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It is something that Australia and other allies have taken for granted – the undisputed primacy of the US and its capacity to throw its military prowess and presence around with impunity – however, the rise of peer and near-peer competitors committed to undermining the US-led global order means that is at an end, something US analyst David Ignatius finds concerning.
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Hubris is defined by Merriam-Websters as an "exaggerated pride or self-confidence" and, unfortunately nowhere is it more evident in contemporary public and strategic policy circles than in the assessment and analysis of America's post-Cold War tactical and strategic dominance.
This dominance has served as the underpinning for Australia's political, diplomatic, economic and strategic policy since the end of Vietnam, when the nation shrunk away from south-east Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific, deferring to the regional designs of Washington.
While this approach was largely tenable during the late-Cold War and into the early-to-mid 2010s, this lazy approach is now a case of the gift that keeps on giving, as the Australian dependence upon a declining US, exhausted from global security responsibilities and decades of conflict in the Middle East, echoes the nation's dependence upon the declining British Empire in the inter-war years.
Australia is unlike virtually every other developed nation, it has enjoyed a record near three decades of economic prosperity and stability, buoyed by the immense mineral and resource wealth of the landmass and the benevolence of the post-Second World War political, economic and strategic order.
However, across the Indo-Pacific, competing economic, political and strategic interests, designs and ambitions are beginning to clash, flying in contrast to the projections of many historians at the end of the Cold War – further compounding these issues is the continued instability caused by the coronavirus and concerns about ecological collapse.
Driven by an unprecedented economic transformation, propelling once developing nations onto the world stage, the region, the globe and its established powers are having to adjust to a dramatically different global power paradigm – one committed to undermining and influencing the fabric of Australian and Western democracies.
The outbreak of COVID-19 has only served to further hasten the economic decline, stagnation and political malaise experienced throughout the developed world, whether in Europe or North America, once-powerful, world-leading nations are beginning to feel the pressure.
Further compounding the impact of the now global pandemic is the era of increasing nation-state competition, driven largely by the great power competition between the US and China and the subsequent impact on nations.
Traditional nation-state competition is not the only national security challenge, as global and domestic economic headwinds, non-state actors and asymmetric challenges, including transnational criminal organisation and violent extremists, all serve as equal yet disparate challenges within the traditional rubric of national security.
Australia is not isolated from the impact of these factors, as was witnessed during the summer bushfires and more recently with the economic, political and societal impact of the coronavirus as it rapidly approaches global pandemic status, placing increased pressure on the security of nations and global supply chains around the world.
Adding further fuel to the fire, US analyst David Ignatius has penned a piece for The Washington Post titled 'Think we have military primacy over China? Think again', in which he moves to dispel the myth of unencumbered and unrivalled American primacy, particularly in an era of committed great power rivals, namely the People's Republic of China.
A 'perfect record': "We lost every single time"
That is not something that one typically associates with the prowess of America's armed forces, long touted as the most fearsome fighting force in human history, no nation on earth has the capacity to enforce its will unilaterally in such ways, however, it appears that cracks are appearing in this capacity, spelling trouble for the Indo-Pacific's geo-strategic balance of power and the regional security paradigm Australia is dependent upon.
Quoting Christian Brose, former staff director of the Senate armed services committee and a close adviser to late senator John McCain, Ignatius outlines a worrying position for America's forward-deployed infrastructure and capabilities in the Indo-Pacific, spelling a major concern for Australia's strategic underpinning:
"Our spy and communications satellites would immediately be disabled; our forward bases in Guam and Japan would be 'inundated' by precise missiles; our aircraft carriers would have to sail away from China to escape attack; our F-35 fighter jets couldn’t reach their targets because the refuelling tankers they need would be shot down.
"We have become so vulnerable, he argues because we’ve lost sight of the essential requirement of military power — the 'kill chain' of his title — which means seeing threats and taking quick, decisive action to stop them."
Expanding on this, Ignatius issues an important challenge: "We should reflect on America’s vulnerability now, when the world is on lockdown and we have a chance to reassess. A new world will emerge after the global coronavirus pandemic, one in which China is clearly determined to challenge the United States as a global power. The propaganda wars over the origin of the novel virus that causes COVID-19 are just a warm-up for the tests that are ahead."
A key focus of this is recognising that while China's military isn't focused on power projection the way the US military is, rather it is focused on "preventing US domination". As students of history, Chinese strategic planners have learned the lessons of Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Gaddafi's Lybia and Assad's Syria.
"Rather than match our fleets of carriers and squadrons of jets around the world, Beijing developed precision weapons to prevent the United States from mobilising these forces. An example is the DF-21, the world’s first ballistic anti-ship missile," Ignatius states.
Challenges to innovation, force and platform agility
The costs associated with the research, development, acquisition and through-life sustainment of America's military platforms has long drawn the attention of both US and allied lawmakers, including in Australia as the cost-benefit analysis often leaves the outcome wanting.
For Ignatius, this, along with the combination of Congressional challenges to force structure, posture and platform review and modernisation, limits the ability of the US Military to credibly respond in a time sensitive, agile manner to the developments of peer competitor threats.
"The Pentagon wants to confront the Chinese challenge, but it insists on keeping the same vulnerable, wildly expensive platforms at the centre of the United States’ military power. And Congress demands adherence to this status quo," Ignatius explains.
"When then-Defense secretary Jim Mattis and then-Navy secretary Richard Spencer tried to retire an aircraft carrier in 2019, Congress refused. Expensive fighter jets have a lobby, too. As Brose notes: 'There is a reason why parts of the F-35 are built in every state in America ... It is political expediency'.
"When the Pentagon tries to innovate, it’s too hidebound to manoeuvre and adapt. A classic example is the Army’s $18 billion misadventure known as 'Future Combat Systems', which was supposed to co-ordinate modern weapons but turned out to be less agile than a Sony PlayStation."
Expanding on this, both Ignatius and Brose articulate potential alternatives for consideration, with Ignatius stating: "Rather than building weapons for an outmoded strategy of projecting power, we should instead be arming ourselves in an effort to 'deny China military dominance'. That means many cheap, autonomous weapons at the edge of the perimeter, rather than a few exquisite ones that are vulnerable to attack.
"These smart systems exist: The Air Force’s unmanned XQ-58A, known as the 'Valkyrie', is nearly as capable as a fighter but costs about 45 times less than an F-35; the Navy’s Extra-Large Unmanned Underwater Vehicle, known as the 'Orca', is 300 times less costly than a $3.2 billion Virginia Class attack submarine. But these robots don’t have a lobby to rival the giant defence contractors."
Each of these challenges pose important questions for consideration and response from Australia's own public and strategic policy leaders, particularly as the qualitative gap between America and China continues to close.
Your thoughts
Australia’s position and responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific region will depend on the nation’s ability to sustain itself economically, strategically and politically.
Despite the nation’s virtually unrivalled wealth of natural resources, agricultural and industrial potential, there is a lack of a cohesive national security strategy integrating the development of individual yet complementary public policy strategies to support a more robust Australian role in the region.
Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability serves as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia.
However, as events continue to unfold throughout the region and China continues to throw its economic, political and strategic weight around, can Australia afford to remain a secondary power or does it need to embrace a larger, more independent role in an era of increasing great power competition?
Further complicating the nation’s calculations is the declining diversity of the national economy, the ever-present challenge of climate change impacting droughts, bushfires and floods, Australia’s energy security and the infrastructure needed to ensure national resilience.
Let us know your thoughts and ideas about the development of a holistic national security strategy and the role of a minister for national security to co-ordinate the nation’s response to mounting pressure from nation-state and asymmetric challenges in the comments section below, or get in touch with
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
