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The values differences between Australia, the West and China are becoming increasingly visible. The way in which the nation navigates the increasingly complex relationships, combined with clarifying the long-term position of Australia in the Indo-Pacific, was a key focus of Alan Gyngell’s ‘How to train your Dragon’ opinion piece over the weekend.
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As the ongoing strategic competition between the US and China begins to branch into the 'values' domain and 'grey zone' competition becomes increasingly common, Australia will be confronted by the harsh realities not just of China's totalitarian system, but equally similar, less liberal, less democratic regimes throughout the Indo-Pacific.
This shift, not only in the regional dynamics but more broadly on the global scale, serves to throw the post-Second World War and post-Cold War era of neo-liberal, democratic and capitalist dominance into doubt as the world's rising powers begin to assert their interests, the systems and models which have supported their growth and development.
In the first part of the analysis of Alan Gyngell's opinion piece ‘How to train your Dragon’ published in The Australian over the weekend we took a closer look at the way in which China is testing the established consensus among the nation's strategic policy experts and causing major challenges for Australia's public policy agenda as it seeks to navigate the Indo-Pacific century.
As part of this analysis, it became apparent that much of the conversation still limits Australia's engagement in the region by taking the easy way out, further entrenching Australia's economic dependence on China, largely due to the 'difficulty' in doing so.
Additionally, the analysis also sought to take a closer look at the increasingly long-term focus and corresponding strategies implemented by China since the days of reformer Deng Xiaoping and his focus on encouraging China to "hide its capability and bide its time".
The values question
The totalitarian nature of Xi Jinping's regime has become increasingly bold and pervasive, both within China and abroad including in Australia, and the regime's focus on clamping down on political and civil rights, freedom of speech and freedom of religious practice and expression have drawn global and regional attention.
The growing police state and examples of authoritarian crack downs in Hong Kong, persecution of Chinese Muslims and Christians seemingly fly in the face of Australia's core values and principles as a nation, yet the nation, like many, including the US, at least up until recently have voiced little opposition to the brutality of the Chinese regime.
Part of this is recognition that no matter what, the concerns will fall on deaf ears within Beijing. This is something Gyngell articulates clearly, saying, "Our interests in China are clear enough, but what about our values, those beliefs fundamental to the way we define ourselves, whether as individuals or nations? Most of the discussion about values in relation to Australia and China focuses on those embedded in our political systems.
"Australia’s liberal democracy, protecting individual rights and free speech under the rule of law, is very different from the authoritarian structure of a communist party-state, run along Leninist principles, in which the right to challenge the fundamental underpinnings of the system does not exist."
Increasingly however, Australia's own liberal democracy has come under attack at the most fundamental levels with pro-Hong Kong rallies at Australian university coming under attack from pro-Beijing opponents, freedom of speech and critical thinking coming under attack more broadly at university and in the public discourse.
Looking beyond China, Australia's position as a 'values' based democracy seems to neglect the the broader anti-democratic and authoritarian regimes the nation finds itself increasingly linked to, something Gyngell also highlights: "China’s capacity to assert its values and influence others is the reason values feature so much more prominently in our relationship with Beijing than with Vietnam, another authoritarian communist state.
"But China is by no means unique. The world of liberal democracies is shrinking. Independent watchdog Freedom House has recorded 13 years of consecutive decline in political rights and civil liberties. Of all the countries in the East Asia Summit, only Australia and New Zealand rate as full democracies in The Economist Intelligence Unit’s annual democracy survey.
"Many governments with which Australia deals closely, from Vietnam and Thailand to the United Arab Emirates, have values different from ours. If Australia did not engage with such countries, our influence in the world would be minimal."
Recognising these factors, it becomes clear, Australia's position both at home and abroad is increasingly compromised, particularly if the very principles and the bedrock of our democracy is under threat – we must remember that the values which permeate every democratic nation give us unique advantages over authoritarian regimes and are worth preserving.
Australia's increasingly precarious position
Gyngell is quick to cite a procession of Australian prime ministers who have strongly pushed for greater acceptance of China's economic and geo-strategic ambitions, in particular, he references former prime minister Malcolm Turnbull, saying: "China will play a larger role in shaping the region. It is natural that Beijing will seek strategic influence to match its economic weight, but we want to see China build a leadership role it desires in a way which strengthens the regional order that has served us all so well."
What this approach fails to recognise is that it in someway legitimises China's grievances and territorial ambitions by focusing solely on the economic factor within the broader equation – this naive and myopic view is incredibly dangerous for Australia, particularly as its economic position becomes more dire.
This is something that Gyngell presents clearly, "We can’t know whether China will continue to grow or if deep social and economic problems lie ahead. But our uncertainty doesn’t change the fact there is no Australian future – sunlit or shadowed – in which China will not be central. We can’t engage blindly, without considering the risks and consequences.
"We need to be calm in the face of some of the hyperventilation and wilder claims about China. The PRC has become more authoritarian and hostile to dissent in recent years, but it is not the Orwellian dystopia portrayed in some Western commentary. Beijing is not taking over the developing world through debt-trap diplomacy. Its influence in the south Pacific is growing, but it is not supplanting Australian aid," Gyngell articulated.
Each of these points presents a unique challenge for what Gyngell describes as a declining Australia: "The US is not the only country whose relative power is slipping. In the early 1990s the Australian economy was larger than those of all the other countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations combined. By some measures, Indonesia’s economy alone is now nearly three times the size of Australia’s. That doesn’t mean absolute decline, but it does mean we will have to work harder to assert our national influence.
"The comforting familiarity of the post-World War II era has ended and the strangeness of our international environment, including China’s centrality, is here to stay. Learning how to adjust to the strangeness and operate effectively within it is this generation’s great national test."
Your thoughts
The nation is defined by its relationship with the region, with access to the growing economies and to strategic sea-lines-of-communication supporting over 90 per cent of global trade, a result of the cost-effective and reliable nature of sea transport.
Indo-Pacific Asia is at the epicentre of the global maritime trade, with about US$5 trillion worth of trade flowing through the South China Sea and the strategic waterways and chokepoints of south-east Asia annually.
For Australia, a nation defined by this relationship with traditionally larger, yet economically weaker regional neighbours, the growing economic prosperity of the region and corresponding arms build-up, combined with ancient and more recent enmities, competing geopolitical, economic and strategic interests, places the nation at the centre of the 21st century's 'great game'.
Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability serves not only as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia.
Shifting the public discussion away from the default Australian position of "it is all a little too difficult, so let’s not bother" will yield unprecedented economic, diplomatic, political and strategic opportunities for the nation.
Australia is consistently told that as a nation we are torn between our economic relationship with China and the long-standing strategic partnership with the US, placing the country at the epicentre of a great power rivalry – but what if it didn’t have to be that way?
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia's future role and position in the Indo-Pacific and what you would like to see from Australia's political leaders in terms of shaking up the nation's approach to our regional partners, and the avenues Australia should pursue to support long-term economic growth and development in support of national security in the comments section below, or get in touch with
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
