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Australia has long been torn between defining its own interests and security agenda and that of larger, ‘great’ and ‘powerful’ friends like the British Empire and the US – now, as the nation seeks to continue its avoidance pattern, we’re on the hunt for new ‘great’ and ‘powerful’ benefactors.
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Australia as both a continent and a nation is unique in its position, enjoying relative geographic isolation from the flashpoints of global and regional conflagration of the 20th century.
Blessed with unrivalled resource wealth and industrial potential, the nation has been able to embrace vastly different approaches to the nation’s strategic role and responsibilities.
The nation’s history of strategic policy has evolved a great deal since the end of the Second World War – when the nation was once directly engaged in regional strategic and security affairs, actively deterring aggression and hostility in Malaya during the Konfrontasi and communist aggression in Korea and Vietnam as part of the “Forward Defence” policy.
However, growing domestic political changes following Vietnam saw a dramatic shift in the nation’s defence policy and the rise of the “Defence of Australia” doctrine – this doctrine advocated for the retreat of Australia’s forward military presence in the Indo-Pacific and a focus on the defence of the Australian continent and its direct approaches.
This shift towards focusing on the direct defence of the Australian mainland dramatically altered the nation’s approach to intervention in subsequent regional security matters, significantly impacting the capacity of Australia to carry out concurrent stabilising operations throughout the region.
These included Australia’s intervention in East Timor and later, to a lesser extent, in the Solomon Islands and Fiji during the early to mid-2000s while the Australian Defence Force juggled concurrent, ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, exposing the limitations of the Vietnam-era doctrine and resulting force structure.
Each of these missions were further followed by subsequent ad-hoc humanitarian and disaster relief deployments throughout the region, each further stretching the ADF’s capacity to juggle multiple concurrent operations.
Further complicating the nation’s strategic capabilities is the evolution of modern warfare, with high-tempo, manoeuvre-based operations that leveraged the combined capabilities of air, sea, land and space forces to direct troops, equipment and firepower around the battlefield yielding to low-intensity humanitarian and peacekeeping operations in southern Europe and the south Pacific, and the eventual rise of asymmetrical, guerilla conflicts in the mountains of Afghanistan and streets of Iraq.
Adding further disruption to Australia’s post-Cold War strategic assessments, doctrine and force structure is the rise of China as a peer or near-peer competitor, combined with a resurgent Russia, recalcitrant Iran and myriad traditional and asymmetric challenges.
This is largely the result of the increasing proliferation of key power projection capabilities, including aircraft carriers and supporting strike groups, fifth-generation combat aircraft, modernised land forces, area-access denial and strategic nuclear forces.
These factors combined with growing political and financial influence of rising powers throughout the region is serving to shake up Australia’s way of thinking.
Identifying this, John West, adjunct professor at Tokyo's Sophia University, has sought to unpack Australia's culture of strategic dependence, in a piece for the Lowy Institute's Interpreter blog, titled, 'Australia, in search of great and powerful friends', in which he breaks down Australia's renewed courting of Indonesia.
As a launching point, West sets the scene of Australia's situation, stating, "Australia’s security and prosperity has always depended on powerful friends – from the United Kingdom for the first 150 years of European settlement to the United States since the Second World War."
Expanding on this, West explained the driving force behind Australia's growing uncertainty, building on the back of a rising China and the relative decline of the US, stating:
"Australia’s security environment has changed dramatically in recent years. Australia banked on a benign Beijing as a source of prosperity, and a strategy that seemed to have delivered a boon. However, reports of Chinese interference in Australian politics and society suggest that Beijing would like to use Australia’s economic dependence as a source of political leverage."
Calling all cars, looking for muscle
West is very clear in breaking down Australia's pursuit of a new great power benefactor, particularly as the nation pursues robust, economic, political and strategic partnerships with the likes of India and Indonesia.
"At one level, Australia’s courting of Indonesia could seem astonishing. Indonesia is a fragile democracy, with a poor human rights record. About 60 per cent of its population lives on less than $5.50 a day. It is not committed to open trade and investment. Islamist fundamentalism presents an ongoing challenge. And the two countries have long had a troubled relationship," he said.
"But Indonesia also has the world’s seventh largest economy in purchasing power parity terms, thanks to its enormous population of 264 million (Australia clocks in as the world’s 20th largest economy). In a matter of decades, Indonesia could have the world’s fourth largest economy. And of course, Indonesia is Australia’s largest near neighbour.
"So, the signing of the Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IA-CEPA) was the visit’s high point in Australia’s efforts to develop a real friendship with the increasingly powerful Indonesia."
While Australia's relationship with its large and increasingly powerful northern neighbour has been rocky, particularly following Australia's intervention in East Timor against the express wishes of Indonesia, the looming spectre of an increasingly assertive China has prompted a major realignment between the two nations.
Building on this, West is quick to highlight the growing relationship between Canberra and Delhi, one which has also drawn the attention of US President Donald Trump who has focused on building a robust, economic, political and strategic partnership with India to serve as a key counterbalance to the influence of China.
Australia's relationship with India is very much focused on reinforcing the aims of the US-India relationship: counterbalancing China.
"India has been everyone’s favourite. Two years ago, the government commissioned report, An India Economic Strategy to 2035, written by former top Australian diplomat Peter Varghese, identified 10 sectors in an evolving Indian market where Australia has competitive advantages. It also focused on 10 states, especially those five states which produce about 70 per cent of India’s exports," West states.
Nevertheless, he remains cautiously optimistic about the Australia-US relationship, but stops short of calling for a greater response and commitment from the Australian government when it comes to taking charge of its own destiny, something that continues to hinder long-term policy making.
"Australia faces a daunting task to court more powerful friends, be it Indonesia or India, yet the public must be willing to persevere for the sake of future security and prosperity. At the same time, Australia should not give up on the US. Future US presidents may see greater value in its long-standing allies," West said.
"Just as Australia must find a way to work more effectively with China. Already, Australia has the most China-dependent economy out of the G20 group – and it is difficult to foresee an Australian future in which China does not play a major role."
Calls for a more 'mature approach' to the Australia-China relationship
Former prime minister Kevin Rudd has drawn both praise in condemnation in recent weeks calling for the nation to take on what he calls a "mature approach" to the China-Australia relationship with a focus on tipping the bilateral relationship and Australia's capacity to influence the direction in Australia's favour.
"Australia needs a more mature approach to managing the complexity of the relationship than having politicians out-competing one another on who can sound the most hairy-chested on China," Rudd explained.
Rudd's focus on this 'mature conversation' includes growing Australia's population to serve as both an increase in the economic potential of the nation and as a strategic deterrent to potential future aggression by an increasingly assertive and often recalcitrant Chinese regime with its own economic, political and strategic ambitions for the Indo-Pacific.
This is best summarised by what Rudd describes as "a big and sustainable Australia of the type I advocated while I was in office".
"Only a country with a population of 50 million later this century would begin to have the capacity to fund the military, security and intelligence assets necessary to defend our territorial integrity and political sovereignty long term. This is not politically correct. But it’s yet another uncomfortable truth," he added.
While the population point is an important component of Rudd's thesis, his focus on a mature debate also calls for the nation to shake its economic dependence on China, looking more broadly to other potential partners in the region, Europe and Africa as a means of limiting the potential for foreign influence.
"We have become too China-dependent. We need to diversify further to Japan, India, Indonesia, Europe and Africa – the next continent with a rising middle class with more than a billion consumers. We must equally diversify our economy itself," Rudd explained.
He encapsulates and distills the premise of each of the aforementioned experts, saying, "Australia must also look to mid-century when we may increasingly have to stand to our own two feet, with or without the support of a major external ally."
Your thoughts
Australia's position and responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific region will depend on the nation's ability to sustain itself economically, strategically and politically.
Despite the nation's virtually unrivalled wealth of natural resources, agricultural and industrial potential, there is a lack of a cohesive national security strategy integrating the development of individual, yet complementary public policy strategies to support a more robust Australian role in the region.
Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability, serves as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia.
Shifting the public discussion away from the default Australian position of "it is all a little too difficult, so let’s not bother" will provide unprecedented economic, diplomatic, political and strategic opportunities for the nation.
Rear Admiral Kevin Scarce also issued a challenge for Australia's political and strategic policy leaders, saying:
"If we observe that the level of debate among our leaders is characterised by mud-slinging, obfuscation and the deliberate misrepresentation of the views of others, why would the community behave differently ... Our failure to do so will leave a very damaging legacy for future generations."
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia's future role and position in the Indo-Pacific and what you would like to see from Australia's political leaders in terms of shaking up the nation's approach to our regional partners.
We would also like to hear your thoughts on the avenues Australia should pursue to support long-term development in support of national security in the comments section below, or get in touch with
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
