape the world.
Again, the eclectic and partisan nature of Canada’s political decision makers has responded to the contemporary global strategic environment, with the Liberal Trudeau government developing a "New vision for defence", which highlights the need to be "STRONG at home, SECURE in North America, ENGAGED in the world".
This new policy aims to rectify the systemic issues within the Ministry for National Defence and the nation’s wider, apathetic approach to defence and strategic policy through the provision of a clear conceptual policy direction. This direction considers the nation’s unique operational realities, participation in regional and global strategic alliances and desperate need for equipment and doctrine modernisation in the face of an increasingly complex global threat environment.
Despite these developments and the nation’s recommitment to being strong at home through its domestically driven recapitalisation and modernisation programs, its renewed commitment to its key strategic relationships, particularly in NATO and as part of securing North America and its recognition of the evolving global strategic environment, Canada’s policy, unlike that of the relative consistency exemplified by the US, fails to adequately account for and identify how Canada’s armed forces will engage in the new international order.
This is clearly outlined in the most recent Canadian Defence White Paper: 'Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy', which identifies: "Canadians want a military that is agile, highly trained, superbly equipped, capable and professional... The Canadian Armed Forces will grow by 3,500 (to 71,500 total) military personnel… The investments in equipment and material necessary to underwrite Canada’s future force will match the significant investment in its personnel.
"The Royal Canadian Navy will acquire 15 Canadian Surface Combatant ships to replace its existing frigates and retired destroyers. This policy now provides the full funding for all 15 ships; this will be one of the largest acquisitions in Canadian shipbuilding history and makes up a core part of the National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS). The Canadian Army will undergo a recapitalisation of much of its land combat capabilities and its ageing vehicle fleets while modernising its command and control systems. Additionally, it will expand its light forces capability, which will allow it to be more adaptable in complex operational theatres. The Royal Canadian Air Force will acquire 88 future fighter aircraft to enforce Canada’s sovereignty and to meet Canada’s NORAD and NATO commitments, while recapitalising many of its existing aircraft fleets such as the CP-140 Aurora anti-submarine warfare and surveillance aircraft."
This partisan political instability as it relates to the sustained, coherent planning of the nation’s defence and strategic policy has served to dramatically impact Canada’s ability to participate as a reliable international ally, provide effective, efficient and cost-effective defence capabilities and coherent doctrine and policy to support industry in the necessary modernisation, expansion and upgrading of military capabilities, and provides stark comparison to the Australian experience.
Next steps
Canada, like Australia, suffers with an identity crisis regarding the nation's strategic role and objectives in a rapidly evolving world. Partisan politics and policy making has served to exacerbate these challenges, unlike the relatively stable approach to long-term strategic policy and capability development successfully modelled by the US in assuming a leadership role in the aftermath of the Second World War.
In the third and final part of this series, we will take a closer look at outlining a number of options for Australia to use to define its future role and objectives in the Indo-Pacific, with a focus on leveraging the power of bipartisan political consensus to clearly navigate the challenges of the 21st century to the benefit of Australia's long-term national and strategic security.
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Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
