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Marcus Hellyer, ASPI’s defence economist and capability specialist, has kicked off the latest round of conversations about developing a credible Australian deterrence and long-range strike capability to support Australia’s long-term security.
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Deterrence theory is as old as warfare and international relations, while the methods have changed throughout history, the concept and doctrine remains constant, albeit, significantly more lethal.
Contemporary deterrence is best broken down into two distinct concepts as identified by US academic Paul Huth in his journal article 'Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates', which states that a policy of deterrence can fit into two, distinct categories, namely:
- Direct deterrence: Preventing an armed attack against a state's own territory; and
- Extended deterrence: Preventing an armed attack against another state.
The advent of nuclear weapons and strategic force multiplier platforms like aircraft carriers, ballistic missile and attack submarines and long-range strategic bomber aircraft, supported by air-to-air refuelling capabilities, fundamentally rewrote the rules of deterrence capabilities.
Australia has enjoyed the benefits of extended deterrence provided by the global reach and capability of the US since the end of the Second World War and, in particular, following the end of Vietnam and the nation's shift towards a policy of continental defence.
However, the changing geo-political, strategic and economic reality of the Indo-Pacific and the emergence of peer and near-peer competitors across the region has served to undermine the qualitative and quantitative edge long enjoyed by the US and allies like the UK, Australia and Japan.
For Australia in particular, the introduction of the 'Defence of Australia' doctrine directly impacted the force structure and platform acquisition of the Australian Defence Force, as defending the nation's northern approaches and the vaunted 'sea-air gap' became paramount in the minds of strategic and political leaders alike.
"Until the late 1960s, Australian defence planning and policy assumed that our forces would normally operate in conjunction with allies, and well forward of the continent. We saw our security inextricably linked with the security of others," author of the 1986 Dibb report, Paul Dibb explains.
This doctrine advocated for the retreat of Australia’s forward military presence in the Indo-Pacific and a focus on the defence of the Australian continent and its direct approaches effectively limited the nation's capacity to act as an offshore balancer.
Only a dead fish goes with the flow
Many would rightfully argue that following the relative decline and eventual collapse of the Soviet Union and the beginning of American hegemony throughout the world, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, this was a prudent step as Australia positioned itself as a key benefactor of the American peace, with minor constabulary responsibilities.
This shift towards focusing on the direct defence of the Australian mainland dramatically altered the nation’s approach to intervention in subsequent regional security matters. These included Australia’s intervention in East Timor and later, to a lesser extent, in the Solomon Islands and Fiji during the early to mid-2000s.
Each of these missions were further followed by subsequent humanitarian and disaster relief deployments throughout the region, each stretching the Australian Defence Force’s capacity to juggle multiple concurrent operations.
However, the rise of China as a peer or near-peer competitor, driven by an unprecedented economic miracle and corresponding military build-up and overt pursuit of its territorial ambitions, coupled with the relative decline of the US as a reliable tactical and strategic benefactor, has caught many Indo-Pacific nations off guard.
The changing dynamics of the Indo-Pacific, namely on the back of increasing Chinese assertiveness, has drawn extensive commentary from across Australia’s political and strategic policy-making community.
Recognising this, Marcus Hellyer, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute's (ASPI) senior analyst for defence economics and capability, has launched a series of analysis articles, beginning with 'Deterrence and long-range strike capability for Australia', in which he begins to debate the options available to Australia.
Hellyer's core driving force behind the radical shift in thinking is the fact that "we could no longer take American military primacy for granted".
This has been echoed by colleagues like Hugh White, who has called for Australia to plan for the worst, stating: "We cannot use such allies as a basis for our strategic posture and force planning. That is why I argue that we should plan to defend Australia alone. This might come as a surprise in view of the much-hyped network of defence partnerships we have built up over the past few decades."
Framing the conversation
Much of the debate surrounding the development of a credible long-range strategic strike capability, as formally operated by the Australian Defence Force in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, has been dominated by sceptics and pessimists, who albeit rightly point out that any such capability would expose Australia to unprecedented reprisal, should the capability be used in an offensive manner.
"To paraphrase the sceptics, having a strike capability is pointless, and in fact self-destructive, because any conventional strike on a major-power adversary’s homeland would inflict minimal damage and be repaid 10 times over," Hellyer explained.
"It’s a fair point, and one that I considered so obvious I hadn’t discussed it. I’m not saying we should get a long-range strike capability to bomb a major-power adversary’s homeland."
In recognising this, Hellyer seeks to dodge the reductionist, defeatist dialogue that has long dominated much of Australia's strategic debate since the introduction of the Dibb report to frame the conversation and capabilities up for consideration.
Hellyer also seeks to expand upon the definition of contemporary deterrence theory as explained by Paul Huth to explain two forms of deterrence, stating:
"The two primary forms of deterrence are deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment. The former seeks to deter by increasing the difficulty of the adversary’s achieving their goals to the point that they regard the risk and investment of resources necessary to not be worth the cost. The latter seeks to deter by imposing penalties. Those penalties could be nuclear, but they could take other forms, such as economic reprisals."
Based on these factors, Hellyer plans to take a deeper look at the impact of such deterrence capabilities on Australia's deterrence capabilities and how it may impact the long-term force structure and acquisition plans of the ADF.
Your thoughts
In the years following the end of the Second World War, long-range air power in the form of the Canberra and later the F-111 bombers served as critical components in the nation's air power arsenal.
Australia's fleet of Oberon, followed by Collins Class submarines have also served as a powerful strategic deterrence capability while Australia has been able to ensure qualitative edges over potential adversaries, however, the economic growth and commitment by Australia's neighbours mean that the nation's qualitative-edge is deminishing.
Additionally, the increasing power of cyber warfare and asymmetric capabilities will play an important role in evaluating, defining and developing a robust, multi-domain strategic deterrence capability for Australia.
The long-range tactical and strategic deterrence capabilities of such platforms, combined with the qualitative edge of Australian personnel and technological advantages of these platforms, ensured Australia unrestricted regional dominance against all but the largest peer competitors.
The rapidly evolving regional environment requires a renewed focus on developing a credible, future-proofed long-range strike capability for the RAAF and RAN to serve as critical components in the development of a truly 'joint force' Australian Defence Force capable of supporting and enhancing the nation's strategic engagement and relationships in the region.
For Australia, a nation defined by this relationship with traditionally larger, yet economically weaker regional neighbours, the growing economic prosperity of the region and corresponding arms build-up, combined with ancient and more recent enmities, competing geopolitical, economic and strategic interests, places the nation at the centre of the 21st century's 'great game'.
Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability serves as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia.
Rear Admiral Kevin Scarce also issued a challenge for Australia's political and strategic policy leaders, saying:
"If we observe that the level of debate among our leaders is characterised by mud-slinging, obfuscation and the deliberate misrepresentation of the views of others, why would the community behave differently ... Our failure to do so will leave a very damaging legacy for future generations."
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia's future role and position in the Indo-Pacific and what you would like to see from Australia's political leaders in terms of shaking up the nation's approach to our regional partners.
We would also like to hear your thoughts on the avenues Australia should pursue to support long-term economic growth and development in support of national security in the comments section below, or get in touch with
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
