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Following much anticipation we now have our first National Defence Strategy and supporting Integrated Investment Program, but what exactly is in and what is out as the Government focuses on "reprioratisations" to accelerate capability acquisition and most importantly, have we got the balance right?
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There was much fanfare surrounding the release of the nation's first National Defence Strategy (NDS) and supporting Integrated Investment Program (IIP), with it seeming like the Government outlining an ambitious new plan and direction for the Australian Defence Force.
The Government's emphasis on the concept of "whole-of-nation national defence" is indeed a welcome change at a time when the world is becoming increasingly dangerous and unpredictable, particularly with revisionist powers on the march in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific.
As part of this broader pivot toward "whole-of-nation national defence" the Government has also formally reinforced the recognition that Australia no-longer enjoys a decade-long warning time as first promoted in the The Defence of Australia: 1987 Defence White Paper forcing a major rethink about how the nation develops and acquires defence capability.
Highlighting this shift, Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister, Richard Marles used the announcement of both the NDS and IIP to reveal the Government's emphasis on reprioritisation to enhance Australia's defence capability, stating, "The 2024 Integrated Investment Program is a complete rebuild of the Integrated Investment Programs of the past. While it contains more money, it also required the reprioritisation of $22.5 billion over the next four years and $72.8 billion over the decade."
But what is exactly a "reprioritisation" and what is actually being "cut" to deliver the capabilities Australia needs to defend itself in the immediate timeframe and develop a future proofed defence capability capable of delivering "impactful projection" and shaping, deterring and responding to the shifting sands of the Indo-Pacific?
Fair warning, I am going to do my best to balance as much detail while being high-level to ensure the content is covered, in saying that I am sure I will miss something, it isn't an intentional oversight, rather it is a necessary cost of ensuring the timeliness of the content.
Accordingly, this will be covered over the course of a number of pieces to ensure that I am as thorough as possible, beginning with the Australian Army.
Army's amphibious shift and long-range strike mission - reprioritisations and cuts
The 2023 Defence Strategic Review the Government's foundational document responsible for informing both the subsequent National Defence Strategy and supporting Integrated Investment Program outlined a major shift in the structure, role and responsibility of the Australian Army.
This evolution would see the Australian Army fundamentally reshaped into a force optimised for littoral amphibious operations and, interestingly, "long-range strike" through the acquisition of new platforms like the HIMARS system.
As part of this, the 2024 Integrated Investment Program states that Army will receive investments of between $36-44 billion over the next decade that are designed to "enable Army to rapidly transform in response to Australia’s changing strategic circumstances", this contrasts to the the $55 billion earmarked for land capabilities in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update and 2020 Force Structure Plan.
In order to deliver the "new plan", Army will face the extensive scaling back of the Army's planned 450 Redback Infantry Fighting Vehicles to 129 (originally worth between $18-27 billion, now worth $5-7 billion resulting in a reduction of between $11-20 billion) and the second regiment of 30 Huntsman self-propelled howitzers as part of LAND 8116 Phase 2 worth an estimated $1.5-2.3 billion in 2020.
The 2024 IIP articulates this shift, stating, "Army will have the capability to hold potential adversary forces at risk, control key strategic land positions, maintain persistent forward partnerships and protect and sustain deployed forces within Australia’s primary area of military interest...To perform these critical tasks, Army’s structure will include specialised combat and support brigades, along with a new dedicated fires brigade and littoral manoeuvre group. Army will consolidate its aviation capability to reduce the cost of aircraft ownership and better generate capability."
Now fair enough, the rationale behind the shift toward an "amphibious capable, combined arms" land force makes sense given the geography of Australia's operating environment and the emphasis on enhancing the nation's capacity to deliver "impactful projection", but what else has been "reprioritised" and what has been "cut"?
The Government has been clear that most of the savings stemming from the reduction of the second regiment of Huntsman self-propelled howitzers (worth between $1.5-2.3 billion) will be reallocated to the acquisition of 42 HIMARS units, with $1.6 billion announced in August 2023 to "expand and accelerate this acquisition".
Army will also be the beneficiary of an "expanded" littoral manoeuvre capability, with Army to receive 18 medium landing craft and eight heavy landing craft, along with "up to 15 amphibious capable support vehicles" as defined in the 2024 Integrated Investment Program, although the $7-10 billion price tag is still sitting in the "Unapproved Planned Investment" category, with only $35 million currently approved between 2024-2034.
Army Aviation will also undergo a major recapitalisation with the replacement of the MRH-90 Taipan helicopters with the UH-60M Black Hawks (approved $3 billion investment with $1-1.5 billion still to be approved), the replacement of the ARH Tigers with the AH-64E Apache ($4.3 billion approved, with $100-150 million to be approved) and continued investment ($170 million approved, with $400-500 million to be approved) in the expanded fleet of the Army's CH-47F Chinook fleet.
But how does this compare to what has come previously, particularly the 2020 Defence Strategic Update and 2020 Force Structure Plan and their own foundational document, the 2016 Integrated Investment Program?
How does the 2024 NDS and IIP compare to previous incarnations?
Beginning at the top level, as I established earlier, the 2024 Integrated Investment Program states that Army is set to benefit from investments of between $36-44 billion over the next decade (to 2034). But it is important to recognise here that the $36-44 billion figure incorporates both the "approved" investment over the period of 2024/25-2033/34 and the "unapproved planned investment" for the same time period.
By comparison, the 2020 Defence Strategic Update and 2020 Force Structure Plan committed $55 billion for the nation's Army over the next decade (to 2030), while the 2016 Integrated Investment Program identifying approximately $35.1 billion worth of investment in Army capability over the decade (to 2016).
On sheer optics, the 2024 NDS and IIP sees a cut in the Army's acquisition plan when compared to both the 2020 DSU and 2020 FSP and the 2016 IIP. So perhaps it is more accurate to compare the "approved" spending for Army over period of 2024/25-2033/34 which amounts to $20 billion according to the 2024 IIP, again, a significant drop in funding when compared to previous incarnations of similar plans.
Equally important, we must now ask, what are we getting for that "approved" funding and how much of it is 'new'?
Well we have already established that Army's Infantry Fighting Vehicle fleet will be reduced by over 70 per cent of the original order as part of the "reprioratisation" of the Army's combat capability, what happens to that $11-20 billion saved remains to be seen.
While it would be reasonable to assume that some of that figure has been rolled into the $1.6 billion announced to accelerate and expand the acquisition of the Australian HIMARS fleet, it is clear that figure comes at the cost of the second self-propelled howitzer brigade (valued at $1.5-2.3 billion in 2020), which has been "reprioritised" to fund the accelerated and expanded HIMARS capability of which the initial order was identified in the 2016 IIP and the subsequently reinforced in the 2020 DSU and 2020 FSP respectively.
Ultimately, this leaves questions about the $11-20 billion saved as a result of the reduction in the numbers associated with the Redback IFV program. Now again playing devil's advocate, one could assume that at least part, if not all of that figure will be invested into the as yet "unapproved" funding for Army's new littoral manoeuvre vessels, but that isn't quite clear.
This is seemingly reinforced by Defence Industry Minister, Pat Conroy with ABC journalist, Greg Jennet on 17 April, where he says, "Another one is we're reducing the number of infantry fighting vehicles from 450 to 129 because we couldn't transport 450 to where we need to get them to ... And we're using that money to invest in Landing Craft and long‑range fire[s], so long‑range rocket batteries for the Australian Army. "
When it comes to "new" spending on capability for the Army, the picture only becomes more confusing when one considers that major Army recapitalisation programs, like the Hawkei and Bushmaster, the Boxer Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle, the M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams replacement, K9 Huntsman, as well as the UH-60M Black Hawk and AH-64E Apache acquisitions were approved and funded under the previous government.
Accordingly, save for the Huntsman and Redback program, those programs are continuing along at their planned pace with their previously budgeted funding and their planned acquisition time frames intact, so where's the beef?
Unfortunately, the 2023/24 Portfolio Budget Statements (PBS) and Portfolio Additional Estimates Statements (PAES) provide even less clarity, with it becoming clear that the only "new" capability Army is set to receive in the coming years is the additional HIMARS, with Army proceeding along with business as usual as originally identified first in the 2016 Integrated Investment Program and subsequently reinforced in each of the subsequent documents.
Final thoughts
Based on the aforementioned figures I am at a loss to see how the Australian Army is going to be a net beneficiary of the 2024 National Defence Strategy (NDS) and supporting Integrated Investment Program (IIP) and I will continue to struggle to see how it will continue to be a net beneficiary until we see the force structure plan which the NDS state will be ready "by 2026".
Equally, it seems that beyond the expanded HIMARS capability and to an extent the littoral manouvre vessel fleet and supporting infrastructure, Army as a force isn't materially changing from what was planned and envisaged in the 2016 Integrated Investment Program, 2020 Defence Strategic Update and 2020 Force Structure Plan.
If that is indeed the case (and I am more than happy to be proven wrong) Army as Australian policy makers' traditional first responders will lack the mass, resilience and attritionable materiel and manpower necessary to materially contribute to the concept of "impactful projection" or to adequately shape, deter and respond to the deteriorating geopolitical and strategic environment.
As I have said multiple times before, ultimately, Australia and Australians face these two concurrent yet interconnected challenges, which stand as the greatest challenges of our age, so which way, Australia?
Do we want to be competitive, consequential and thriving, or do we want to be “steady and sturdy” in our managed decline?
In the next part of this series, I will take a closer look at the Royal Australian Navy and the future as projected and outlined in the 2024 NDS and IIP and how it compares to previous incarnations of the Integrated Investment Program and respective Defence Strategic Updates and Force Structure Plans.
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
