Australia must have maritime security control to meet threats against northern trade corridors

A force may be unable to claim enduring control of a theatre, yet still be able to protect a corridor, move a submarine, escort shipping, sustain a task group or secure critical undersea infrastructure for a particular time and purpose.

Equally, a force may field impressive platforms but lack the environmental understanding, information resilience, decision speed or logistical depth to employ them with confidence.

The more practical question is therefore not simply: Do we have sea control? It is: What access can Australia assure, for which mission, in which area, for how long, and at what level of risk?

This is the foundation of assured ocean access: the ability to create, sustain and adapt sufficient freedom of manoeuvre and action in, on and through the maritime environment for designated forces and missions, at acceptable risk, despite contest, uncertainty and disruption.

It is not an argument against ships, submarines, aircraft or weapons. Australia requires capable platforms and credible combat power. But platforms are only instruments. Their effectiveness depends on the system around them: hydrographic and oceanographic knowledge, sensors, networks, intelligence, data fusion, trained people, operational authorities, sustainment, infrastructure and decision making.

The Russia–Ukraine war demonstrates why this distinction matters. Ukraine did not need conventional fleet parity with Russia to change the maritime balance in the Black Sea. It combined coastal defence, intelligence, long-range strike, uncrewed surface systems, deception and pressure against bases and logistics. The result was not theatre-wide sea control but a significant reduction in Russia’s freedom of action and the restoration of commercially meaningful access from Ukrainian ports.

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The lesson is not that autonomous vessels replace navies. It is that maritime advantage increasingly derives from the ability to understand, decide and adapt faster than an adversary.

The same lesson is evident in the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz. Missiles, mines, drones, proxy forces, cyber activity, electronic warfare and political signalling can impose costs on commercial movement without an adversary needing to defeat a fleet in a traditional battle. Powerful navies can protect individual ships and strike threats ashore yet still struggle to restore the confidence required for free commercial passage.

For Australia, this is not an abstract issue. Our strategic geography is dominated by long sea lines of communication and northern approaches that lead into the crowded, shallow and environmentally complex archipelago to our north. These are waters in which military, commercial, legal and political risks overlap. They are also waters where a shortage of environmental knowledge can be as consequential as a shortage of weapons.

A mine threat, a suspected submarine, an uncrewed underwater vehicle, damage to a cable, or an uncertain seabed feature should not automatically force a pause while separate specialist communities are assembled and tasked in sequence. Mine countermeasures, anti-submarine warfare, hydrography, oceanography, route survey and protection of critical undersea infrastructure should increasingly be treated as contributors to a common access problem.

Their shared purpose is to answer a commander’s practical question: where can forces safely move, operate and sustain themselves now, and how will that assessment change in the next hour, day or week?

This changes the logic of force design. Rather than beginning with the platform – what ship, aircraft, sensor or autonomous system should be acquired – Defence should begin with the access effect required. What operational risk threatens that effect? What information would reduce the uncertainty? What decisions must be made at speed? Which combination of crewed and uncrewed systems, data, people and sustainment can deliver a dependable service?

That last point matters. The future maritime force will be hybrid, but not because autonomous systems are fashionable. Uncrewed systems can widen surveillance, extend persistence and reduce risk to personnel. Their strategic value arises only when they are integrated with crewed forces, resilient communications, protected data, recovery arrangements, sustainment and sound command judgement. A sensor that cannot pass its information securely, an autonomous vehicle that cannot be recovered or maintained, or a data feed that cannot be trusted in a contested environment does not create assured access. It creates another vulnerability.

Assured ocean access should therefore be seen as an integrating construct for Australian maritime strategy. It links sovereign hydrographic knowledge, undersea warfare, maritime domain awareness, critical-infrastructure security, industry capacity and coalition interoperability.

The objective is not perfect knowledge of every part of the ocean.

That is unattainable.

The objective is to generate enough trusted understanding, quickly enough, to enable action at acceptable risk and to sustain that ability when an adversary is trying to disrupt it.

In the contested Indo-Pacific, the advantage will not belong automatically to the force with the most impressive platforms.

It will belong to the force that can turn information into operational freedom: repeatedly, credibly and when it matters most.

Stewart Dunne, a former hydrographer with the Australian Defence Force and current Naval Reserve commodore, is a founder and director of AusPac Hydrospatial and a non-executive director and strategic adviser at Proteus Maritime.