A strong industrial base is the foundation of Australia’s defence resilience

Naval
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By: Joshua Cowell
Able Seaman Marine Technician Connor Pickens conducts welding in the chippy’s workshop as HMAS Sydney is deployed on a regional presence deployment. Photo: LSIS Daniel Goodman

Australia has the opportunity to strengthen its defence resilience by developing the industrial capacity, skills and infrastructure required to sustain, repair, replace and adapt critical capabilities when they are needed most.

Australia has the opportunity to strengthen its defence resilience by developing the industrial capacity, skills and infrastructure required to sustain, repair, replace and adapt critical capabilities when they are needed most.

Australia’s defence debate is rightly focused on deterrence, capability, and a deteriorating strategic environment. The harder test is whether the nation can sustain what it acquires, repair what is damaged, replace what is expended, and adapt what becomes vulnerable under pressure.

That capacity cannot be improvised during a crisis. It depends on an industrial base, skilled workforce, resilient supply chains, and institutional habits built over years through consistent demand, disciplined investment, and clear accountability.

 
 

The 2026 National Defence Strategy reinforces National Defence as a coordinated whole-of-government and whole-of-nation approach, underpinned by greater self-reliance, a resilient sovereign defence industrial base, innovation, secure supply chains and a skilled national workforce. Recent policy settings have moved in the right direction. The challenge now is translating this strategic intent into practical capacity that can be sustained and scaled when required.

Mobilisation Starts Before War

Ukraine’s defence against Russia’s invasion is not a template for Australia, but it instead offers a powerful warning about the consequences of entering conflict without sufficient depth. Ukraine’s experience demonstrates both the value and the limits of improvisation when people, stockpiles, infrastructure, and industrial output come under sustained pressure.

Retired Australian Major General Mick Ryan AM has argued that national mobilisation, allied burden-sharing, rapid adaptation, leadership, and workforce resilience are among the key lessons military institutions should draw from Ukraine. He has also cautioned that these lessons must be adapted to the Indo-Pacific rather than adopted wholesale. That distinction matters. Australia should focus on building the institutions, skills, industrial capacity, and partnerships needed to adapt under pressure.

Industrial Capacity is an Ecosystem

Discussion about mobilisation often narrows to missiles and ammunition. Both are essential, but industrial resilience extends far beyond production volume. It includes qualified suppliers, engineering authorities, testing and certification pathways, secure digital systems, repair facilities, protected energy and communications networks, transport capacity, access to intellectual property, and a workforce capable of moving between design, manufacture, and sustainment.

Modern conflict also rewards close collaboration between operators, engineers, manufacturers, and decisionmakers. Ukraine’s rapid adaptation of uncrewed systems highlights the value of distributed repair networks, rapid modification, and strong links between frontline users and industry. For Australia, the implication is not to simply acquire more drones. We must develop acquisition, assurance, and sustainment systems that support continuous modernisation.

Guided weapons and explosive ordnance illustrate this point. A production facility delivers limited strategic value if critical inputs cannot be sourced, skilled workers cannot be surged, designs cannot be modified, or testing and assurance processes become bottlenecks. Governments, Defence organisations, and industry must therefore assess mobilisation capacity across entire value chains and against realistic disruption scenarios.

People are the Decisive Constraint

Platforms and factories do not mobilise themselves. Behind every ship, aircraft, sensor, weapon, and digital system are apprentices, tradespeople, engineers, technicians, logisticians, cyber specialists, and program managers whose expertise takes years to develop.

Defence industry competes with the resources, energy, infrastructure, construction, and technology sectors for many of these skills. Assuming labour will simply appear during a crisis is not a strategy. Australia needs long-term investment in apprenticeships, vocational education, STEM pathways, university partnerships, and specialist training, supported by a dependable pipeline of work.

Australia Must Translate, Not Imitate

Direct comparisons between Ukraine and Australia can be misleading. Ukraine is fighting a continental war across a shared land border and receives extensive support through European land lines of communication. Australia faces a fundamentally different strategic environment. Any major Indo-Pacific conflict would be maritime in nature, characterised by vast distances, contested sea and air routes, and partner nations making difficult decisions about access, alignment, and support. Access to our region cannot be assumed.

These differences shape Australia’s priorities. Greater attention must be given to ports, fuel supplies, shipping, undersea infrastructure, northern logistics, air and missile defence, cyber resilience, repair capacity, and the ability to sustain dispersed operations. Planning must also account for the possibility that allied production and transport networks are under simultaneous strain.

The maritime campaign in the Black Sea nevertheless offers valuable insights into adaptation and asymmetric sea denial. Ukraine has demonstrated how innovative tactics and emerging technologies can impose costs on a larger and more powerful adversary. The task for Australia is to identify the underlying lessons, assess their relevance to the Indo-Pacific, and apply them to Australian circumstances with urgency.

Confidence and Accountability Matter

Industry will not maintain mobilisation capacity on aspiration alone. It requires credible demand, consistent policy, realistic schedules, and an investable pipeline of work. Where markets alone will not preserve capabilities important to national security, targeted co-investment, strategic reserves, shared infrastructure, or minimum production arrangements may be justified. These measures should be linked to measurable readiness outcomes and assessed against clear fiscal, workforce, and opportunity-cost trade-offs.

The 2024-2025 Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) report titled Maximising Australian Industry Participation through Defence Contracting, found shortcomings in Defence’s implementation and administration of industry participation requirements. Defence accepted all nine recommendations aimed at strengthening governance, assurance, and reporting. These findings demonstrate that policy strengthens resilience only when requirements are embedded in contracts, performance is measured, and decisionmakers are held accountable.

The same principle applies across mobilisation. Policy intent matters only when it shapes doctrine, training, acquisition, contracting, institutional behaviour, and industrial outcomes. A useful test for every major capability is whether Australia can operate, maintain, modify, repair, and replenish it during prolonged disruption. Value for money must account not only for acquisition costs, but also for availability, supply security, adaptability, and the strategic consequences of losing access when it matters most.

A Partnership with Clear Responsibilities

Mobilisation cannot rest with a single institution, nor can it be reduced to a critique of any one government. Government must set priorities, align national policy, and provide confidence for investment. Defence must define operational requirements, engage industry early, and make timely decisions. Industry must invest, deliver reliably, manage risk honestly, and develop the workforce, facilities, and suppliers needed for preparedness. States, territories, universities, unions, and infrastructure operators also have important roles that should be defined before a crisis emerges.

Trusted international partners remain indispensable. Sovereign resilience should not be confused with self-sufficiency. Australia will be stronger when domestic capability is integrated with allied technology, production, repair, and sustainment networks. Partnership, however, is most credible when Australia contributes meaningful capability and understands where shared systems may be vulnerable.

Preparedness Before Crisis

Australia’s security will continue to depend on capable armed forces, strong alliances, and effective diplomacy. Those foundations become more credible when supported by an industrial base capable of sustaining today’s force and adapting to tomorrow’s demands.

National preparedness is measured not only by the capabilities Australia possesses today, but also by how quickly the nation can repair, replace, modify, and generate capability when circumstances change. Effective mobilisation is built through sustained investment in people, industry, infrastructure, innovation, and partnerships, then tested through exercises that expose weaknesses while there is still time to address them.

National resilience cannot be created on demand. If Australia is serious about deterrence, resilience, and readiness, industrial mobilisation can no longer sit at the margins of defence policy. It must become a national capability, deliberately built, regularly exercised, and ready before it is needed.

***Joshua Cowell is Business Development Manager for Navantia Australia.***

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