Concerns over Chinese interest in Aussie infrastructure should raise alarms

As the Australian public settles into the 'new normal' of the post-COVID world, many Australian public policy thinkers and journalists have picked up on the growing groundswell of support within the community to chart a path towards establishing and maintaining true economic and strategic sovereignty in the era of disruption. 

In doing so it is becoming abundantly clear that Australia's 'new normal' will involve a level of great power competition and nation-state driven coercion not experienced even at the height of the Cold War, leaving many uncertain of how to respond. 

This malaise is particularly powerful as unlike many of its contemporary and comparable international neighbours, Australia has enjoyed a record near three decades of economic prosperity and stability, buoyed by the immense mineral and resource wealth of the landmass and the benevolence of the post-Second World War political, economic and strategic order.

As a result, both the public and government are relatively unaccustomed to the economic, political and strategic realities of mass social isolation, a comparatively mild form of rationing and what seems to be a relatively low, albeit tragic body count.

However, it isn’t all doom and gloom as the COVID-19 predicament seems to have shaken the Australian public’s confidence in the public policy status quo. 

Far from the "end of history" we were promised at the end of the Cold War by the likes of Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington, COVID-19 for many was not what they anticipated, at least not in the 21st century, causing a major reshuffle in the global power dynamics.

This is particularly the case following the near two decades of US-led Western attention on countering violent extremism in the Middle East, which has paved the way for the likes of Russia and China to quietly position themselves as credible rivals to the liberal-democratic, capitalist world order. 

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All of this comes at a time when the Australian public is being exposed to the rather concerning reality about the nation's national resilience, security and competitiveness in an increasingly isolated, less collaborative economic, political and strategic order. 

Please explain!? Why are state government's allowed to potentially undermine national security?

While much has been made of Victorian Premier Daniel Andrews' plan to sign Victoria up to Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), NSW is not to be outdone as it has been revealed that a Chinese owned company responsible for shipping Australian medical supplies back to China during the height of COVID-19 is close to securing tenders to construct pumped hydroelectricity generation facilities in the north of the state. 

It has been revealed by Clare Armstrong of The Daily Telegraph that the Beijing-linked Goldwind Australia is expected to be selected to build WaterNSW's Glennies Creek and Glenbawn Dam hydroelectricity projects in the NSW Hunter region at a time when Australian companies like AGL and Meridian dropped out of the race due to concerns about the commercial viability of the programs. 

This revelation has drawn the attention of Labor senator for NSW Deb O'Neill, who expressed these concerns to the Senate: "I am deeply, deeply troubled by these rumours and the prospect of a major utility with access to critical NSW energy assets owned and managed by a company with major ties to a foreign power.

"What is even more troubling to me is Goldwind’s desire to hide their ties with the ruling Chinese Party," Senator O'Neill added. 

It has been revealed that the projects will still need to be reviewed and approved by the Commonwealth's Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB). Despite this, it raises critical questions about the power of state and territory government's to make deals that have long-term national security and resilience implications. 

In response, Armstrong quotes a spokeswoman for the NSW Water Minister, Melinda Pavey, who resolutely stated that NSW would "remain the owner and operator of the dams".

Minister Pavey's spokersperson added, "WaterNSW is yet to finalise the tender process, however should it be required, oversight of matters involving foreign investment can be looked at the by the FIRB."

Building on this, it is believed that several Australian companies did not progress tenders as conditions imposed by WaterNSW made their involvement in the programs economically and financially unviable – raising the question, why the Chinese interest?   

An integrated response and the end result is ‘national security’ 

Australia has recently undergone a period of modernisation and expansion within its national security apparatus, from new white papers in Defence and Foreign Affairs through to well-articulated and resourced defence industrial capability plans, export strategies and the like in an attempt to position Australia well within the rapidly evolving geostrategic and political order of the Indo-Pacific. 

Each of the strategies in and of themselves serve critical and essential roles within the broader national security and national resilience debate. 

Additionally, the formation of organisations like the National Resilience Taskforce, state-based Energy Security Taskforces, and supporting organisations like Infrastructure Australia and broader government departments all serve to provide an intricate yet competing tapestry muddying the water and decision-making process for political and strategic leaders.

Each of these organs and constituencies in the form of state and territory governments have their own individual agendas and lobby accordingly for Commonwealth support and assistance, further complicating a national response, hindering both national security and national resilience in an age of traditional and asymmetric disruption. 

Air Vice-Marshal (Ret’d) John Blackburn AO explained the importance of a cohesive, integrated response to national resilience and by extension, national security: “We have our departments doing great work in their respective fields. We have organisations like the CSIRO doing great work in terms of the hydrogen economy, energy security and the like, but the problem is each of these organs is siloed. 

“One would expect that there would be a co-ordinating authority within the organs of government, which can support the development and implementation of a national resilience policy framework. Unfortunately, that isn’t the case, and we are seeing the affects of that today, so the only way to address this is with a co-ordinated, integrated response,” Blackburn explained to Defence Connect. 

The individual nature of the aforementioned respective strategies, combined with the competing interests of the respective portfolios and departments are further exacerbated by a lack of cohesive, co-ordinating authority managing the direction of the broader national interest and implementation of a resulting strategy.

It is important to recognise that this realisation does diminish the good work done by the respective ministers, assistant ministers and opposition representatives.

But recognising the limitations of siloed approaches to the increasingly holistic nature of national security in the 21st century requires a co-ordinated, cohesive effort to combine all facets of contemporary national security and national resilience policies into a single, cohesive strategy. 

In order to maximise the nation’s position, prosperity and security, is it time to introduce a role of a Minister for National Security or special envoy role to support the Prime Minister and respective ministers, both within the traditional confines of national security or national resilience like Defence and Foreign Affairs, to include infrastructure, energy, industry, health, agriculture and the like?  

Your thoughts

Australia’s position and responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific region will depend on the nation’s ability to sustain itself economically, strategically and politically.

Despite the nation’s virtually unrivalled wealth of natural resources, agricultural and industrial potential, there is a lack of a cohesive national security strategy integrating the development of individual yet complementary public policy strategies to support a more robust Australian role in the region.

Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability, serves as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia.

However, as events continue to unfold throughout the region and China continues to throw its economic, political and strategic weight around, can Australia afford to remain a secondary power or does it need to embrace a larger, more independent role in an era of increasing great power competition?

Further complicating the nation’s calculations is the declining diversity of the national economy, the ever-present challenge of climate change impacting droughts, bushfires and floods, Australia’s energy security and the infrastructure needed to ensure national resilience. 

Blackburn encapsulates the need for robust conversation with the Australian public perfectly, telling Defence Connect, "We need to have a serious conversation with the Australian public about the challenges we face as a nation – that includes climate change, it includes the fact that 90 per cent of our energy supplies are imported from overseas and our industry base is declining.

"This should be a key focus point for the government, but when you look at the government’s own national security site, it is focused on counterterrorism, countering violent extremism and de-radicalisation and the vulnerability of transport infrastructure to such actors. This is far too narrow a focus for a nation like Australia."

Let us know your thoughts and ideas about the development of a holistic national security strategy and the role of a minister for national security to co-ordinate the nation’s response to mounting pressure from nation-state and asymmetric challenges in the comments section below, or get in touch with This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..  

Stephen Kuper

Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.

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